

AJP-3

ALLIED JOINT OPERATIONS

September 2002

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

September 2002

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Jan H ERIKSEN
Rear Admiral, NONA
Director, NSA

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FOREWORD

- 0001 **General.** The nature of modern military operations demands that military forces operate as a team. This does not mean that all forces will be equally represented in each operation. In the Force Generation Process the capabilities needed for the operation are selected from the air, land and maritime forces and Special Operations Forces (SOFs) at the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO's) disposal on the basis of national capabilities and agreements to provide specific forces. Nations agreeing to participate in a Joint Force (JF) would nominate forces, on a temporary basis, using mechanisms employed for Alliance missions. The resulting team provides Joint Force commanders the ability to apply force in pursuit of common objectives.
- 0002 **Aim.** The above reflects the central operational philosophy necessary for successful joint operations. Doctrine gives guidance to bring these thoughts into operation. The aim of this publication is to establish NATO's joint operations doctrine for the full range of military operations with an operational focus, to enhance common understanding of the planning and conduct of joint operations in NATO. This joint operations doctrine forms the basis for multinational joint operations and serves to assist commanders and their staffs to achieve assigned missions.
- 0003 **Purpose.** The Allied Joint Publication 3 "Allied Joint Operations" (AJP-3) describes the fundamental operational aspects of joint operations and provides guidance on the conduct of joint operations at the operational level. These operations may range from peace to general war and may have an all-environment or predominant land, air or maritime nature. The level of joint participation may vary and may include non-military agencies, institutions or organisations. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgement of the commander, circumstances dictate otherwise.
- 0004 **Scope and applicability.** AJP-3 is intended for use by the Joint Force Commander (JFC), his Component Commanders and their staffs. This publication can also be used as a reference aid and to promote common understanding of joint operations at all levels. The doctrine in this publication covers the full range of potential NATO operations inside or outside NATO territory, both Article 5 Collective Defence operations and non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (CROs) including those conducted in co-operation with the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Western European Union (WEU). It is also applicable to non-NATO nations participating in NATO-led operations.
- 0005 **Generic nature.** AJP-3 outlines joint operations doctrine in a generic way. Unless specifically mentioned, neither the doctrine nor the command titles depicted in the AJP-3 are specific to either the static NATO Military Command Structure, a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) or any other Multinational Joint Force that might be activated. In this publication the generic term Joint Force (JF) is used to cover Allied Joint Force, Regional Joint Force, Sub-Regional Joint Force, Multinational Joint Force, Combined Joint Task Force, WEU-led Joint Force, etc. The generic

term Joint Force Commander is used to cover all possible commanders of a Joint Force be it a Strategic Commander, Regional Commander, Joint Sub-Regional Commander or CJTF commander. The generic terms Component Command (CC), Maritime Component Command (MCC), Land Component Command (LCC), Air Component Command (ACC) and Special Operations Component Command (SOCC) are used to cover respectively: All kind of Component Commands; Component Command Naval (CCNAV) and Joint Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC); Land Component Command and Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC); Component Command Air (CCAIR) and Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC); and Joint Force Special Operations Component Command (JFSOCC), etc. These generic terms will be used unless the use of the specific term is more appropriate. In chapter 2 of this publication different command and control structures in NATO are explained.

- 0006 **Relations with other joint publications.** The overarching doctrine for joint operations is described in the capstone publication “Allied Joint Doctrine” (AJP-01(A)). AJP-3 is one of the nine keystone publications, which are focused on principal functional staff areas. Certain subjects are dealt with in more than one keystone publication, but from different perspectives. To understand joint operations fully AJP-3 must be seen in the context of the other keystone publications. Many operational aspects are further explained in joint publications, which are placed in the hierarchy below AJP-3 or in doctrinal single service publications. Consistency between all these joint publications is essential to building sound doctrine.

CHAPTER 1 - THE NATURE OF ALLIED JOINT OPERATIONS

Section I – Introduction

- 1001 The strategic level of war is the level of war at which a nation or group of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources to achieve them. The operational level of war is the level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. At the operational level armed forces are deployed and employed to achieve military strategic objectives within a designated Joint Operations Area (JOA). Normally this would imply sustained operations with simultaneous and/or sequential actions by committed forces. To attain objectives, operations have to be planned in the context of the operational environment. This requires thorough analysis of the military strategic situation in the JOA and the ability to conduct planning under severe time restraints if situations change. Arrangements for co-operation and co-ordination with non-military agencies, institutions or organisations are important and part of the responsibilities at this level.
- 1002 Joint operations are operations in which elements of at least two services participate. In joint operations, understanding of the capabilities of each component of a Joint Force, liaison and co-ordination are crucial to achieve seamless joint synergy and unity of effort. A joint Operation Plan (OPLAN) endeavours to synchronise the employment of land, maritime, air and Special Operations Forces and space assets. The commander's intent should focus on achievement of the mission through the synergetic effect of these joint capabilities and must be the core of the OPLAN. A joint operation is oriented on the adversary's strategic and operational Centres of Gravity (CoGs), regardless of the environment. Joint operations require an attitude of mind, a culture, by which servicemen and women at all levels are encouraged to develop a sense of interdependence, mutual respect and trust. Jointness is enhanced through the increased knowledge and appreciation of each service's capabilities, requirements and sensitivities. Assumptions based upon experience gained only within their own service can lead to uncoordinated planning. Unforeseen practical limitations can lead to substantial disruption.
- 1003 Forces from NATO nations will be deployed in a Joint Force. A CJTF might also contain forces from non-NATO nations. The effectiveness of a combined force depends on each nation's national support and on the ability to operate together effectively and efficiently. Successful multinational operations are achieved through the use of common doctrine, supported by standardisation of equipment and procedures and validated through participation in multinational exercises. Depending on the level of integration of the force, multi-nationality at lower levels in high intensity operations may reduce the tempo of operations. Force integration training is therefore of the utmost importance. At the operational level, emphasis must be placed on the integration of the contributing nations' forces and the synergy that can be attained through the employment of the strengths of each force. Close co-ordination between the Strategic Command, the Joint Force Headquarters (JF HQ),

the National Contingent Commands (NCCs) or National Support Elements (NSEs) on the deployment of the national contingents should be considered.

Section II – Principles for Joint and Multinational Operations

- 1004 Many nations have distilled their operational experience into principles that apply to the planning and conduct of military operations, often known as the Principles of War. The general principles for Allied and multinational joint operations are explained in AJP-01(A), Chapter 2.
- 1005 Although there is a common agreement on the importance and relevance of the principles, they are not absolute and the operational situation may demand greater emphasis on some of them rather than others. For instance, the principles of surprise and concentration of force may have a different connotation in a Peace Support Operation (PSO) from their application in the context of a full-scale war. For commanders the principles are important guidelines in forming and selecting a course of action at the operational level and in the conduct of operations. The following principles for joint and multinational operations are outlined in AJP-01(A):
- a. Objective
 - b. Unity of Effort
 - c. Co-operation
 - d. Sustainment
 - e. Concentration of Force
 - f. Economy of Effort
 - g. Flexibility
 - h. Initiative
 - i. Maintenance of Morale
 - j. Surprise
 - k. Security
 - l. Simplicity

Section III – Factors and Considerations in Joint Operations

- 1006 Although factors and considerations in joint operations vary with the nature of the operation, they will become evident in each joint operation and their identification will assist in the planning and the execution of operations.
- 1007 **Political Military Interface.** The initiation of military action is decided by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), with advice from the Military Committee (MC). Political objectives and end states must be clear and well defined in order to facilitate development of equally clear and feasible military-strategic objectives and measures. Military authorities should prepare Contingency Operation Plans (COPs) and Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) to cover possible changes in the political and military strategic situation. Military activity at the strategic and operational level will clearly be influenced, and ultimately directed by political considerations. Less obviously, military activity at all levels may adversely affect the local or international political situation. The need to consider the political dimension applies equally across the range of operations. Military actions are controlled by Rules of Engagement (ROE), which are authorised by the NAC.
- 1008 **Strategic Objectives.** The employment of the whole force through the conception, planning and execution of campaigns and operations is addressed at the operational level. This must contribute directly towards achieving previously defined military strategic objectives, which are themselves drawn from the overarching political aims of the operation. Initial planning and preparations for an operation may be required before clear political guidance is formulated. NATO and its partners may be called upon to conduct Article 5 operations or non-Article 5 operations using military expertise, infrastructure, capabilities and forces. Article 5 operations are aimed at collective defence. Non-Article 5 CROs may take the form of assistance to international organisations with the objectives of preventing armed conflict, encouraging political resolution of crises, and the return to stable conditions.
- 1009 **Range of Military Operations.** The Alliance may be required to respond to a variety of situations that require the use of military forces. These operations may occur over the full range of military operations from peace to general war. When other avenues are unable to achieve Alliance objectives or protect Alliance interests, the NATO leadership may employ military forces to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations in order to conclude hostilities on terms favourable to the Alliance. It is possible that the Alliance will be required to operate in peace, conflict and war at the same time.
- 1010 **Civil-Military Interface.** Joint forces will usually conduct joint operations in co-operation with governmental and non-governmental agencies. Some of the conditions for military success can be achieved without force, or the threat of force, by harmonising the military commander's aims and methods with those of the civilian population and institutions in the area. Complex crises tend to engage a wide range of political bodies. Within the Alliance, responsibility for political

engagement rests with the NAC where the political mandate is developed with advice from the MC. The political mandate should define the political end state for the military operation, appoint a head of mission and/or a strategic commander, assign areas of responsibility and as far as possible establish mechanisms to integrate the activities of all involved parties and organisations. In a purely NATO context these issues should be covered in the Initiating Directive. It then becomes the head of mission or strategic commander's responsibility, with the assistance of all the major involved bodies, including those of the host nation when appropriate, to develop the political/military planning for the operation. In a large and complex operation involving major civilian elements and a civilian political head of mission, the military campaign plan or operation plan will be one of several functional plans in the wider multifunctional planning. The reality is that civilian agencies, typically International Organisations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) will be engaged. The Alliance will need to co-ordinate its intended activities with the civilian agencies already working in the area of operations. This is especially true in non-Article 5 CRO, where civilian considerations may impose severe constraints. In a hostile environment or a high intensity conflict it may be impossible to achieve harmony between the civilian considerations of IO/NGOs and the requirements of the military mission. In these situations, Civil Military Co-operation (CIMIC) will still be a major consideration because of the need to obtain local resources and facilitate eventual transition to civilian government.

- 1011 **Legal Aspects.** Legal considerations play a key role in the decision making process and during the conduct of an operation. Legitimacy must be based on a mandate recognised under international law such as a UN Security Council mandate or OSCE mandate. A clear understanding of the legal grounds of an operation is required at all levels of the participating forces and in the participating nations. The legal basis of an operation may limit the scope of the operation. International law provides limitations and possibilities for operations as a whole as well as for individuals. They include neutrality, use of weapons, targeting, war crimes, self-defence, non-combatants, immunity and environmental limitations. The conduct of military operations is controlled by international customary and conventional law, and the domestic law of the participating nations. Within this framework it is for NATO to set out the parameters within which military forces can operate. Rules of Engagement define the degree and manner in which force may be applied and are designed to ensure that such application of force is carefully controlled. It is important to note that the conformity of any action with any set of ROE in force does not guarantee its lawfulness, and it remains the commander's responsibility to use only that force which is necessary and proportionate under the prevailing circumstances.
- 1012 **Media.** Without public support and the endorsement of the international community, the morale and cohesion of forces engaged in operations against an adversary might be seriously undermined. The media have a powerful influence on public opinion within the international community, on an adversary and at home. International news media interest will be intense during all phases of an operation. The number of press in theatre will be dependent in part on accessibility, the degree of potential interest, the intensity of violence and separate, concurrent

stories. This media presence will require a properly established organisation to manage facilities, registration, briefing, transportation, accommodation and escorts. Co-operation with the media must always respect the demands of operations security.

- 1013 **Freedom of Action.** At the operational level activities are conceived, planned and orchestrated in a cohesive and continuous manner to gain and retain the initiative, in pursuit of the strategic objectives. For the conduct of such a plan and to anticipate unforeseen situations or emerging opportunities, freedom of action to deploy reserves, set priorities and allocate maritime, ground, air, space and support assets is of critical importance. While recognising the political and military constraints, each commander will convey a clear statement of his intent which outlines his concept of operations and establishes the objectives to be achieved by subordinate commanders and enables freedom of action at lower levels.
- 1014 **Environmental Conditions.** The environmental conditions will influence all joint operations. The characteristics of the JOA such as climate, weather, oceanography and topography must be considered.

Section IV-Joint Capabilities

- 1015 At the operational level military capabilities are considered for joint applicability. Although not exhaustive, the principal joint capabilities are listed below, and described in more detail in other chapters of this publication.
- 1016 **Command and Control (C2).** C2 should include all forces and organisations contributing to the operation. This includes co-operation with civil and non-governmental organisations. Direction should be at the highest level necessary to achieve unity of effort. Authority for execution should be delegated to the lowest level appropriate for the most effective use of forces. To enable the execution of such direction a C2 structure is required, that must be fully understood at all levels, and that facilitates the clear, timely and secure passage of guidance/orders, situation reports and co-ordinating information. Because of the joint nature of the force the characteristics, doctrine, procedures and equipment of each of the components have to be taken into consideration. Furthermore, the C2 structure and all command relationships must have built-in redundancy, be robust, be flexible and be capable of development and adaptation throughout the course of the operation.
- 1017 **Intelligence.** The purpose of Intelligence is to support the planning, execution and support of military operations by provision of timely, tailored and accurate intelligence in accordance with the commanders mission. A JFC will be allocated an Area of Intelligence Responsibility (AOIR) for the conduct of Intelligence. A JFC will designate an Area of Intelligence Interest (AOII) which will surround and include the AOIR. Early deployment of intelligence assets is essential for the successful conduct of joint operations. The deployment of intelligence assets is largely dependent upon the identification and formulation of the Commander's Critical Information Requirements' (CCIRs). From these the Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) are developed. Staffs, through the Collection, Co-ordination

and Intelligence Requirement Management (CCIRM) process, identify the actual questions to be asked and then pass them to the appropriate collection sources and agencies. The resulting information is processed into intelligence to meet PIRs and to support the planning and conduct of operations. The joint intelligence architecture provides the framework for the delivery of intelligence in a timely and relevant manner. It must be flexible and tailored to the demands and circumstances of the operation. It needs to include an operational framework, both within and beyond the JOA and, as such, may not be exclusively hierarchical in nature. For example, it will need to provide linkages to agencies outside the normal military chain of command (e.g. NGOs), as well as appropriate access to NATO and national intelligence databases and National Intelligence Cells (NICs). The joint intelligence architecture, both as part of the in-place command structure or as an ad hoc design for a specific operation, should allow for a rapid flow of information and intelligence from all available sources to, from, and within the JOA. Thus, it will provide support not just to the conduct of joint operations, but to military strategic decision-making at higher levels.

- 1018 **Planning.** Planning for an operation is an essential function of command and, ultimately, it is the JFC who must direct planning and decide upon the Course of Action (CoA) that will form the basis of the OPLAN. In joint operations the integration of numerous planning cycles, will require careful co-ordination. Operation planning is the primary means by which a JFC can strive for unity of effort between national contingent commanders and Component Commanders. In some cases regional instability will have been foreseen, and the planning staff will be able to draw on existing Contingency Operation Plans (COPs) or Standing Defence Plans (SDPs). Such advanced planning should ideally have incorporated Operational Analysis (OA) work, so that various courses of action can rapidly be modelled and the risk factor assessed. There will, however, be unexpected crises where only generic planning has taken place. Even in cases where a COP is in place, it will invariably need refining based on the actual situation. In all cases the planning of the operation must be joint.
- 1019 **Manoeuvre.** Manoeuvre is the gaining of a position of advantage with respect to an adversary from which force can be threatened or applied. It is, in effect, the process by which combat power is employed to achieve decision. Manoeuvre is more than just movement with fires. It is the process by which combat power is focused where it can have decisive effect, to pre-empt, dislocate, or disrupt adversary operations. It involves trade-offs (e.g. speed versus time, width versus depth, concentration versus dispersion) and, thus requires an acceptance of risk.
- 1020 **Fires.** The skilful use and exploitation of firepower assets available within the different components of the Joint Force will maximise synergy and leverage and enable decisive manoeuvre at the operational level, particularly now that Component Commanders increasingly possess weapon systems able to fire into each other's Areas of Operations (AOOs). Joint fires are fires produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in co-ordinated action toward a common objective. Joint fires may be used by the JFC to balance the capabilities of the Joint Force, so as to better shape the JOA and attack the enemy's cohesion. By

their nature, joint fires require synchronisation and co-ordination by the JFHQ in order to avoid conflicting fires, and to use the available firepower as efficiently as possible. The process of selecting and prioritising targets is an integral part of a joint targeting process.

- 1021 **Targeting.** Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. Potential targets will be identified by the analysis of available intelligence about the adversary, leading to proposals for the engagement of specific targets. Targeting considers a wider range of activities other than purely destruction by air launched weapons. It includes use of Special Operations Forces, surface fires, Electronic Warfare (EW) and other non-lethal attack techniques. As such, it is complementary to other enabling capabilities such as Information Operations (INFO OPS).
- 1022 **Information Operations.** INFO OPS are actions taken to influence specially targeted decision makers in support of political and military objectives by affecting adversary information and/or information systems while exploiting and protecting one's own information and/or information systems. INFO OPS relates Command and Control Warfare (C2W) military activity with political, diplomatic, civil-military co-operation, public information and any other Alliance activity that may affect the perception of an adversary and other parties involved. INFO OPS are joint defensive and offensive actions over a broad scope involving the strategic and operational levels with direct links to the tactical and system user levels. C2W focuses on the adversary's C2 and associated decision cycle whilst protecting friendly C2 capabilities. In offensive application, it is the integrated use of all military capabilities including Operations Security (OPSEC), deception, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), EW, and physical destruction, supported by all source intelligence and Communication and Information Systems (CIS), to deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy an adversary's command and control capabilities. Effective C2W provides the JFC with the ability to shape or influence the adversary commander's estimate of the situation in the JOA. It may even be possible to convince an adversary that to engage in battle would be fruitless, thereby potentially avoiding hostilities.
- 1023 **Logistics.** Effective logistic support is fundamental to the success of any campaign. It must be an integral part of all operational planning where it might restrict the scope of operations or enable freedom of action and support morale. NATO logistics encompasses the planning and execution of the movement and sustainment of forces and includes the disciplines of movement and transportation, medical and health services, infrastructure engineering, contracting, supply/maintenance/services management, real estate management and Host Nation Support (HNS) co-ordination. Depending on the nature and scale of the operation, logistic support responsibilities will be established for nations and NATO commands. While nations are ultimately responsible for the provision of resources to support their forces, the JFC will ensure that the logistic force structure is capable of supporting the operation, and will co-ordinate support among contributing nations and with the host nation to ensure operational success.

- 1024 **Civil Military Co-operation (CIMIC).** JFCs need to establish relationships with a variety of civilian authorities and organisations. CIMIC may be a central part of the mission, as in the case of disaster or humanitarian relief. The JF may be partially dependent on the civilian population for resources and information, and rely on the civil authorities to provide security in certain areas. It may even be impossible to gain full freedom of action and movement without their co-operation. However, merely establishing good relations might be enough to deny the same advantages to hostile or potentially hostile forces. In many situations, commanders have a moral and legal responsibility towards the civilian populations in their area that can only be met by co-operating with the civil government and international bodies. The aim of CIMIC is to establish and maintain the full co-operation of the civilian population and institutions within a commander's JOA in order to create civil-military conditions that offer him the greatest possible moral, material, environmental and tactical advantages. Implicit in this aim is the denial of such advantages to an actual or potential adversary. The long term purpose of CIMIC is to create and sustain conditions that will support the achievement of a lasting solution to the crisis.
- 1025 **Public Information (PI).** PI specific goal is to increase knowledge and promote further understanding of the mission among all key audiences, including Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) and the populace of the area affected. An operation could attract major international media interest, particularly in the JOA and at mounting locations during the initial stages of the operation. The JFC should assume that information release authority concerning a Joint Force operation, prior to NAC formal approval to execute the operation, will be retained at the strategic-political levels. He should anticipate a passive PI policy at the operational and lower levels during initial operational planning, and possibly up to the point of approval for mission execution. During the execution of the operation usually an active PI policy for the operation in general, and at all NATO military levels, will be in effect.

Section V – Operational Art

- 1026 **The concept of operational art.** The concept of operational art, as described in AJP-01(A) is applicable for the design of the operation and for the employment of forces. In seeking to conduct major operations, battles and engagements in pursuit of the strategic objective, the operational commander will design his operations plan around a number of key operational concepts, as described below, which help to visualise how the campaign will unfold. The application of such skills form the essence of operational art.

Key Operational Concepts

- 1027 **Synergy and leverage.** Synergy and leverage (gaining, maintaining and exploiting advantages in effectiveness across all dimensions) can be obtained by the imaginative combined exploitation of different resources. The psychological effects of interdiction fires, particularly when integrated into information operations can greatly reduce an adversary's will to continue, especially when faced with the prospects of also having to defend against subsequent manoeuvre operations.

Interdiction fires may facilitate manoeuvre by giving ground forces the time and protection they need to manoeuvre. Interdiction fires can isolate adversary forces and control and restrict their movement. Manoeuvre can greatly enhance the effectiveness of interdiction fires. It can place sustained pressure upon an adversary, enabling interdiction to degrade capabilities at a faster rate than they can be regenerated. Actual or threatened manoeuvre can force an adversary to respond and expose his combat and logistic assets, making these assets more vulnerable to interdiction fires. In the maritime environment manoeuvre of air and surface forces combined with the orchestrated co-operation with subsurface units can achieve results, which are unattainable by the forces on their own.

- 1028 **Manoeuvre.** The principal purpose of manoeuvre is to gain positional advantage in respect to the adversary from which force can be threatened or applied. Manoeuvre will be directed at the adversary's Centres of Gravity. Joint manoeuvre involves the assets of more than one component and may even involve strategic assets, temporarily made available to the JFC. It has the potential to attack an adversary both physically and morally and is the key to the integration of the JFC's joint operation. At the operational level joint manoeuvre is the means by which the JFC sets the terms of battle in time and space, declines or joins battle or exploits emerging developments.
- 1029 Simultaneity and depth. Simultaneous action and also extension in depth shape future conditions and can disrupt an adversary's decision cycle as well as his ability to execute operations. Interdiction, which can be carried out by elements of all components, allows the JFC to create simultaneous and competing demands throughout his adversary's chain of command and in all environments. INFO OPS can also be applied over wide areas and in depth. The concept of depth applies to time as well as space. Depth contributes to protection of forces by destroying adversary's potential before its capabilities can be employed. The battlespace is increasingly non-linear and hence open to imaginative non-linear and/or asymmetric exploitation. At sea the simultaneous effort of subsurface, surface and air forces can take the initiative from the adversary and force him to retreat or defeat.
- 1030 **Balance and anticipation.** The operational commander must be able to stand back from the detailed conduct of operations and to take the time to think, and look ahead, to identify emerging trends, to be the first to see glimpses of an opportunity or to detect a looming threat. The ability to keep and hold a general overview is a characteristic of the successful operational commander. Balance is achieved by maintaining the force and its capabilities for operations that contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness. It refers to the appropriate mix of forces as well as the nature and timing of operations conducted. Balance enables the JFC to exploit opportunities. Anticipation requires situational awareness, intelligence effort and careful consideration of information on which to base decisions.
- 1031 **Tempo.** Tempo is the rate or rhythm of activity relative to the opposition, within tactical engagements and battles and between major operations. The Joint Force should conduct operations at a tempo and at points in time that best exploit friendly

capabilities and their ability to generate combat power in time and space, while inhibiting its adversary from achieving the same goal. The JFC aims to dominate events, remain unpredictable and operate more quickly than the adversary's ability to respond effectively. If one's own tempo exceeds that of the adversary, then the adversary can be forced to his culminating point. Tempo is often dependent on quality of preparations, timing of initiative and morale. Tempo incorporates the capacity of a Joint Force to make the transition from one operational posture to another.

- 1032 **Time Management.** The C2 system must enable the staff to manage their time and information flow. It must also afford the JFC the environment in which to make his three main decisions: how the JFC directs his assigned forces to commence operations; when to commit his operational reserves or second echelon forces; when and how to terminate the operation.

Section VI - Allied Forces in Joint Operations.

Joint Maritime operations

- 1033 Large areas of the world are covered by sea and the majority of important land areas can be reached by sea. The vast area of the sea and the cover it can provide can be exploited by own forces with deployment, concentration and manoeuvre. The same attributes are possible for opposing forces, which stresses the importance of threat oriented warfare. Maritime forces are able to ensure the unconstrained use of important sea areas by exercising sea control and, if necessary, sea denial. These roles include operations to locate, classify and track surface vessels, submarines and aircraft and, if required, to apply force against them. Sea control may also include Naval Control of Shipping (NCS), protection of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), blockades or embargoes against economic or military shipping.
- 1034 Maritime power provides the JFC a long-term, flexible presence and fighting capability. The attributes possessed by maritime forces as political/ military instruments in support of policies are readiness, flexibility, self-sustainment and mobility. Maritime forces may be used to deter aggression, influence unstable situations or respond to aggression. Maritime operations include any actions performed by Surface-, Subsurface- and Maritime Air Forces to gain or exploit command of the sea, sea control or sea denial and/or to project power from the sea. Maritime operations can influence land operations by deterrence, providing access to the JOA, assisting in providing battlespace dominance, projection of power ashore and provision of sea lift. In joint operations, maritime forces can be employed in littoral waters for the conduct of force protection operations or to enable or support missions ashore. Maritime operations can be supported by land-based forces with surveillance, logistics and air assets. Maritime operations cover the range from peacetime operations with no military threat, such as presence and surveillance, through operations in times of tension, such as Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs), to operations during conflict, such as protection of the Sea Lines Of Communication (SLOC) and power projection. Amphibious

operations with their inherent flexibility increase the commander's options for manoeuvre.

Joint Land Operations.

- 1035 The nature of land operations reflects the diversities and complexities of the environment. The number and variety of participants, combatants, non-combatants, observers (e.g. the media) and other interested parties, factions and agencies, with the potential for error, confusion and friction, will be greater in land operations than in other operations. This complexity requires an approach that emphasises decentralised command, freedom of action, tempo and initiative, in order to contend with the multitude of activities and rapidly changing situations. The additional demands of multinational land operations will require an appropriate level of standardisation to operate, communicate, and to provide mutual support that can be achieved partly through training and a commonly understood doctrine. Land forces, as part of a Joint Force, will synchronise a range of joint enabling capabilities, for example, intelligence, information operations, fires, and logistics.
- 1036 In broad terms, land forces are composed of combat forces, combat support forces, combat service support forces, and special operations forces, within a command and control framework of HQs and CIS. Combat forces are those forces that use fires and manoeuvre to engage an adversary. They are primarily armoured, non-armoured, reconnaissance, and aviation and, in some cases, a combination. Combat support forces provide fire support and operational assistance (for example, combat engineers) to combat forces. Combat service support forces are concerned directly with the tactical and operational sustainment of combat forces and combat support forces.
- 1037 Land force roles normally entail the holding of terrain, destroying enemy forces, occupying territory and regaining lost territory. The Land Component Commander (LCC) needs to be able to conduct simultaneous offensive and defensive operations utilising fires and manoeuvre to apply overwhelming combat power, achieve decisive results, protect the force, and facilitate future operations. A wide variety of missions may be executed, ranging from disaster relief, the full range of Peace Support Operations, to general war. In NATO operations, the composition of land forces will usually be multinational. Land forces require substantial logistic supply, which normally requires sea lift, air lift and ground transportation. The multiplicity of actors and the large number of functional land specialities that must be co-ordinated for the successful conduct of ground warfare make land operations rather complex. These characteristics also make land operations particularly accessible to the attention of the media.

Joint Air and Space operations.

- 1038 When facing an adversary who is capable of exercising air operations, priority in air operations should be given to achieving the required level of control of the air. Control of the air helps shape the battlespace wherein friendly operations can proceed at the optimum place and time without prohibitive air interference, whilst providing force protection. Gaining control of the air is not an end in itself, but is

only useful if it is then exploited as a means to a greater end. Once sufficient control of the air has been achieved, the full range of air power capabilities should be exploited to project combat power in support of the joint objectives.

- 1039 The characteristics of air power are ubiquity, range, speed, perspective, flexibility, responsiveness and penetration. The particular characteristics of air power lend themselves to the imaginative prosecution of asymmetric attacks, where capabilities are projected unexpectedly from one environment into another, maximising effect and leverage.
- 1040 Air operations can be applied over large distances. Application in a responsive and visible manner requires the availability of secure staging facilities sufficiently close to the area of operations, overflight rights, flexible use of airspace and the necessary support. Air assets are often scarce; moreover, like all forces they are vulnerable from air attack when on the ground. The effective prosecution of all types of air operations depends on a wide range of supporting functions. These activities fall into two major categories: combat support related and support related. Combat support functions for air operations include capabilities for example in the field of EW or Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). Support functions include administration, logistics and maintenance .
- 1041 The exploitation of space may be crucial to the outcome of conflicts. Space assets owned and operated by NATO nations can provide a range of capabilities that can contribute to mission planning and execution at all levels of warfare. The JFC and his Component Commanders must identify requirements that will lead to the tasking of space forces for the conduct of space control and force enhancement operations as an integral part of the operations plan. Capabilities and products facilitated by space assets include reconnaissance and surveillance, environmental monitoring, communications, imagery/global geospatial information and services, positioning and navigation and warning systems. However, there are limitations on the conduct of space operations due to the physical laws of the space environment, which have direct operational implications for a commander and which space tasking must take into account.

Joint Special Operations

- 1042 Special operations are military activities conducted by specially designated, organised, trained and equipped forces using operational techniques and modes of employment not standard for conventional forces. These activities are conducted across the full range of military operations independently or in co-ordination with operations of conventional forces to achieve military, political, economic or psychological objectives, or a combination thereof. Political-military considerations may require overt, covert or discreet techniques and the acceptance of a degree of physical and political risk not associated with conventional operations.
- 1043 SOF provide the JFC with a flexible, versatile, and unique capability. SOF may be employed in support of the Alliance's military-strategic objectives (as directed by the

NAC/MC) and operational objectives as directed by the JFC. SOF operations would be directed at the accomplishment of high value, critical objectives that may entail high risk but also high pay-off value. Although SOF can be employed at the tactical level for a limited period of time, e.g. on a special, high value task, these forces are limited in number, not easily replaceable, and should not be used as a substitute for other, more appropriate forces. SOF can contribute directly to enhance mutual co-operation, promote democracies, support peace operations, establish forward presence, provide early identification and assessment of a crisis, train friendly forces, develop military liaison. In crisis, SOF can provide: area assessments and an early Command, Control and Communication (C3) capability, complement and reinforce political activity, support the NATO Precautionary System and military response options and assist in the transition from peace to crisis and conflict if necessary. During conflict, SOF would conduct their full range of tasks to repel aggression, restore peace and assist in conflict termination; they would also assist post-conflict activities during the transition back to peace.

- 1044 In the context of joint operations, SOF conduct three principal tasks: special reconnaissance and surveillance, direct action and military assistance.

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CHAPTER 2 – COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ALLIED JOINT OPERATIONS

Section I – Introduction

- 2001 Achieving military objectives in peace, crisis and conflict depends primarily on the ability to position the right force at the right place at the right time. Effective employment and support of the deployed forces rely on effective Command and Control arrangements, from the highest to the lowest levels of authority.
- 2002 The aim of the JFC is to ensure that his Component Commanders and staff at all levels and at all times have a clear and common understanding of the higher commander's intent. They must know the desired end state, the political and military objectives and the Rules of Engagement.
- 2003 This chapter describes the C2 principles, NATO C2 key concepts, structures, relationships and responsibilities, operational staff functions and communication and liaison.

Section II – Command and Control Principles

- 2004 Unity of Command. At the military strategic, operational and tactical levels of command, a fundamental tenet of C2 is unity of command. At whatever level, unity of command provides the necessary cohesion for the planning and execution of operations. Unity of command is achieved by vesting the authority to direct and co-ordinate the action of all forces and military assets in a single commander. The command relations by which this authority is achieved will be determined mainly by the composition of a Joint Force. However, constraints may be placed on the use of national force components and supporting national assets and also by the extent of military activities of other authorities in a commander's JOA. To ensure unity of command, JFC would in most cases have Operational Control (OPCON) over all NATO or attached forces within a JOA. When unity of command (for forces or agencies outside the Joint Force) can not totally be achieved, at least unity of effort has to be assured by establishing clear co-ordination arrangements.
- 2005 Continuity of Command. Unity of command is further enhanced by continuity of command for the duration of an operation. In principle, "he who plans should execute"; however, circumstances may not permit this. Command should be continuous throughout an operation. The higher command authority, in consultation with JFC, should arrange a succession of command; JFC should arrange an alternate HQ to meet operational contingencies.
- 2006 Clear Chain of Command. The structure of a C2 system is hierarchical. Where necessary and appropriate, direction and orders to a subordinate commander may include tasks for specific force elements, subject to any limitations imposed by nations and/or attachment orders.

- 2007 Integration of Command. The command structure should ensure that the capabilities of the nations, or those of several nations, can be brought to bear decisively to achieve the joint commander's operational objectives in the most effective way. Normally, Component Commands into which nations contribute are functional (maritime, land, air, Special Operations and other specialised units). The specific task organisation will be tailored by the higher command authority to suit the needs of each operation. Integration between components is strengthened by a clear chain of command. If separate single national contingent headquarters are required, they should be established to complement the chain of command of the Joint Force. An efficient and comprehensive liaison structure, linking the JF HQ, all elements of the force, and other organisations (e.g. NGOs) is an essential element of the command structure.
- 2008 Decentralisation. JFC's responsibility for mission accomplishment is indivisible, but delegation of authority to subordinates and their responsibility to act in support of the higher commander's intentions are included in the decentralisation. Through decentralisation, commanders generate the freedom of action for subordinates to act purposefully when unforeseen developments arise and exploit favourable opportunities. Decentralisation encourages the use of initiative and promotes timely decision-making. Commanders who delegate authority to subordinate commanders need to state clearly their intentions, freedoms and constraints, designate the objectives to be achieved and provide the forces, resources and authority required to accomplish their tasks. Although the emphasis given to a decentralised command style in the doctrine and practice of different services and nations may differ, Joint Force commanders and their staffs should employ the principle of decentralisation. Successful decentralisation has the following prerequisites:
- a. Joint commanders and staffs should concern themselves primarily with joint operational matters, taking account of component issues only as necessary.
 - b. The subordinate commander must understand fully JFC's intentions and be free to exercise initiatives based on that understanding.
 - c. There must be an active involvement in doctrine development process by the nations and a common understanding of the operational doctrine governing the employment of forces. This can be achieved through peacetime training and exercises.
 - d. Centralised planning and decentralised execution should be encouraged at all levels.
- 2009 **Trust and Confidence.** Trust, total confidence in the integrity, ability, and good character of another, is one of the most important ingredients in building strong teams. Trust expands the commander's options and enhances flexibility, agility, and the freedom to take the initiative when conditions warrant. Trust is based on the mutual confidence that results from the demonstrated competence of each member of the team. The opportunity to observe each member's capabilities in training builds trust and confidence in a Joint Force.

2010 Co-operation and mutual understanding. Without the common will and necessary trust to plan and execute a joint campaign or major operation, there can be little chance of success. A mutual understanding of strengths and weaknesses provides the foundation of co-operation and trust, which is vital in the planning and successful execution of joint operations. This must stem from the highest levels. Mutual understanding also rests on a common application of joint doctrine. Familiarity with the procedures of each service and nation is best achieved throughout joint and multinational training. A common approach should be inherent in thought and practice; joint and multinational training should be undertaken whenever possible, but it is particularly important, should time be available, prior to any major operation. The greater the degree of standardisation (in terms of both equipment and doctrine), the better the prospects are for fruitful co-operation, mutual understanding, and ultimately, for success.

Section III - Organisation of Forces.

2011 Within the integrated military structure of NATO there are four basic models for the command and organisation of forces with varying degrees of multi-nationality:

- a. **Fully Integrated.** Fully integrated forces are based on a “proportional shares” multinational basis with national components and a fully integrated headquarters. Commanders of such multinational formations are usually appointed on a rotational basis.
- b. **Bi/multi-national.** Bi/multi national formations are formed on an “agreed shares” basis with fully integrated headquarters.
- c. **Framework Nation.** Forces based on a Framework Nation are commanded by an officer of that nation. A significant proportion of the staff and the headquarters support will come from the framework nation; its working language is of that nation. Staff procedures, although based on Alliance standards, will also reflect those of the framework nation. In practice, however, once command and staff teams work together, procedures may incorporate the “best ideas” of the contributing nations.
- d. **Lead Nation.** This model is based on one nation assuming responsibility for planning and execution of an operation. The commanding officer, staff, Command, Control, Communications and Information’s (C3I) structure, doctrine and logistic¹ co-ordination of the force will normally be provided by one nation (the lead nation). Other nations can assign contributions to this force, and fulfil some staff positions in the lead nation’s staff.

These basic models are flexible and can be used for different command organisations. They are also suitable for operations led by international organisation.

¹ According to AJP-4 Lead Nation logistic support might be separately carried out by a nation without being responsible for the total planning and execution of an operation.

Section IV – NATO Joint Command and Control Concepts

- 2012 This paragraph describes the basic command relationships and responsibilities for the execution of allied joint operations under NATO command, based upon the standing NATO military command structure. Command and Control of NATO Joint Operations is based on four key concepts:
- a. The operational focus of Alliance military activities will be at the regional level.
 - b. CJTFs are an integral part of the military command structure
 - c. Boundaries and areas will be contingency/mission dependent.
 - d. The execution of military operations will be guided by the supported/supporting concept.

Regional Focus

- 2013 The operational focus of Alliance joint military activities will be at the regional level. Regional Commanders will provide the bridge between strategic level direction and lower level execution.
- 2014 Three levels of command exist within the command structure in order to effect C2 of NATO forces throughout the Alliance Area and beyond as directed. These are strategic, regional and sub-regional levels, with the latter comprising Component Commands, for air and maritime forces, together with Joint Sub-Regional Commands. The third level of command exists only in the Allied Command Europe (ACE) command structure.
- 2015 **Strategic Commands (SCs).** The Strategic Commander appointed by the MC is ultimately responsible for all operational matters, co-ordinating logistics support, rotation of units and manpower for extended deployments and for providing the operational interface at the political/military level.
- 2016 **Regional Commands (RCs).** At the second command level, Regional Commanders are the commanders responsible to their respective SC for military activities within their regions, and beyond, as directed. C2 of NATO military operations will be focused at this operational level as the key link between strategic level guidance and lower level operations. Regional HQ, at the operational level, have a fully integrated joint staff capability supporting all functional areas concerned with the conduct of the full range of military operations. In addition, ACE Regional HQ are nominated as current CJTF HQ.
- 2017 **Combatant Commands.** At the second command level in ACLANT, two Combatant Commands are established. Submarine Allied Command Atlantic (SUBACLANT) and Striking Fleet Atlantic (STRIKFLTLANT) are directly subordinate to SACLANT. These Commands provide co-ordination and/or C2 functions in specific operational warfare areas of strategic relevance. STRIKFLTLANT is also nominated as a parent CJTF HQ.

- 2018 **Component Commands.** At the third command level in ACE, Air and Maritime Component Commands (CCAIR and CCNAV) exercise region-wide responsibilities in peace, crisis and conflict on behalf of the RC. As such, they are directly responsible to the RC for the region-wide planning, co-ordination and conduct of air and maritime operations in support of his objectives. In Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), Component Commands functions will be performed by entities in the RC HQ or force structure commands.
- a. The strength of CCs stems from the flexible employment and unity of control of air and sea power by exploiting the principle of Centralised Planning/Decentralised Execution.
 - b. As directed by the RC, they will support operations conducted by other joint or component commanders and may contribute to the provision of CJTF HQ capabilities.
- 2019 **Joint Sub-Regional Commands (JSRCs).** In ACE also at the third command level, Joint Sub-Regional Commands are established. Each of these commands are commanded by a Commander Joint Command (COMJC). COMJC provides the RC a geographically dispersed joint planning and C2 capability in peacetime and, in crisis or conflict, execute subordinate operations within contingency/mission-specific JOAs in direct support of the RC's campaign plan.
- a. The strength of JSRCs stems from their sub-regional expertise on matters such as geography, climate, operational environment, national force structures and national C2 capabilities; in their permanent joint planning and C2 capabilities; and, where established, in their land expertise and ability to command large-scale land operations. With augmentation as appropriate, COMJCs can assume command of a joint operation and receive, prepare, deploy and employ designated forces. Land-heavy JSRCs also have the ability to command large-scale land operations. They will be prepared to discharge, for the planning and conduct of large-scale land operations, the functions and responsibilities of an LCC.
 - b. JF HQ will have a joint staff with fully integrated single service expertise. Their size and service composition will be dependent on their specific tasks. Additional air and/or maritime staff expertise will be provided, as required, by the appropriate CC HQ. JHQ will be prepared to contribute to the provision of CJTF HQ capabilities.




Figure 2.1 NATO Military Command Structure

Combined Joint Task Forces

- 2020 A CJTF is a multi-national and multi-service task force, task-organised and formed for the full range of Alliance's military missions, which require multi-national and multi-service C2 by a CJTF HQ. It may include elements from non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations.
- 2021 CJTFs are not permanently established; they will be formed, as required. A CJTF is capability to provide the Alliance with flexible and efficient means to generate, at short notice, rapidly deployable Combined and Joint Task Forces, with dedicated C2. A CJTF, its associated HQ and forces are capable of rapid and efficient deployment in and beyond Alliance Territory, including areas with limited or no Host Nation Support. The primary mission of a CJTF will be to conduct NATO non-Article 5 CRO. However, the possible employment of a CJTF for Alliance Article 5 missions is not excluded.
- 2022 The selection of a CJTF commander will be based on a proposal done by the Strategic Commander but requires the approval of the MC and noted by the NAC. The CJTF Commander will exercise C2 through a CJTF HQ. The CJTF HQ will be formed around a nucleus, augmented by support and augmentation modules, as appropriate. Component HQ, subordinate to the CJTF HQ, may come from Alliance

HQ, or like the forces comprising the components, be provided by the nations. RC HQ, other Joint HQ and CC HQ will contribute to the provision of CJTF HQ capabilities, as required. Furthermore, they may be tasked to act as supporting commands.

- 2023 An Article 5, Collective Defence operation will normally be conducted using existing NATO C2 arrangements with a Region Commander as the JFC. In these cases there will be no requirement to activate a CJTF. However, under some circumstances, such as geographic isolation or a limitation on available forces and/or static C2 elements, the activation and deployment of a CJTF for Article 5 operations within the NATO AOR may be warranted for reinforcement purposes. In these cases a CJTF HQ will normally operate under the direction of the RC.
- 2024 The Commander of a CJTF operating beyond NATO's AOR will, in most cases, report directly to the appropriate Strategic Commander and have a full deployed component organisation.

Command and Control in NATO led CJTF operation




Fig 2-2 Example of an implemented CJTF structure

- 2025 The CJTF HQ nucleus is a permanent minimum framework staff that serves as a core for a CJTF HQ formed from pre-designated, personnel serving at a CJTF Parent HQ. The nucleus provides the core of the CJTF HQ. It is sized and structured in such a way that permits the operational planning process to proceed in the CJTF

HQ's nucleus staff simultaneously and in parallel with strategic planning at the SC level.

2026 Key Personnel in the CJTF Nucleus Staff have the following responsibilities;

- a. Focuses on CJTF matters in peacetime
- b. Ensures cohesion of a trained Nucleus Staff
- c. Enhances the ability of the Nucleus Staff to form rapidly
- d. Receives and integrate augmentation

2027 The CJTF Nucleus Staff has the following characteristics;

- a. Embedded within designated Parent HQ
- b. Drawn from a specified Parent HQ – i.e. Dual-hatted
- c. Provides the core of the CJTF HQ; represents all principal Staff Functions
- d. At 7 days notice to full commence planning.
- e. Political and Military capabilities
- f. Personnel pre-designated by HQ, pre-approved by Nations, trained and exercised
- g. Prepared for CROs and Collective Defence missions.

Boundaries and Areas

2028 In the NATO structure boundaries are contingency/mission-dependent. They will be used to enhance flexible military activities by delineating areas, limited by defining parameters such as time and scope. With the exception of the Inter-SC boundary and the RC boundaries in ACE, all boundaries will be mission related, temporary and limited by agreed defining parameters, such as time and scope

2029 A Joint Operations Area is temporary, defined by a SC or a JFC/RC, co-ordinated with nations and approved by the NAC or MC as appropriate. Designated joint commanders will plan and conduct military operations within a JOA to accomplish a specific mission. JOAs and their defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, are contingency/mission-specific and may overlap Areas of Responsibility (AORs) between RCs and/or SCs.

2030 Other sub-regional delineation of geography, waterspace, and/or airspace will generally be within an established JOA. Area of Operations may be used, to refer to a sub-area of another area (e.g. JOA), delegated to a subordinate commander by a joint commander for a specific purpose. The JFC has related to the JOA an Area of Interest (AOI). Inside the JOA we see for example an AOO for the LCC and MCC.

Pending on the C2 structure of the operation also an AOO for the SOCC and the JRA Commander can be established. Amphibious operations will be conducted in an Amphibious Operation Area (AOA). (See Figure 2-3)




Figure 2-3: Example Boundaries and Areas

Supported/Supporting inter-relationships

- 2031 With the wide range of operational requirements to be covered with minimal assets, the execution of NATO Joint military operations will be guided by the supported/supporting principle. This key principle provides an effective means of weighting the phases and sub-phases of Alliance operations with each operational commander typically receiving support from, and providing support to, other commanders. The number and importance of these inter-relationships, in particular that support provided to a Supported Commander tasked with achieving the JFC's primary objectives in an operation, require the close attention of the JFC and his subordinate commanders in the planning and execution of operations.
- 2032 The supported/supporting inter-relationship principle allows the strengths and capabilities of the headquarters and forces of the military command structure to complement each other to best overall effect. Within a Joint Force, components or elements can support or be supported for the achievement of a particular task. Subordinate commanders may be supported and act as supporting commanders concurrently
- 2033 A specific commander will normally be assigned responsibility for achieving the primary objectives of an operation, or for a specific phase of an operation, and thus be designated the Supported Commander for all mission elements. He then has the primary responsibility for execution of the military tasks assigned by the Joint

Commander, and the authority for the general direction of the supporting effort. At the operational level, it may be more appropriate to designate different Supported Commanders for different mission areas. For example, the Air Component Commander will be the supported commander for region-wide counter air operations, the Maritime Component Commander for sea control and amphibious force entry; the Land Component Commanders for decisive land operations.

- 2034 The supported/supporting inter-relationship constitutes a firm and binding relationship between commanders as defined by the Joint Commander, but is not a command relationship. It is a Joint Commander directed relationship through which the mission requirements of Supported Commanders are met. The supported/supporting inter-relationship is clearly a 'two way street'. The Supported Commander must participate and comment to on the development of Support Plans of Supporting Commanders. Conversely, Supporting Commanders must allow the Supported Commander the opportunity to participate in the process of the development of Support Plans. This iterative process of participation and comment at each level will ensure appropriate co-ordination takes place before OPLANs are finalised. A complete understanding of the Supported Commander's mission, assigned tasks and intent is critical to enable the Supporting Commander to meet his responsibilities flexibly. Conversely, a common understanding of the Supporting Commander's capabilities by the Supported Commander is crucial. To this end, all JF commands will be prepared to exchange liaison elements as appropriate for a given operation, (e.g, CC-JSRC, CC-Corps, CC-CC, etc.)
- 2035 Within a JOA, Component Commanders and COMJCs will likely be engaged in executing their own assigned tasks and missions as part of the common plan, while supporting one another in specific mission areas. If a conflict between Component Commanders develops, it is incumbent upon the Joint Commander to prioritise tasks and mission areas. Joint mechanisms at the JFC level can be used to assist the JFC in the prioritisation process. One key example is the Joint Targeting Co-ordination Board (JTCCB) which reviews target information, develops targeting guidance/priorities and refines the target lists.
- 2036 The Supported Commander. The Supported Commander has the primary responsibility for execution of the military tasks assigned by the Joint Commander, and the authority for the general direction of the supporting effort. Supported Commanders should provide Supporting Commanders as much latitude as possible in the planning and execution of their operations. Supporting Commanders plan and execute their operations with only that co-ordination required by Supported Commanders.
- 2037 The degree of authority granted to a supported commander should be specified in the JFC's operation/mission directive or, at the operational level, by the JFC. Directives should indicate the purpose in terms of the effect desired and the scope of action to be taken and should include:
- a. The objective to be achieved by the Supporting Command Forces allocated to the mission.

- b. The scope of the action.
- c. The strength of forces allocated to the supported mission.
- d. The time, place and duration of the supported effort.
- e. The effects desired.
- f. The priority of the supported mission relative to other missions of the supporting force.
- g. The authority, if any, of the supporting force to depart from its supporting mission in the event of an exceptional opportunity or emergency.
- h. The general or special authority for any operational or other instructions to be issued by the forces being supported or by other authority in the action areas.

Notwithstanding the above, supported commanders should provide supporting commanders as much latitude as possible in the planning and execution of their operations.

2038 **The Supporting Commander.** The Supporting Commander will respond to the task issued by the Supported Commander. The Supporting Commander will employ the required forces from those available to provide augmentation or other support to a Supported Commander. A supporting commander will:

- a. Provide support to the Joint Force as directed by higher command authority.
- b. Advise the JFC and supported commanders on the capabilities and limitations of the resources provided to the force.
- c. Advise the JFC on the priorities for the accomplishment of competing tasks for supporting organisations and assets.
- d. Provide the JFC and supported commanders with timely information on changes in the availability or capability of supporting organisations and assets together with an assessment of the potential impacts on operations.
- e. Consider and, if required, pass to higher authorities requests for additional support.

2039 At all times supporting commanders should keep the supported commander informed of the capabilities available to him and plan and execute their operations with the co-ordination required by the supported commander.

Section V - Tasks and Responsibilities of Command in Operations.

2040 **Strategic Command.** The Military Committee nominates the Strategic Commander who would be held ultimately responsible for all operational matters, co-ordinating logistic support, rotation of units and manpower for extended deployments and for providing the operational interface at the political/military level in NATO HQ Brussels. Subject to NAC approval, the nominated Strategic commander would:

- a. Propose the military strategy.
- b. Propose the most appropriate command structure/arrangement to satisfy the operational requirement. This includes the selection of a HQ or initialisation of a deployable HQ. In doing so the Strategic Commander might nominate Regional Commander North, Regional Commander South, Striking Fleet Atlantic or in certain circumstances a Component Commander/Joint Sub-Regional Commander as the JFC to lead the operation, in which case some of the following tasks might be delegated.
- c. Establish an intelligence architecture linking NATO and national intelligence centres with All Source Analysis Cells at the various headquarters to provide JFC with a common, timely and accurate picture of the situation during all phases of the campaign. Establish an counter intelligence and security architecture within the Intel architecture to provide JFC with a common, timely and accurate capability to act and react on hostile Intelligence activities during all phases of the campaign.
- d. Propose the JFC and specify his command authority.
- e. Recommend to the MC, based on JFC's needs and the development of the operation, the appropriate force to accomplish the mission. In consultation with NATO HQ Brussels, develop and request support required from national authorities and international entities to support the Joint Force by sending Activation Warning messages, Activation Request messages and Activation Order for action by nations. Following receipt of national responses, co-ordinate the force balancing process with nations and establish the supporting deployment architecture.
- f. Confirm funding.
- g. Specify a JOA.
- h. Issue an initiating directive to the JFC.
- i. Specify: command authority, the military strategy, the desired end-state and military objectives to be achieved.
- j. Recommend to NATO authorities the ROE to be used, based on JFC's needs and the development of the operations.

- k. Establish a flexible logistic and control structure as required for increased support and requirements in non-Article 5 CRO missions. The different employment options of a Multinational Joint Logistic Centre (MJLC) provide the basis for adequate and timely support functions.
- l. Obtain and promulgate diplomatic clearances.
- m. Establish liaison between the senior NATO commanders and the JFC and host-nation governments.
- n. Establish an integrated Command and Information System linking Allied Command authorities, JFC, functional components, national contingents and Supporting Commanders/authorities.
- o. Establish liaison as required for the conduct of operations. Establish a civil military co-operation policy for the JF.
- p. Monitor the development of the situation and the JFC's campaign and provide the MC with appropriate information.
- q. Formulate an information operations policy for the JF.
- r. Establish a public information policy for the JF.
- s. Establish a PSYOPS policy for the JF and coordinate with PI and Information Operations.
- t. Establish the strategic targeting policy.
- u. Establish LOC outside the JOA.
- v. Establish strategic reserve policy.
- w. Establish force rotation policy.

2041 Joint Force Commander is required to:

- a. Exercise C2 as delegated by the SC (normally OPCON) over all force components provided to him. The JFC should also exercise co-ordinating authority over all forces remaining under national control that are operating in or transiting his JOA. Co-ordinating authority should be granted, as a minimum, for area security, for positioning and reporting, movement control and ROE.
- b. Plan and execute the operation to accomplish his operational objectives. Issue directives and guidance to CCs, approve their OPLANS and co-ordinate their operations. The operational objectives contained in the directives should be clear and concise, applicable, attainable and measurable (an indicator of the success required, not necessarily quantifiable).

- c. Plan and orchestrate the operation to accomplish his objectives. Assign, within the limits of his command/control authority, tasks to Component Commanders, co-ordinate their operations and approve their missions. He needs to state clearly his intentions, designate the objectives to be achieved and provide the resources and authority required by the forces to accomplish their tasks. But should also grant them as much latitude as possible.
- d. Designate the Airspace Control Authority (ACA) and appoint the Air Defence Commander (ADC)
- e. Seek approval of the campaign plan by the Strategic Commander/RC.
- f. Establish the targeting priorities via a JTCB and approve the Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List (JIPTL), within the limit of his delegated target approval authority in the respect of Strategic Commanders and component commanders nominations.
- g. The JFC may appoint supporting commanders for specific tasks, as appropriate. These may be defined by either time, activity or location.
- h. Synchronise operations and activities to build consensus with other military forces, local government officials, and non-governmental organisations in the JOA to achieve unity of effort.
- i. Establish liaison with the commands and authorities operating in support of the campaign or independently in the JOA, as well as between the components of the force.
- j. Develop the civil-military co-operation policy in the JOA in accordance with the general instructions of the SC.

2042 **Component Commanders.**

- a. General. The Component Commanders are in general responsible for the operational and other aspects of the JFC's mission. They:
 - (1) Exercise the delegated level of Command and Control over component assigned forces and makes recommendations to the JFC on the proper employment of those forces.
 - (2) Recommend to the JFC on the proper employment of all forces under CC control.
 - (3) Select units for assignment to subordinate task forces according to their capabilities, the JFC's intentions and required missions.
 - (4) Provide to the JFC a recommendation on target priorities within the targeting cycle.
 - (5) Request theatre logistic movement support from the JFC, as required

- (6) Provide the CIS services that are required for the purpose of C2 of his subordinate formations.
 - (7) Co-ordinate operations with other component commanders to ensure unity of effort and establish liaison accordingly.
 - (8) Ensure that cross-component support is provided as directed by the JFC and agreed to by the respective national contingent commander.
 - (9) Provide liaison support to the JFC staff.
 - (10) Keep the JFC and other component commanders informed of the situation, with emphasis on developments which may require changes in the concept of operations or additional resources.
 - (11) Conduct PI activities as directed by the JFC
- b. **The Maritime Component Commander.** Maritime operations include any actions performed by forces on, under or over the designated area to gain or exploit command of the sea, control of the sea or sea denial and to project power from the sea. The Maritime Component Commander is responsible for the maritime aspects of the JFC's mission and:
- (1) Plans and executes maritime operations and employs designated maritime forces in support of the JFC's concept of operations.
 - (2) Selects Naval units for assignment to subordinate task groups according to their capabilities and required missions.
 - (3) Co-ordinates operations with other component commanders to ensure unity of effort and establish liaison accordingly. Ensures that available maritime assets, both land and sea based, are co-ordinated with/ integrated into ACC operations.
- c. **The Land Component Commander.** The Land Component Commander is responsible for the land aspects of the mission and:
- (1) Recommends to the JFC on the proper employment of all land forces under LCC control.
 - (2) Plans and executes land operations and employs designated land forces in support of the JFC's mission.
 - (3) Co-ordinates Air operations with the Air Component Commander, and Co-ordinates targeting and Combat Assessment (CA) with the JFC and other component commanders. Liases with the Air Component Commander for all air space control and Air Defence (AD) matters - particularly for Land component aviation, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD).

- (4) Liases with the JFC.
- d. **The Air Component Commander.** The component commander with preponderance of air assets and the best capacity to plan, task and control joint air operations will normally be designated the Air Component Commander. He is responsible for accomplishing air aspects of JFC's mission and assumes the responsibility for joint air operations. The Air Component Commander will normally be designated as the Air Defence Commander and the Airspace Control Authority within the JOA. The Air Component Commander is responsible for the air aspects of the mission and:
- (1) Develops and executes the combined joint air operation plan in support of the JFC's concept of operations and evaluate the results of these operations.
 - (2) Provides to the JFC a recommendation on air target priorities within the targeting cycle.
 - (3) In consultation with other CCs, recommends air apportionment to the JFC in accordance with the JFC's guidance.
 - (4) Allocates sorties, missions and assets in accordance with the JFC's apportionment decision.
 - (5) Assigns air missions to appropriate subordinate commanders or commanders of units/assets apportioned to him from other components.
 - (6) Performs the duty as the Air Defence Commander, when assigned that authority by JFC.
 - (7) Produces and disseminates the Air Tasking Order (ATO); if designated as the ADC, the Air Defence Plan (ADP); if designated as the ACA, and the Airspace Control Order (ACO).
- e. **The Special Operations Component Commander.** The SOCC Special Operations Component Commander is responsible for all aspects of Allied Special Operations. The Command and Control of SOF may be executed by a Joint Task Force comprised of land, air and naval SOF components. The Special Operations Component Commander is responsible for the special operations aspects of the mission and:
- (1) Advises the JFC and the other component commanders on the proper employment of all SOF.
 - (2) Plans, co-ordinates and executes SOF operations in support of the JFC's concept of operations.
 - (3) Co-ordinates the utilisation of national SOF assets in support of JFC.

- (4) Participates as the SOF representative in the multinational targeting process.
- (5) Co-ordinates SOF communications.

2043. **National Contingents.** A national contingent within a Joint Force may be either single-service or joint in nature and has a wide range of operational capabilities. A national contingent commander's role would be, essentially, to represent national concerns to the JFC, keep own national authorities informed, and co-ordinate and foster international component relations to support the JFC's mission. Specific tasks for a national contingent commander could be to:

- a. Co-ordinate and co-operate with component and contingent commanders to ensure unity of effort, and establish liaison accordingly.
- b. Ensure the administrative and logistic support of own forces required to achieve and sustain their operational readiness.
- c. Advise the JFC on specific capabilities of own forces and constraints limiting their employment.
- d. Ensure that cross-component support is provided as arranged by the JFC and agreed by own national authorities.
- e. Provide liaison support to the JFC's staff.
- f. Keep own higher commander(s) and own national authorities informed on the situation and developments that may require changes in the concept of operations, additional national resources or support from other force components or national contingents.
- g. Ensure that provision is made within the intelligence architecture for the integration of national contributions to the overall intelligence picture for the JFC.
- h. Harmonise the national Command and Control Information Systems (CCIS) with other components and contingents of the JF.
- i. Implement the JFC's PI directives.

Section VI - States of Command of Allied Joint Operations.

- 2044 Except where specifically restricted by agreements with nations, SCs may reassign operational command and/or forces under their command as deemed appropriate. The following guidance applies: All command relationships must facilitate the smooth transition of operations from peacetime, through crisis, to conflict.
- a. C2 arrangements must accommodate the situation prior to, and after, Transfer of Authority (TOA).
 - b. The Strategic Commander will normally delegate OPCON to an appointed JFC (e.g. Regional Commander, COMSTRIKFLTLANT, or CJTF commander) at an appropriate moment, once the force has been constituted. Unless otherwise specified, JFCs can sub-delegate OPCON based on contingency/mission-dependent operational requirements.
 - c. National forces (generally maritime or air) operating under a NATO commander outside of the NATO AOR may remain under national OPCON as required by the nation(s) concerned.

Degrees of Authority

- 2045 A common understanding of the degrees of authority is a prerequisite for effective co-operation under NATO military command structures. The following definitions form the basis for this common understanding.
- 2046 **Full Command.** The military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. Nations that assign forces to a NATO operation will always retain Full Command of those forces. Only Operational Command or Operational Control will be assigned to the designated NATO Commander.
- 2047 **Operational Command (OPCOM).** The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units and to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. May also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander.
- 2048 **Operational Control.** The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location and to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control to those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.
- 2049 **Tactical Command (TACOM)** The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.

- 2050 **Tactical Control (TACON).** The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
- 2051 **Administrative control.** Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organisations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services and other matters not included in the operational mission of the subordinate or other organisations.
- 2052 **Co-ordinating Authority.** The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for co-ordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more services or two or more forces of the same service. He has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement he shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority.

Section VII - Command and Control Arrangements

- 2053 A wide range of operational scenarios, with a corresponding range of C2 arrangements, will be possible. These can be categorised as those C2 arrangements required for: Collective Defence operations (e.g., Regional and sub-regional operations within a JOA); Crisis Response Operations; or any combination required to meet operational requirements as directed by the NAC.
- 2054 **Regional Joint Operations for Collective Defence** will be conducted under the C2 of a JFC/RC and will take full advantage of the flexibility afforded by the supported/supporting principle. RCs will have the flexibility to use other command structure HQ and/or force structure HQ, as designated, to conduct operations at the operational and tactical levels, in support of an OPLAN. All missions must contribute to the accomplishment of the overall military objective. Therefore, the synchronisation of effort is of paramount importance.
- 2055 The JFC/RC will exercise C2 as directed by the Strategic Commander, normally through his assigned subordinate commanders. In this respect, he will be the joint commander exercising OPCON of assigned forces, or as co-ordinating authority over all forces remaining under national control that are operating in or transiting his AOR. Unless otherwise specified, the JFC/RC can choose to retain OPCON of all forces or to delegate it for certain forces to subordinate levels of command.
- 2056 **Regional Operations.** In Regional Operations, the JFC/RC will exercise C2 through the regional component structure. In such cases, the ACC, the MCC and designated LCCs/COMJCs will report directly to the JFC/RC. The ACC and MCC will act throughout the JOA as directed, on behalf of the RC. In order to maintain the principle of unity of command at the regional level, OPCON of air and maritime forces will normally remain with their respective CCs. Regionwide JOAs will potentially cover broad geographic areas. In such cases, it is imperative land forces be placed under the command of a single LCC who will harmonise the efforts of

subordinate Land forces within their respective AOOs. This will ensure unity of effort.

- 2057 The JFC/RC could also engage certain JHQs within designated JOAs in warfighting operations to achieve his campaign objectives. In this event, COMJCs will, at some point in the campaign, be designated Supported Commanders and be responsible for the synchronisation of maritime , land and air assets within their designated JOAs. However, given that the execution of operations normally involves the prosecution of a series of related military operations, the supported-supporting inter-relationship between third level commands subordinated to the RC could vary continuously.
- 2058 **Sub-regional Operations.** When an operation or associated mission can be contained at the sub-regional level, the RC could exercise C2 through a COMJC/JFC whose selection would be based on the location of the JOA and force requirements. The RC will determine the joint command organisation and the supported/ supporting inter-relationship which is best suited to undertake and support an operation within a JOA. The designation of a JOA and the definition of the supported/supporting inter-relationship is contingency/mission specific. For joint operations, the Supported Commander will normally be a COMJC, but, depending on the mission, could be another designated commander. The RC will also establish liaison with the commands and authorities operating in support of the operation.
- 2059 When a COMJC is designated the JFC for a sub-regional operation within a JOA, JFC's Direction and Guidance (D&G) will describe command authority for designated assets; the relationships between supported/supporting commands; and an appropriate C2 structure.
- 2060 **CJTF Operations.** In the event of the deployment of a CJTF within, or beyond, NATO's AOR, the CJTF will serve as an adjunct to existing regional forces and C2 capabilities. The formation of a CJTF HQ and associated forces will be agreed upon by the NAC. Political control of a NATO led CJTF is vested solely in the NAC and allows for unified political direction. The activation, formation and deployment of a CJTF will be in accordance with NATO procedures. The NAC will nominate the Strategic Commander who will have overall responsibility for all operational matters (e.g. planning and mission execution, co-ordinating communications, logistics support and rotation of units and personnel for extended deployments) and for providing the military operational interface with the Political/Military level of HQ NATO. The nominated Strategic Commander termed the 'establishing authority', will recommend the most appropriate command sub-structure to satisfy operational requirements. This structure will then be presented to the MC and NAC for approval. A CJTF operation may also be non-NATO led.
- 2061 The CJTF will be an organisation created for a specific operational purpose. Due to the strategic importance of deployments beyond the NATO AOR and the close political oversight of the NATO HQ, the chain-of-command for these CJTF operations will normally be two-tiered with the CJTF Commander reporting directly to the appropriate SC for operations conducted under the C2 of an appointed CJTF. In addition, RCs must be prepared to contribute to the provision of CJTF capabilities.

Section VIII – Joint Force Headquarters

- 2062 The JFHQ will need to establish itself with a command, control and communications capability as early as possible. Depending on the situation in the JOA, the JFHQ will be positioned within or outside the JOA. It is likely that the initial JFHQ deployment party will form the first element of this capability. It may be incorporated in a survey team that will contribute to selecting its location. The initial priority will be to establish a capability to monitor and possibly influence the flow into the JOA, as controlled by the Allied Movement Co-ordination Centre, and exercise C2 over the force build-up and preparation for onward deployment. The priority will be to establish the means for exercising command, co-ordination and control over the battlespace. All HQs will be modular, which implies that their size and structure can be adapted to the requirements of the operation. They are therefore designed to be further augmented, when required, during the subsequent phases of the operation, and to be downsized when the operation no longer requires a fully established HQ presence.
- 2063 Concerning the location of the HQ, a number of criteria could be used to determine their positioning. Afloat or on land, inside or outside the JOA, mobile or fixed, are just a few of the options from which to choose from. However, it must be understood that each option does not only have operational implications, but also provides the nations or parties involved in the conflict with a message from NATO's strategic and operational commanders. For instance in Peace Support Operations, an even-handed positioning of the Allied Joint Force's HQ can stress NATO's impartial approach towards the parties. It is also conceivable that a NATO HQ could be positioned forward to a non-NATO Nation within the JOA to stress NATO's concern with the development of the conflict and its determination to get involved. The decision regarding the location of the HQs is a crucial one that has to be made early and, considering its possible impact, in close conjunction between the military and political authorities. Another reason for a timely decision on the positioning of HQ is that the movement of the established HQ within the JOA during an operation must be regarded as difficult. The land based HQs' protective measures and extensive communications facilities can make even a deployable land based HQ highly inflexible and inherently resistant to move once established. The sea based HQ must also adjust their force protection measures as it moves about the JOA. However, the sea based HQ inherently remains mobile throughout the campaign. Additionally, it can remain within sight of the coast or disappear over the horizon as required by the military and political situation.
- 2064 The communications capability of the operational HQ must be secure robust and flexible. Robust implies that the initial build up of communications can be easily expanded to include all operational HQ inside or outside the JOA. Also, these communications must be flexible and resilient to deal with threats to the systems of physical attack or exploitation. Therefore, a multiplicity of communications assets must facilitate the redundancy of the initial communications network. Furthermore, the initial HQ capability must include a liaison capacity to make timely contact with (host) nations' governments and non-military agencies possible and should include an ability to monitor media reports. It should be kept in mind that any communications network used to communicate with host nation governments and

non-military agencies will more that likely require the employment of commercial equipment.

- 2065 The JFHQ will need to establish its C2 structure as described in more detail in AJP-6. A key component of this C2-structure is the communications and information systems (CIS) infrastructure and all appropriate links, back to the relevant NATO HQs, with subordinate Component Commands, host nation(s), supporting NATO and coalition partners. As in any rapidly changing military operation, the ability to maintain connectivity between all elements in the command chain, and between individual formations, is vital to be pro-active. Tactical level operations will normally be conducted by a designated Component Commander, who will require the deployment of operational C2 assets.
- 2066 When exploited appropriately, CIS can give a commander a decisive edge over his opponent by reducing decision to action-cycles. However, if care is not taken, modern CIS will bring such a volume of information that the staffs will become over-burdened, and the effect will be reversed. The key to success is information management. This requires the JFC to decide the principles for information management at the outset and to ensure that his information management policy is adhered to throughout the Allied Joint Force for the duration of the operation. The JFC needs to publish a CIS plan and ensure an adequate overall management of all CIS assets. This plan will need to be closely co-ordinated with other plans, most notably related to the Joint Force's INFO OPS strategy. The crucial issues to be addressed by the plan concern the timely flow of relevant, accurate information and assurance of its validity.

Section IX – Joint Staff functions

- 2067 The circumstances surrounding the establishment of a JF, its relationship with any existing NATO HQs in the theatre of operations, the assigned forces' mission and the environment in which the mission is to be conducted will dictate the staff requirements and functions. The JFC will organise his staff as he deems necessary to optimise its ability to plan, conduct and support the operation successfully. The following staff functions will usually be established:
- 2068 **Personnel and Administration. (J1).** The Personnel and Administration (PANDA) staff's principal role is to advise the JFC and the joint staff on the personnel policies and manpower management systems and procedures established by national authorities for their force components. The staff's responsibilities include personnel management, accounting, entitlements and benefits, Joint Personnel Centre Operations, morale, welfare, recreation, postal services, safety, provost and discipline, Prisoners Of War administration and casualty reporting. The PANDA staff should also co-ordinate personnel matters with the personnel staffs of the national contingents.
- 2069 **Intelligence. (J2).** The Intelligence Staff is responsible for the provision of accurate, timely and relevant intelligence to meet the JFC's operational and security requirements within the Joint Operations Area and maintaining situational awareness

in the JFC's Area of Intelligence Interest. Intelligence aspects of Allied joint operations will be covered in more detail in AJP-2 and in subordinate documents.

2070 **Operations (J3).** The essential role of the Operations staff is to act as the focal point through which the JFC directs the conduct of a joint operation, ensuring unity of effort and the most effective use of resources supporting immediate and planned operations. The Operations staff may comprise sections that cover, maritime, land and air operations, special operations, space operations (when applicable) plus cells to cover the INFO OPS co-ordination and targeting disciplines. The Operations staff are responsible for:

- a. Assessing the status and capabilities of assigned forces, as a pre-condition for JFC's decision on a CoA and his concept of operations.
- b. Assembling JF HQ and deploy to approved site.
- c. Recommending force organisations for planned operations.
- d. Advising JFC on applicable ROE and suggesting changes/additions he may wish to consider.
- e. Specifying the tasks for force components, based on JFC's concept of operations.
- f. Co-ordinating the execution of the overall INFO Ops strategy, as well as the organisation of the Info Ops cell. Participation in the Info Ops cell will include: (but is not limited to) Special Operations, Intelligence, CIMIC, CIS, joint C2 targeting activities, OPSEC, Deception, PSYOPS, and EW.
- g. Co-ordinating the conduct of Nuclear Biological Chemical Damage (NBCD) control within the JOA; advising the JFC on the impact of Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) attacks; and upward reporting of NBC attacks to higher HQ.
- h. Producing and distributing operation orders.
- i. Monitoring force components' plans and operations supporting JFC's campaign within the JOA:
 - (1) Land operations including manoeuvre, fire support, communications, aviation, mobility, and logistics.
 - (2) Air Operations including Counter Air Operations, Anti Surface Force Air Operations, Strategic Air Operations, and Supporting Air Operations.
 - (3) Maritime operations including surface, subsurface, air, strategic air operations, amphibious, sea-lift and mine warfare.
 - (4) SOF operations.

- j. Co-ordinating or appointing LNOs to assist the civil-military liaison established by CJ9, and co-ordinating the activities of liaison officers appointed to the JF.
- k. Participating in the co-ordinating of joint fires and targeting activities as required.
- l. Co-ordinating and monitoring refugee support operations.
- m. Force protection
- n. Co-ordinate security/detention plan.

2071 **Logistics (J4).** The Logistics staff (including the medical branch) is responsible for assessing the logistic and medical/health service support required for achievement of the JFC's campaign objectives, and for ensuring that these support requirements are met throughout the campaign. Based on this assessment, the logistic staff develops the logistic concept and plans in support of operations and co-ordinates the overall logistic effort. The size and complexity of operations, component participation and force contribution of the nations as well as the degree to which national and/or multinational logistics are to be integrated into the logistics concept may require specific logistic co-ordinating activities. If appropriate, a Multinational Joint Logistic Centre in support of the JFC's logistics staff may be activated to co-ordinate support between components, National Support Elements, the host nation and NGOs. In the case of a sea-based CJTF being assigned, a MJLC will normally be activated. Logistic aspects of Allied joint operations are covered in more detail in AJP-4.

2072 **Plans and Policy (J5).** The Plans and Policy staff assist the JFC in the preparation of his campaign plan and the planning for future operations. It co-ordinates these planning efforts within the AJFHQ and with higher, subordinate and adjacent commands and civil authorities. The Plans and Policy staff will:

- a. Determine, on the basis of the intelligence assessments, the military conditions for successful accomplishment of the JFC's assigned mission objectives, including action to be directed against the adversary's CoG and that required to protect friendly CoG.
- b. Develop CoAs to accomplish the JFC's assigned mission
- c. Co-ordinate the JFC's INFO OPS overall campaign policy by determining those actions necessary to influence the adversary's decision-makers. Ensure all source intelligence and technical analysis is used to determine the exploitation of the adversaries overall C2 structure as well as what measures should be taken to protect friendly C2 systems. Provide planning guidance for the execution of the phases of the campaign, with particular emphasis on synchronisation of forces, time and area towards achievement of the campaign objectives.
- d. Provide planning guidance for the phased execution of the campaign, with particular emphasis on the delineation of the Component Commander's

AOO's within the JOA and the time phase synchronisation of forces to achieve the campaign objectives.

- e. Promulgate the JFC's decisions on the CoA for the campaign through planning directives, operation plans and contingency plans.
- f. Review the Supporting Plans of component and subordinate commanders.
- g. Identify additional forces and capabilities needed to perform the mission, and determine the required order of arrival and initial employment of forces.
- h. Conduct combat assessment by using Operational Analysis of operations as directed by the JFC.
- i. Plan, in consultation with the CIMIC staff, for emergency and disaster relief assistance in accordance with NATO policies.

2073 **Communications and Information Systems (J6).** The CIS staff should ensure that adequate support is provided for Allied joint operations, and that interoperable CIS procedures are used at all levels in the Joint Force. CIS systems activities, critical to the effective C2W strategy of alliance forces, must be fully co-ordinated with the Info Ops cell to ensure transparency of the Info Ops strategy. CIS are covered in more detail in AJP-6.

2074 **Training (J7).** The Training staffs advise and manage in-theatre training during the Joint Force work-up period prior to the outbreak of hostilities, and conduct training for augmentation forces added to an ongoing campaign. They also perform liaison with a relief force to ensure a smooth transition and that lessons learned in-theatre are passed to the incoming force. If the operations are bounded in time such that relief on site will not be required, or if the level of training to be provided is such that it can be handled by the J3 organization alone, or if a training phase is not required by the JFC, this staff may not be established, or may be disbanded after initial theatre training is completed.

2075 **Resources and Finance (J8).** The Resources and Finance branch's tasks are to manage the civil secretariat, administrative and budgetary aspects of Allied joint operations and to provide appropriate specialist advice to the JFC.

2076 **Civil-Military Co-operation (J9).** The J9 is responsible for advising the JFC on the implications of all the activities undertaken by the Joint Force, in peace, crisis and conflict which directly concern the relations between the armed forces, local government, civil population, IOs, NGOs, and other agencies of the countries where the Joint Force is deployed, employed and supported. CIMIC Staff personnel are not necessarily individual specialists with skills applicable in a civilian environment. However, they must have broad military experience, understand CIMIC principles and procedures, understand the environment in which they will operate and understand the workings of NGOs and IOs. They must be capable of explaining military requirements to civilian organisations and vice versa. Finally, they must be

able to carry out accurate assessments and provide tactical advice to the commander.

- 2077 **Public Information.** A PI staff should be established to advise the JFC on Public Information in co-ordination with the relevant SC/RC PI staffs and representatives from the Joint Force components. The PI staff would be responsible for a programme of communication with military and civil audiences during Allied joint operations. The PI staff will ensure that the INFO OPS cell is apprised of all PI activities. A close liaison with the CIMIC staff will be maintained.

Section X - Liaison

- 2078 Allied joint operations require significant co-ordination and liaison. Liaison personnel should be exchanged between: the JFHQ and higher commands; adjacent units; Host Nation; force providing nations; international organisations involved in the operation and supporting forces assigned to the JF. Within the JF, exchange from liaison elements between the functional components is critical to facilitate co-ordination of these component commanders. Differences in language, culture, equipment, capabilities, doctrine and procedures are some of the challenges that mandate close co-operation. the requirement for liaison personnel is identified by STANAG 2101 – establishing liaison -. The JFC could identify additional requirements and request them at the earliest opportunity. The maximum use of liaison personnel, especially in operations involving non-NATO nations that may employ different doctrine or procedures, will enhance interoperability and contribute significantly to mission success.
- 2079 The establishment of a liaison network throughout the Allied Joint Force will be a major supporting ‘enabler’. During initial force generation planning, the requirement for the particular operational circumstances should be properly quantified in terms of quality personnel, communications and transport, then allowed for during initial force generation planning. The JFC will need to set policies and priorities to ensure a deliberate and structured allocation takes place at the earliest opportunity and certainly before the arrival of the main body. In PSO and humanitarian operations, there will be an additional need for liaison with the indigenous population and major aid agencies and international organisations, e.g., NGOs. If initial risks are high and main body forces are taking some time to deploy, there may be merit in deploying special liaison teams, possibly including SOF, in order to identify key players and gain initial access, before handing over to main body forces, once they are established.
- 2080 Liaison personnel generally represent the interests of the sending commander to the receiving commander, but can greatly promote understanding of the commander’s intent at both the sending and receiving headquarters. They should have the authority to speak for their Commander and be of sufficient rank to influence the decision making process at the level they are assigned. Liaison personnel should have sufficient knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the staff / unit they represent. They should also be innovative and tenacious, but at the same time diplomatic and sensitive in respect of the force element to which they are detailed.

- 2081 The sending Commander is responsible for ensuring that liaison personnel have sufficient communications equipment at their disposal to permit instantaneous communications with his command. This communication is especially important during the early stages of JF formation and planning. The receiving commander is responsible for providing the required equipment when liaison elements have to communicate on nets within the receiving command.

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CHAPTER 3 - THE PLANNING PROCESS OF ALLIED JOINT OPERATIONS

Section I – Introduction

- 3001 Planning for an operation is an essential function of command and, ultimately, it is the JFC who must direct planning and decide upon the course of action that will form the basis of the operation plan.
- 3002 Planning in a joint and multinational environment, in response to an escalating crisis, will present a considerable challenge. While the SC's role is to translate NATO's strategy, objectives and end states into a comprehensive strategic directive, and to be the authority for drawing together the resources required, it is the JFC's task to develop a coherent OPLAN, in line with the directive, and to make best use of his assigned forces. Once the planning process begins, it becomes a continuous and concurrent process: nationally, at the NATO military strategic level, and within the nominated JF HQ. The integration of numerous planning cycles, each being conducted at different locations and with varying constraints, will require careful co-ordination. Operation planning is the primary means by which a JFC can strive for unity of effort between component and national commanders, leading to a coherent plan for the operation. Furthermore, the OPLAN cannot be developed in a vacuum. The JFC will have to contend with decisions and constraints over which he has limited influence and he will be subjected to a range of pressures, from individual nations, the chain of command, the media and his adversary.
- 3003 For the planning of an operation the JFC will depend heavily upon his own staff and subordinate commanders. Time for planning will be a key factor in gathering information, conducting reconnaissance, establishing liaison, and developing options. In all circumstances, the key principle remains the ability to generate a timely decision that gives the JFC's subordinate commanders sufficient direction and time to conduct their own planning and disseminate orders.
- 3004 Planning, although structured, is not a mechanical process. It requires conceptual thought, imagination, intuition, and the ability to bring together both subjective and objective data. It is essentially a cognitive process based upon professional knowledge and insight. The challenge for the JFC, particularly in a joint and multinational environment, is to articulate his own vision in such a way that he can harmonise the efforts of his subordinates in order to produce an OPLAN that meets his requirements. Planning needs to be focused and relevant, and must aim to make best use of the capabilities available to the JFC.
- 3005 In circumstances where multiple joint operations are conducted concurrently within a theatre, it may be deemed necessary to develop a single, theatre-wide campaign plan to ensure proper co-ordination, unity of purpose and economy of effort of all military activities involved in the execution of, and support for, these operations. The campaign plan provides the overall authority and framework within which a series of related and subsidiary OPLANs are produced. The campaign plan expands on the operational concept by showing how a series of joint operations link together in a

theatre to achieve the end state. Thus, the campaign plan is the principal plan of a series of OPLANs.

Section II – Types of Planning

3006 The NATO Operational Planning System is described in MC 133/3 and detailed in the Bi-SC Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP). There are two principal types of NATO planning, Advance Planning and Crisis Response Planning, the product of which, in effect is the OPLAN.

Advance Planning

3007 Advance planning is conducted with a view to preparing the Alliance to deal with possible future security risks, either Article 5 or non-Article 5, and calls for two distinct types of plan, namely a Standing Defence Plan and a Contingency Operation Plan.

- a. A Standing Defence Plan is designed to cater for a long-term, short/no-notice Article 5 potential security risk. The requirement for a SDP would normally be identified in a NATO commander's Terms of Reference (TOR). The purpose of a SDP requires that it be a fully developed operational plan capable of execution, with command forces assigned and execution authority delegated to the appropriate level of command.
- b. A Contingency Operation Plan is designed to cater for a possible future security risk and would normally be based on one or more of the Planning Situations identified in the Bi-SC Defence Requirements Review. A COP must be based on a number of planning assumptions and, consequently, it will be insufficiently detailed to be capable of execution. Should a foreseen crisis materialise, the appropriate COP would require review and further development to take account of actual circumstances. To this end, a COP should address potential future force and capability requirements necessary for the conduct of the mission, out to the planning horizon. In this way, COPs will be able to assist in the refinement of the defence planning process.

Crisis Response Planning

3008 Crisis Response Planning is conducted in response to an actual, or developing, crisis, both article 5 and non-Article 5, and calls for the development of an OPLAN. The development of the OPLAN is the responsibility of the JFC and his staff. Once the OPLAN has been produced, following appropriate national and command consultation, approval is sought for it to be used as the basis of conducting the operation. Typically approval authority is held at the level that issued the Initiating Directive.

Operation Plan

3009 An OPLAN is designed to counter an actual or developing crisis, both Article 5 and non-Article 5. If a crisis was foreseen the OPLAN may be developed from an

appropriate COP; if the crisis was not foreseen the OPLAN must be developed in response to the prevailing circumstances. An OPLAN is a detailed and comprehensive plan capable of execution, which has forces assigned and all necessary preparations undertaken for successful execution of the assigned mission. Thus, the OPLAN is the parent plan for a single or series of Supporting Plans (SUPLANs). It should address the essential components of the overall operation, particularly the Concept of Operations, risk assessment, missions and tasks, Outline Force Requirements and C2 arrangements. It must also specify the subsequent SUPLANs which are required for supporting operations in the JOA. Because of the rapid manner in which crises can develop, it is essential that procedures are in place, throughout the NATO command structure, to allow for the timely and efficient development of OPLANs.

Operation Orders.

3010 Operation Orders (OPORDs) are written directives, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of affecting the co-ordination and execution of an operation. They are the executive instruments that may enact an OPLAN, and can be produced by commanders to give detailed instructions to their subordinates. Since they are based on approved OPLANs, they do not require further approval by higher authority but should be sent, for information, to the immediate superior commander.

Section III – Military Strategic Considerations

Military Strategic Direction

3011 Normally, the JFC can expect to base his planning upon the direction given to him by the MC via SC/RC. A CONOPS would be produced by the SC, outlining the mission, desired end state and C2 arrangements. Once approved by the MC/NAC, this document forms the basis upon which the JFC develops his own OPLAN. Thereafter, the SC/RC continues to monitor the operation, providing additional direction as required.

Joint Force Commander's Responsibilities

3012 The JFC has a number of principal responsibilities which he exercises within the framework of the military strategic direction given to him by NATO:

- a. Conducting the operational level assessment to identify the operational objectives.
- b. Developing a CONOPS and producing the OPLAN.
- c. Apportioning forces and resources to subordinate commanders in order to achieve their operational missions.

- d. Assessing the relative risks of CoAs and giving guidance to subordinate commanders on risk management.
- e. Establishing logistic requirements and setting priorities for the sustainment of operations.
- f. Establishing and prioritising his Commander's Critical Information Requirements and directing the production of the intelligence collection plan.
- g. Requesting changes to the ROE.
- h. Directing the production of a Joint Force PI plan to execute the SC PI policy.
- i. Establishing the JFHQ structure and working practices

3013 These responsibilities cannot be undertaken in isolation. They will require the closest liaison with the NATO SC/RC, the co-operation of the participating nations, be they NATO members, Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations, or others. Although the JFC and his staff conduct planning at the operational level, in practice, nations and NATO authorities have a collective responsibility for the planning and execution of NATO operations. This entails the interpretation of political objectives into military-strategic objectives that, in turn, can be used by the JFC to give direction to his operation planning. Linked to this need for a military-strategic framework for operations is the requirement for nations and NATO to prepare contingency plans in the event of changes to the political or military strategic situation.

Freedom of Action

3014 The JFC is required to conceive, plan and orchestrate all activities that are needed to seize and maintain the initiative in pursuit of the military strategic objectives. To achieve this, he must be given latitude to freely act to overcome the influence of national interests, sensitivities and constraints. It is important, however, that these are understood from the outset, in order that the JFC can set his objectives within a framework of what is achievable given the circumstances. Once this has been agreed, the JFC should be given the freedom of action to dictate the nature of major operations, battles and engagements, and the scope to deploy reserves, set priorities, and assign missions to his components. From this, the JFC should be able to state his intent, giving an outline concept of operations. In operational terms, the commander's freedom to act in executing the assigned mission is framed by the boundaries established by the nations. These limitations (constraints/restraints) are the products of the given military (space, time, and force) and non-military factors (political, diplomatic, economic, social, legal, etc.).

Rules of Engagement

3015 ROE are designed to ensure that application of force is carefully controlled. ROE are directives (in some nations orders) to military forces (including individuals) that define

the circumstances, conditions, degree and manner in which force, or actions which might be construed as provocative, may or may not be applied. ROE are applicable to situations ranging from peacetime operations to armed conflict. A well-defined ROE profile helps prevent unintentional or uncontrolled escalation. In peacetime or tension, the use of force is prohibited except in self-defence or when specifically authorised by ROE. NATO and NATO-led forces also have the right to use that force which is necessary and proportional to defend other NATO and NATO-led forces and personnel in the vicinity from attack or imminent attack. If hostilities break out, use of force will not be limited to defensive action as commanders must be able to seek out, engage and destroy, an opponent in accordance with the Principles of War and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Nevertheless, the strategic military direction given to the JFC may impose certain political and legal constraints, which may restrict his freedom of action.

- 3016 To be legitimate, NATO military operations must be conducted in accordance with the principles of international and national law, political and military guidance, and operational and diplomatic considerations. The ROE profile for an operation will be proposed by the relevant SC and agreed by the NAC. Within this framework and the direction of the NAC via SC/RC, the JFC sets out the parameters within which assigned military forces can operate. The ROE profile is then promulgated by the SC through a ROE Implementation message for use by the JFC and assigned forces. Notwithstanding the extent of force authorised in the ROE, it remains a command responsibility to use only that force which meets the principles of necessity and proportionality.
- 3017 Although commanders may delegate authority for operations, they always remain responsible for the conduct of their forces. To ensure that authorised force is properly applied, commanders at all levels must ensure that their subordinates:
- a. Understand and strictly adhere to the Law of Armed Conflict, the Geneva Conventions, the Hague Conventions, related protocols, and the various weapons conventions. All personnel will comply with the LOAC, whether in a humanitarian assistance operation, PSO or war.
 - b. All personnel will be trained to conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the LOAC/ROE in carrying out NATO missions. Commanders must ensure the ROE reflects the inherent differences and limitations of national policies caused by certain of the conventions and protocols. Critical to this success is the active, integrated participation of legal advisors. However, the commander and his operational staff retain the ultimate responsibility to train the forces and to draft the ROE.
- 3018 Ideally, there should be just one set of ROE, agreed by the NAC and all contributing nations, however, national differences often result in additional national limitations on ROE which may be more restrictive than NATO's ROE. This will be a major concern for the JFC and his subordinate commanders and may influence the assignment of troops to tasks. Divergent or contradictory ROE for national contingencies may, for example, derive from sensitivities about the subordination of national units to a NATO commander, restrictions of national law, or as a result of weaknesses in the

C2 arrangements. Cultural and legal differences between nations may also have an effect, for example, in the case of different national interpretations of self-defence, hostile act and hostile intent. The JFC will strive, through the auspices of the SC and MC/NAC, to establish uniform ROE throughout his command. This process can, however, be lengthy and, thus, the issue must be an early component of the planning process. The JFC must ensure that interpretation and application of the ROE down the respective chains of command and within components and contingents are consistent with that of the JFC.

- 3019 ROE augment the directives issued for a particular operation but they are not intended to be used to assign specific tasks or as a means of issuing tactical instructions. As the ROE profile is developed it is important that it meets the operational need and reflects the demands of the emerging OPLAN. At each stage of development the JFC is consulted to ensure that the profile being proposed agrees with these criteria. ROE, when authorised and implemented, are the JFC's rules for the use of force, and will reflect his military mission and the military strategic intent. The JFC may retain the authority to implement certain ROE.
- 3020 A commander at any level may request changes to ROE from his immediate superior, if he considers his ROE to be inadequate to allow him to fulfil his mission or to ensure the protection of his forces. When requesting changes to ROE it is essential for the commander to include the following elements in his justification:
- a. Explanation of the change request.
 - b. Rationale for the requested ROE changes.
 - c. Military consequences if requested ROE changes are not approved.

Section IV – Operation Planning

- 3021 The Operation Plan is the practical expression of operational art. There can only be one OPLAN to which individual components contribute, with a single commander at the operational level charged with responsibility for the formulation and conduct of that operation. In assembling his OPLAN, the JFC will use a number of building blocks, which provide a conceptual framework, which can be applied to any operation, regardless of its nature. These building blocks are known as planning tools.
- 3022 **Operation Planning.** Operation planning is a cognitive and conceptual exercise that involves preparing the estimate and a theatre assessment, then developing and establishing a theatre organisation and C2 structure. The main questions that a JFC and his staff will, at this stage, be seeking to answer are:
- a. What military conditions must be achieved in the JOA in order to achieve the strategic objective and end state?

- b. What sequence of actions is most likely to produce these conditions?
- c. How should the resources of the deployed force be applied in order to accomplish this sequence of actions?
- d. What are the potential risks in performing this sequence of action?

Planning Tools/Key operational concepts

- 3023 **End State.** The end state is the political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved.
- 3024 **Centre of Gravity.** CoGs are characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. CoG can be an aspect of an adversary's overall capability which, if attacked and defeated, will lead either to his ultimate defeat or a desire to seek peace. CoG may be an intangible factor such as the will of a government or people to continue to support the aims for which the operation is being conducted, or it may be a key military asset such as the C2 infrastructure. In PSO or humanitarian operations, where there is no identified adversary in the warfighting sense, the CoG may, for example, be the effective co-operation of the military together with NGOs and IOs.
- 3025 A CoG can exist at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, but is probably a less appropriate tool for use at the tactical level. It is for the JFC to focus on his own CoG at the operational level while being aware of the political and military strategic CoG that may impact on his own planning and freedom of action.
- 3026 As well as identifying an adversary's CoG, and considering ways of attacking it, the JFC must also assess how vulnerable his own CoG is to attack from the adversary, in order that he can protect it. Thus, identification of CoG, both friendly and adversary, is essential to the estimate process/analysis.
- 3027 **Decisive Point (DP).** A DP is a point from which a hostile or friendly CoG can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or the information environment. While it may be possible to defeat the adversary's CoG by direct attack, it is more likely that a series of co-ordinated actions will be required to eliminate it. Such actions may not necessarily constitute a battle or physical engagement, nor need they have a geographical relevance. The key is the effect that the actions have on the adversary. Thus, identification of DPs, both friendly and adversary, is an important part of the planning process. Furthermore, unless these DPs can be seen as contributing to the defeat of the adversary's CoG, then they risk a confusion of the aim and a waste of resources. Identifying the optimum number of DPs is consistent with economy of effort.
- 3028 **Lines of Operations.** Lines of operations link DPs in time and space on the path to the CoG. They connect a force with its base of operations and its objectives. Lines

of operations are conceptual planning tools; they do not link physical geographical features, nor do they prescribe the direction or axes of advance. Lines of operations establish the inter-relationship between DPs, to establish the critical path along which operations must develop en route to the CoG, in order that events and actions are sequenced to achieve the end state.

- 3029 **Main Effort.** Main Effort is a concentration of forces or means, in a particular area, where a commander seeks to bring about a decision. The concept of Main Effort provides a focus for the activity that the commander considers crucial to success. A commander states his main effort for the operation or for a particular phase in order that his subordinates understand where his priorities lie, so that in times of uncertainty, and as the situation changes and tactical orders may become inappropriate, subordinate commanders can take quick and independent action.
- 3030 **Operational Pause.** An operational pause is a periodic pause in operations that retains the initiative in other ways. Ideally, the operational pause should be planned in order to minimise the loss of tempo, but in some circumstances an unplanned operational pause will be necessary. Implicit in the term 'pause' will be the ability to re-activate the line of operation in order to maintain momentum and the initiative.
- 3031 **Sequencing and Phasing.** Sequencing is the arrangement of activities within an operation in terms of time and space, and resources. Although simultaneous action by all forces in all sectors may be ideal, lack of resources, and the desire to avoid unnecessary risk, will normally force the commander to sequence his actions. Once the overall sequencing of the operation has been determined, the JFC may wish to divide his Operation into phases. He should not, however, regard these two planning tools as immutable; the aim must always be to maintain tempo and avoid unnecessary pauses between phases.
- 3032 **Branches and Sequels.** In order to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing circumstances, it will be important that the JFC incorporates options into his plans. Careful consideration of the potential consequences of each phase will enhance the flexibility of the OPLAN. Alternate plans for each phase are known as branches; plans based on possible outcomes of each phase are known as sequels (See figure 3-1).
- a. **Branches.** Branches are options for a particular phase, designed to anticipate opportunities or reversals, providing the commander with the flexibility to retain the initiative.
 - b. **Sequels.** Sequels are options for the next phase. One of the sequels of the current phase may be the next pre-planned phase. However, to ensure that a phased operation can proceed in the face of setbacks, or in the event of unexpected success (for example, the collapse of an enemy at the tactical level), several options or sequels should be planned.




Figure 3.1 - Branches/Sequels

3033 **Culminating Point.** Operation reaches it culminating point when it can just are maintained but not developed to any greater advantage. In warfighting terms, it is the point at which an attacking force can no longer sustain an offence, and thus goes onto the defensive; or when a defending force can no longer hold and is forced to disengage or withdraw. The culminating point is difficult to predict, and, once it has been reached, the commander's options are much reduced. The art is to achieve the end state before there is a risk of reaching the culminating point, or plan operational pauses in order to avoid it. Identifying the adversary's culminating point will provide the commander with opportunities to develop his plans to advantage.

3034 **Direct and Indirect Approach.** The Operation can be conducted by employing an uninterrupted direct approach against the adversary's strengths, for example, his elite forces, or by an indirect approach against, for example his C2 or strategic logistics assets. Neither approach is likely to be exclusively the right one to follow. A fine balance between direct and indirect methods, which, in itself, may contribute to confusing and undermining the adversary, will normally be required. This balance is the essence of operational art.

Section V – The Estimate Process

- 3035 At all levels of command, there is a requirement for a fast and flexible decision making process. An estimate is a methodology to analyse and develop CoAs for a given situation taking into account all of the relevant factors, limitations and constraints. An estimate is an iterative process and may be reviewed during the course of planning for a situation as time permits or as more information becomes available.
- 3036 The estimate process is central to the formulation and updating of the OPLAN. The four key stages of an estimate are mission analysis, evaluation of factors, consideration of courses of action, and the commander's decision. The estimate process will lead to planning guidance being issued to the Component Commanders, enabling them to review and complete their own estimates.
- 3037 **Review of the Situation.** Prior to starting the planning process, the JFC will seek to gain as much background knowledge as possible of the context in which his operation must be planned. This geostrategic analysis should include the politico-diplomatic short and long term causes of the conflict. It should consider the political influences, including public will, competing demands for resources, and the political, economic, legal and moral constraints. Also included should be the international interests, positions of international organisations neutral to the conflict, international law and other competing or distracting international situations. Much of this information will be provided to the JFC by the strategic command.

Mission Analysis

- 3038 The planning process begins with the conduct of mission analysis, which should be led by the commander. Upon receipt of the Mission Directive, the JFC and his staff must first analyse the mission to determine precisely what the JF is to accomplish. This should include the determination of any implied tasks or preconditions (such as political imperatives) which must be satisfied in order to accomplish the overall mission, as well as the impact of time on the execution of the mission.
- 3039 The mission analysis should allow the JFC to focus initially on three of the operational planning tools: the end state, the CoG, and DPs. With the background knowledge gained from the review of the situation, together with details of the desired end state given to him by the MC/NAC, the JFC may, at this stage, be able to predict likely adversary and friendly CoG, and begin the process of determining his DPs. These, in turn, will lead him towards the adversary's CoG, while identifying vulnerabilities that will require protecting. Notwithstanding the potential value of these early assumptions, it will be important that they are not confirmed until all factors in the estimate have been thoroughly examined.
- 3040 The mission analysis should also consider what other instruments of policy, particularly diplomatic and economic, will be used to support the military strategic objectives. Planned military actions must complement diplomatic and economic activities conducted by the Alliance and the international community.

- 3041 Completion of his mission analysis will allow the commander to determine his mission statement, his initial critical information requirements and provide initial planning guidance to his staff, in order to focus their efforts. The guidance should clearly state the tasks to be accomplished and the framework within which the remainder of the estimate is to be conducted. It would normally be appropriate at this stage to issue a Planning Directive (a form of warning order) to the force components for the operation.

Evaluation of Factors

- 3042 Once the JFC has completed his mission analysis and issued his critical information requirements and staff planning guidance, the remainder of the estimate is completed, starting with an analysis of factors. The range and relative importance of factors will depend upon the type of operation. From an evaluation of the appropriate factors, a list of tasks necessary to achieve the overall mission will emerge. The examination of factors will also contribute to the refinement of the operational planning tools considered in the mission analysis, the enemy CoGs and the DPs which lead to their elimination. An analysis of factors should include the following:

- a. **Environment.** Each of the component environments will need to be analysed, focusing on those environmental factors likely to impact upon the operation. However, this analysis should avoid the detailed maritime, land and air environment factors which are rightly the province of the individual Component Commanders. This part of the analysis should also consider the characteristics of the JOA including military geography (topography, hydrography), climate and weather, transportation and telecommunications and make comparisons by day and night and under varying light levels. It should also embrace economics, social conditions, science and technology.
- b. **Adversary.** The analysis should consider the adversary situation, including his capabilities and vulnerabilities, normally based upon a formal intelligence assessment. The enemy's broad CoA should be considered, together with his political and military intentions and objectives, where known. The analysis of the adversary should also include his military strategic and operational advantages and limitations; possible external military support; CoG (strategic and operational); specific conventional and NBC operational characteristics (strength, composition, location and disposition, reinforcements, logistics, time and space factors, bases in use and available), and his combat effectiveness.
- c. **Friendly Forces.** The analysis of friendly forces should follow the same pattern as that for the enemy. It must include the capabilities and limitations of each of the component parts of the JF in relation to the effect they can have on the adversary. Account should also be taken of those non-military, governmental, non-governmental, and international organisations operating within the JOA. Identification of mobility, sustainability, and infrastructure requirements to support the operation is an important element in the analysis of friendly forces.

- d. **Time and Space.** An analysis of time and space is essential if the JFC is to sequence the lines of operation effectively within his OPLAN. He must also keep in mind the time and space needed by each of his Component Commanders to achieve their tasks if the overall OPLAN is to be coherent. He must also take account of the time and space necessary for the non-military lines of operation such as political, diplomatic and economic activity, ensuring that these are co-ordinated with his own operation planning.
 - e. **Surprise and Security.** At the operational level, surprise and security are probably even more important to the success of the operation than they are at the tactical level, and greater resources will generally be available to achieve them. Surprise is predicated on security. At the operational level this is achieved through Operations Security and Force Protection. Effective security measures deny the adversary information on friendly forces and prevents him interfering with their actions. The element of surprise can then be used by friendly forces to take the initiative and influence the adversary's decision-action cycle. This effect can be magnified by a well co-ordinated deception plan that supplies the adversary with false information, leading him to believe that he has accurately predicted his opponent's likely course of action. The deductions made in this part of the estimate must be available to the Component Commanders in order that they can incorporate the analysis into their own estimates.
 - f. **Other Factors.** This list of factors is not exhaustive. Others will apply dependent upon circumstances and the nature of the operation.
- 3043 **Summary of Tasks.** Once all the factors have been analysed, the deductions will have helped to define, in more detail, the principal tasks, and identified the decisive points and any additional tasks, which will need to be undertaken in order to achieve the mission. These tasks should be tabulated as a Summary of Tasks. The DPs and tasks will then need to be sequenced, in order to maximise the capabilities of the assigned forces and identify any limitations.

Courses of Action

- 3044 **Consideration.** The next stage of the process is to develop the friendly CoAs derived from the analysis of factors in order to produce options for the commander. Each CoA must be credible and achievable, and should be developed with a concept of operations, including mission outlines, the forces required (including reserves), the logistic concept, estimated time and space calculations. The effect of adversary action on each CoA should be analysed taking account of as many variable factors as time allows. The analysis also includes a test for validity:
- a. **Suitability.** If executed and phased in the manner described, will the CoA result in mission accomplishment?
 - b. **Feasibility.** Is the CoA achievable with the allocated resources?
 - c. **Acceptability.** Does the CoA employ military forces and material resources efficiently and within accepted NATO guidelines and levels of risk?

- d. Exclusivity. Is the CoA sufficiently varied from other CoAs being considered to clearly differentiate its comparative advantages and disadvantages?
- e. Completeness. Is the CoA complete?

The consideration also determines any additional requirements; makes any necessary modifications; and lists the advantages and disadvantages of each CoA. If available, Operational Analysis staff will be invaluable in assisting with this task.

- 3045 **Comparison.** The penultimate stage of this process is to compare the developed CoAs by identifying their advantages and disadvantages. If appropriate, certain elements of different CoAs can be merged to form one. Again, OA can be a useful tool.

The Commander's Decision

- 3046 The estimate provides the JFC the opportunity to examine all relevant factors, to analyse courses of action and to determine the best CoA from which a concept of operations is developed. Once the CONOPS is approved by the MC/NAC, the JFC's staff will be able to conduct detailed operation planning. In selecting the preferred CoA for the JFC's decision it should be borne in mind that alternative CoAs to that chosen may provide a sound basis for branch planning or deception operations.

Section VI - The Production of the OPLAN

- 3047 Once the MC/NAC has approved the CONOPS the JFC will issue planning guidance to enable his subordinate commanders and their staffs to complete their own estimates and plans. This guidance should include a statement of the JFC's mission, his intent and concept of operations, and assign missions to the Component Commanders.
- 3048 **Concept of Operations.** The CONOPS is the means by which the JFC expresses his vision of purpose for the forthcoming Operation. At the operational level, the CONOPS will explain how the commander intends to attain his objectives, while informing both his superiors and subordinates of his intentions. The CONOPS needs to be carefully balanced: not too prescriptive as to be inflexible, but with sufficient detail to give subordinates a clear and overall understanding of the commander's intentions. The commander's intent and his main effort are means by which this can be communicated:
- 3049 **Commander's Intent.** The commander's intent should state succinctly how the JF is to achieve the end state by describing how the JFC sees the components of the force operating within the overall OPLAN. The intent must focus on the effect the JF is to have on the adversary. It is the JFC's vision of how the operation is to be conducted and its purpose. For every mission, the commander determines what should be achieved and develops plans for the force to accomplish the mission. This visualisation embodies the intent for the conduct and outcome of the operation. It is

a mental picture of the current situation and intended end-state, and how to move from one to the other. The commander must transmit this vision to subordinates in clear and simple terms. This is accomplished through the articulation of the commander's intent. Later, the commander, assisted by the staff, will delineate the specific details of the operation through the concept of the operation. The commander's intent is the statement that provides the linkage between the operational objectives and the OPLAN and must reflect the military and civil-military dimensions of an operation.

- 3050 Because of its criticality, it is essential that the commander personally prepares and delivers the intent. While time constraints and combat conditions may require the commander to deliver the intent verbally, possibly even by radio or electronic means, it is best when it is articulated to subordinates personally and in written form. Face-to-face delivery ensures mutual understanding of what the issuing commander wants, and the provision of a hard copy provides subordinates with the corner stone of their own planning.
- 3051 The commander's intent statement is the commander's personal expression of why an operation is being conducted and what should be achieved. The intent is an expansion and expression of how a commander intends for an operation to progress. It is a clear and concise statement of a mission's overall purpose, the resulting end-state, and any essential information on how to get to that end-state; it must be clearly understood by all subordinate commanders for adequate preparation of their own orders.
- 3052 The intent statement is the unifying concept for all elements of the force. It provides an overall framework within which subordinate commanders may operate. It pertains even when a plan or concept of operations no longer applies, or circumstances require subordinates to make decisions that support the ultimate goal of the force as a whole rather than a set of sequenced events that may no longer reflect what 'makes sense' at that time or place.
- 3053 In stating the intent, the issuing commander provides subordinates with the freedom to operate within the larger context of the mission, rather than within the restrictions of a particular concept of operations or scheme of manoeuvre. The commander's intent provides subordinates with the flexibility to adapt their actions to achieve success. By focusing on the end-state rather than sequential events, it allows commanders to operate with increased speed and efficiency in decision-making. This allows subordinate forces, and hence the whole force, to operate faster, and with greater agility, than the adversary. This keeps the adversary off-balance and unable to respond coherently.
- 3054 **Main Effort.** The main effort provides a focus for the activity that the commander considers crucial to the success of the mission. The JFC identifies a main effort so that, in a fluid and fast moving situation, his subordinates can understand his intent, and take quick and independent action to support that intent. This focuses effort, contributing to success.

3055 **Operation Plan.** The development of the OPLAN is based on the approved CONOPS. An OPLAN will normally include the following aspects:

- a. Securing the sea, land, and air line of communication to, and within, the JOA.
- b. Establishing and maintaining the required level of sea and air control in the JOA.
- c. Deployment.
- d. Allocation of forces and resources to Component Commanders to achieve the military strategic end state.
- e. The application of INFO OPS.
- f. Mounting of maritime, land, and air operations commensurate with the military capabilities of the assigned forces.
- g. Resupply; Sustainability of the force, including logistics, combat service support, medical and health support, and Host Nation Support.
- h. Redeployment.

The JFC will conduct final consultations with his subordinate commanders before the OPLAN and detailed operation orders are issued.

3056 **Operation Order.** OPORDS are produced by commanders to provide the details of the forthcoming operation to their subordinate commanders. The five main headings for the OPORD are:


- (1) SITUATION
- (2) MISSION
- (3) EXECUTION
- (4) SERVICE SUPPORT
- (5) COMMAND AND SIGNAL

Annexes:

Annex 3A: Planning Tools

Annex 3B: Operation Planning Concepts


ANNEX 3A - PLANNING TOOLS



3A-1

ORIGINAL

ANNEX 3B OPERATION PLANNING CONCEPTS



NOTES

1. Political Direction sets the Military Strategic End-State and directs other non military Lines of Operation (see note 9). It provides the criteria for the Military Strategic Directive to the JFC.
 2..The Military Strategic Directive identifies the End-State. It provides the Means (Allocation of Resources), the Ways (Mission and Guidance on use of Resources) and outlines Constraints.
 3..The operation Plan flows from the Directive, Mission Analysis and Estimate. It utilises the peration Planning Tools to achieve the End State.

4. Military Lines of Operation within the operation are not environmentally exclusive; they are Joint lines whenever necessary. Decisive Points are sequenced in time and space on Lines of Operation. This Sequencing can be assisted by Phases.
 6. Operational Pauses may be introduced as necessary.
 7. Branches are formulated and continuously refined as the operation develops. They may be introduced to Lines of Operation, within Phases, whenever necessary.

8..Sequels are also formulated and refined; they are introduced when Phases are not completed as planned.
 9. Other Lines of Operation (such as Political, Economic, Humanitarian or Media) do not sit entirely within the JFC's operation Plan, but they must be co-ordinated with his Military Lines of Operation; the line at the bottom of the operation Plan box is thus dotted rather than solid.
 10. A culmination point may prevent the commander from eliminating the enemy CoG.

CHAPTER 4 - ESTABLISHING THE ALLIED JOINT FORCE

Section I — Introduction

- 4001 This chapter deals with the functional and chronological aspects of the Establishment Phase of a joint operation. They present the JFC and the Component Commanders with a joint insight in the challenges and problems they may encounter on the way towards the successful conclusion of the operation. This includes a discussion of the shared responsibilities among national military authorities, the Strategic Commanders, the JFC, and his Component Commanders, related to the activities of the Joint Force during the Establishment Phase.
- 4002 The JFC will deploy the forces assigned to him to the JOA. He has to protect, build up and train these forces, establish LOC and liaison with the host nation(s), International Organisations and relevant agencies. He has to shape the JOA, in order to facilitate the actual conduct of the operation. Collectively, these activities can be defined as the Establishment Phase.
- 4003 **Establishment Phase.** Steps the JFC may consider as part of the Establishment Phase are:
- a. Establish C2 for the JF and communications arrangements with the NATO HQs and through the Strategic Commander with the Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs).
 - b. Create and protect the LOCs infrastructure.
 - c. Co-ordinate the deployment of the forces.
 - d. Build up the forces.
 - e. Prepare and train the forces within the JOA.
 - f. Protect and secure the forces.
 - g. Install, when required, a liaison network.
 - h. Conduct, when required, preliminary operations.
- 4004 Many of the activities that are conducted during the Establishment Phase are not the JFC's primary responsibility. Quite often, he depends on the SCs or the TCNs to facilitate the activities of the JF. For example, the strategic deployment is predominantly a national responsibility, with the Strategic Commander in a co-ordinating role and the JFC often only monitoring the progress. Also, the JFC has limited influence over initial preparation and training of the national troop contributions, although he can be asked to issue directives and guidance on the focus of the preparation and training programme. Yet, at a certain moment the JFC

will play a more dominant role and have his authority formally invested. After Transfer of Authority of the national troop contributions, the JFC will be, among other aspects of the operation, in charge of the protection and security of the forces, their build-up (including intra-JOA preparation and training) and, when required, the conduct of preliminary operations. Even then however, a number of constraints will be placed upon the JFC by the Strategic Commander and the TCNs. Additionally, the activities of the adversary or adversaries and the media will have an effect on the conduct of operations during the Establishment Phase.

Section II: Factors for Establishing Forces in the JOA

- 4005 The Establishment Phase of a multinational joint operation has its own specific dynamics and characteristics. A number of particular factors involved in this phase are outlined in this section.
- 4006 **Basis for success.** Although the Establishment Phase of any military operation has not always been considered crucial by everyone, recent crises have provided sufficient evidence that it presents the JFC with an opportunity to create a relatively favourable starting position prior to the actual conduct of the operation. The Establishment Phase can easily be disturbed or disrupted by an adversary, a fact anyone within the staff of the JF HQ and the CC HQ should be aware of. Clear and unhindered access to the JOA is fundamental to the success of an operation. It is essential that the LOC are secured and maintained whenever possible. Strategic LOC will remain a national responsibility co-ordinated by the national authorities, in close conjunction with Strategic Commanders. However, the number and type of assets assigned to this mission will clearly be dependent upon the operational and political environment.
- 4007 **Enabling Forces.** The initial arrival of forces in the JOA must provide an early and viable capability, with the necessary logistic support, to meet the JFC's mission requirements. The arrival of these so-called "Enabling Forces" is a vital part of the deployment process, as co-ordinated by the respective SC's Allied Movement Co-ordination Centre (AMCC). This deployment is executed in accordance with the Strategic Commander's Allied Disposition List (ADL), based upon the JFC's Commander's Required Date (CRD) as well as the JFC's relevant Direction and Guidance. The assessment of the situation in the JOA and the right mix of combat, combat support and combat service support elements within the Enabling Forces - based upon that assessment - is indeed one of the most difficult and important challenges for the JFC, the Component Commanders and their staffs. This task is made even more complicated by the constraints of the available strategic lift, both in capacity and dimension.
- 4008 The JFC should be granted co-ordinating authority at the earliest possible stage in order to facilitate the set-up of forces in the JOA and to enforce the commander's intent. Once selected, Points of Debarkation (PODs) and Forward Mounting Bases (FMBs) will need to be established prior to the deployment of the main force. To ensure the correct level of reception at the PODs or FMBs, it is essential that advance logistic resources be deployed early, enabling speedy onward movement.

The exact composition of the logistic enabling forces will be operation dependent and, therefore, the importance of a pre-deployment survey cannot be over-stressed.

- 4009 **Entry operations** may be required to gain a foothold in the JOA and establish secure PODs and Holding Areas (HAs). The establishment of the JF into the JOA hinges upon the successful initial entry of forces. It is possible that this entry is hindered by the parties involved in the conflict (or even third parties), with the aim of creating a favourable position relative to the JF prior to the commencement of its build up. In that case, the JFC could decide to conduct entry operations, which would imply the employment of manoeuvre elements disposing of combat power to establish a secure foothold in the JOA. A combination of Special Operations Forces, airborne forces, air assault/helicopter borne forces, amphibious forces, and follow-on forces could be tasked to create such a foothold, that would subsequently be expanded and used to successfully establish the JF in the JOA. However, these operations should not be confused with Preliminary Operations, as directed by the JFC, that could be performed prior to the conduct of the operation, and that are explained in more detail at the end of this chapter.
- 4010 **Assessment of capabilities.** The earliest and correct assessment of the infrastructure capabilities within the JOA is vital to the operation. The organisation of a liaison network, especially with the host nation(s) providing support, allies, coalition partners and the many other agencies likely to be operating in the JOA, can assist in gathering information to facilitate the analysis of the capabilities and shortfalls of the reception facilities within the JOA. By identifying the shortfalls, the JFC can, in close conjunction with the SC, enhance the infrastructure capabilities within the JOA with military and/or commercially hired installations and facilities.
- 4011 **Main effort.** The main effort of the operation is focused initially on intelligence and logistics. The early development of an intelligence architecture greatly facilitates the actual conduct of the operation. This requires the JFC to determine as soon as possible his Commanders Critical Information Requirements and the intelligence community to put in place a robust and versatile intelligence network. The creation of an adequate sustainment capability for the operation is a vital part of the Establishment Phase and determines whether the operation can be conducted at all and at what moment. It greatly depends on the levels of stock that have been brought into the JOA, the level of efficiency of that specific part of the operation and on other preparatory logistic measures that facilitate subsequent activities by the forces.
- 4012 **Protection/security/safety.** Protection is crucial to the successful build up of the JF. It implies that part of the forces will be used to execute this task and therefore, may not be available for other tasks. When required, the protection of LOCs outside the JOA has to be arranged by the NATO Nations and the SCs. Furthermore, the JFC is required to take measures to safeguard personnel, documents and equipment from the variety of threats that the JF can be confronted with, ranging from well-organised, large-scale adversary combat operations to small-scale subversive and terrorist actions. Force protection should also address safety regulations to prevent unnecessary loss of life or equipment within the JF or with the local population in the

JOA as a result of unsafe behaviour by individuals belonging to the JF prior to the actual conduct of the operation.

- 4013 **Public Support.** During the Establishment Phase of an operation, the JFC will initiate Public Information activities with the aim of influencing the public opinion within the JOA and national capitals. The main effort of this element of his overall campaign will be to ensure and promote the legitimacy of the forces' presence and objectives. To achieve the desired aim, the JFC will direct all available and relevant elements and functions of the JF, such as PSYOPS, Media Operations and PI activities, according to a common strategy, as promulgated regularly by his HQ through the JFC Public Information Officer. Since timing is of essence, the former could imply that elements of the Enabling Forces will also be involved in these operations and activities. This in turn means that the structure of the Enabling Forces is partly determined by the demand for elements that are capable of conducting these operations. Evidence of public support within the JOA could have a positive effect on the support by the TCN's parliaments and general public and thereby facilitate both the conduct and the outcome of the operation.

Section III - Establishment and Protection of the LOC Infrastructure

Reception Facilities

- 4014 **Sea- Air- and Rail-Points of Debarkation.** The Point of Debarkation is likely to be a Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD), an Air Port of Debarkation (APOD) or a Rail Point of Debarkation (RPOD), through which forces and supplies can be deployed into the JOA. However, movement may also be by road. The POD is usually, but not necessarily, inside the JOA. Expected disruption by adversary elements may influence the selection of PODs. The selection of PODs is mainly a responsibility of the TCNs. As it is a crucial matter for the Strategic Commander and the JFC, they may advise on the selection as appropriate. De-confliction will take place in movement conferences on strategic and operational level.
- 4015 **Forward Mounting Base.** A FMB is a base, frequently a port, airfield or railhead, from which an operation may be launched into the JOA, particularly if the JOA is at the end of a long or vulnerable strategic LOC. A FMB is normally within a SC's AOR, but not necessarily within the JOA. A FMB must be secure and not be directly exposed to, or at risk from, adversary action. An essential stepping stone into the JOA, the FMB should have the capacity for an insertion force to form-up within it, and subsequently should be able to handle reinforcements, reserves and evacuees. Its selection and occupation is a strategic matter for the Strategic Commander with advice from the JFC.
- 4016 **Forward Operating Base.** A Forward Operating Base (FOB) is a locality within the JOA from which subsequent operations are projected. Its selection and use is an operational matter for the JFC and his Component Commanders and forms part of the OPLAN.

Host Nation Support (HNS)

- 4017 HNS concept. HNS is civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis and war by a host nation to NATO and/or other forces and NATO organisations which are located on, operating on/from, or in transit through the host nation's territory. The basis for such assistance are commitments arising from NATO, bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded between the host nation, NATO organisations and the nation(s) having forces operating in the host nation's territory.
- 4018 **Relations with the Host Nation.** Before deployment of a force, or the staging of forces in or through another state, it will normally be necessary to obtain clearance from the host nation. Once this has been granted, the more detailed co-ordination of relations with the host nation will start in earnest. The provision of HNS will often involve bilateral or multilateral agreements to detail the agreed levels of support. The JFC is likely to be granted authority to implement and manage existing HNS arrangements. Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) and Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) will be established at the strategic level, but their application will be the responsibility of the J4 and J9 staffs in the JFHQ with the advice of the HQ Legal Advisor.
- 4019 The early incorporation of HNS capabilities into the force logistic support system, which CCs logistic elements can 'plug into', will be one of the JFC's top priorities. In certain circumstances, the JFC may also be authorised to negotiate new arrangements with governments in his JOA. The development of HNS would normally be co-ordinated by the Strategic Commander under the direction of NATO HQ. The Strategic Commander would delegate operational management to the JFC for co-ordination by the Component Commanders. Detailed HNS guidance is contained within the AJP-4 and AJP-9.
- 4020 Operational success may well depend on the civil and military support given to the JF by the nations located within the JOA. Co-ordination of this support should be pre-planned, wherever possible, and negotiated as a function of advanced planning or at an early stage of the crisis response planning. Even where a humanitarian crisis is absent, the introduction of a large military force can reduce the available civil resources to the point of hardship for the civilian population. It is the task of CIMIC to ensure that a thorough assessment of civil resources is carried out and that clear guidance is given to ensure that any unnecessary hardship is avoided. Additionally, CIMIC must assess the impact of military presence on the local economy so as to prevent damage to the economy through misapplication of military or civilian resources. All arrangements should be prepared by a single authority (normally the Strategic Commander for his respective AOR for strategic planning and the assigned CJTF Parent HQ for operational planning). The implementation of HNS plans (normally provided within Technical Arrangements or Implementing Arrangements) should be managed and co-ordinated by a single intra-JOA authority on behalf of the JFC.
- 4021 **Multinational Operations.** Since the operation is conducted multinationally and the JF consists of a number of national contingents, the JFC should seek to ensure that HNS plans are co-ordinated with these national contingents in addition to the host

nation. This assists in both the management of intra-JOA resources and cost control (competition for resources among TCNs will inevitably inflate prices). Therefore, it is essential to assign a staff element within the JFHQ the responsibility for the effective distribution of resources. It is possible that a host nation may promise the same facilities to more than one TCN even within the same JF. Close co-ordination with allies is therefore necessary to avoid double counting of resources. For NATO operations beyond the NATO boundaries, the JFC and/or the relevant Strategic Commander will put a central co-ordinating authority in place.

Contracting

- 4022 Contracting has become increasingly important to the conduct of operations. During the Establishment Phase of an operation, the SC's Head of Contracts (HOC) will exercise technical supervision and oversight of all procurement activities associated with the NATO operation. It is likely that during an Article 5-operation the bulk of co-ordinating activities for contracting will rest with the host nation. In PSO however, the likely lack of pre-existing HNS agreements will imply much greater efforts by NATO commanders at the strategic and operational levels to co-ordinate contracting.
- 4023 Within the JOA, contracting activities are usually conducted from the Multinational Joint Logistics Centre in the JFHQ. Although national contracting may exist, the organisational element that is primarily responsible for contracting is the Theatre Allied Contracting Office (TACO). TACO facilitates the contracting requirements on behalf of the TCN and the NATO Commands. This does not imply that NATO always funds these requirements. In fact, requirements will be funded either by the TCNs or by NATO. This dual funding chain must be recognised and appropriate accounting procedures implemented to keep the process co-ordinated but separate. Contracting information should be provided to other parties and contracts should be open ended to permit additional parties to accept the same terms. The functions of the Strategic Commander's HOC and TACO are described in more detail in the AJP-4.

Enabling Forces

- 4024 The flow of incoming resources to a POD must not be greater than the handling capacity of the receiving unit, unless Holding Areas have been set up. Indeed, for large or complex operations, it may be necessary to plan on using HAs from the outset, to allow acclimatisation, the creation of formations, and their preparation prior to deployment into the JOA.
- 4025 **Operational Lines of Communications.** LOC are all the land, water and air routes that connect an operating military force with one or more bases of operations, and along which supplies and reinforcements move. Operational LOC are the responsibility of the JFC and should be established as early as possible. Operational LOC, particularly road and rail, are rarely uniquely available to NATO forces. The indigenous population, aid agencies and local forces will all rely on them. Early clarity concerning responsibility and authority for the co-ordination of their use and for their maintenance and development will be required.

- 4026 **Protection.** The JFC will consider the risk to the JF during all phases of its deployment. During the strategic movement, protection of the LOC might be required, especially when potentially hostile states are present in the vicinity, and on passing through choke points. Even as the Enabling Forces are establishing themselves in the JOA, they must have a defensive capability. The ability to project military power forward will depend on their ability to operate from and through secure bases. The physical location of PODs and FMBs, their vulnerability and the support available from the host nation, are major factors in their selection, and will also determine their protection requirements.
- 4027 In addition to the physical security of these reception facilities and bases, OPSEC measures, PSYOPS and even limited offensive actions in the form of Preliminary Operations, may be required to influence opposing force dispositions, expectations, and their combat effectiveness. The deployment of specific protection forces implies a movement priority to ensure they are in place in time to cover the deployment from the start until its completion. Consideration must be given to the employment of protection forces in other roles as the operation unfolds. Squaring the demands for command and control of protection forces within the Joint Rear Area (JRA) could influence the JFC to make one of his Component Commanders responsible for the security in the JRA.

Section IV – Deployment

- 4028 **Aspects of deployment.** The deployment of the JF is guided by a number of aspects, of which the most relevant and important are:
- a. The mission of the JF.
 - b. The relationship with transit nations and host nations.
 - c. The deployment environment.
 - d. The responsibilities of the TCNs, the Strategic Commanders, the JFC and the Component Commanders.
 - e. The availability and requirement of strategic lift.
 - f. The protection of the strategic lift.
 - g. The operational situation in the JOA.

The relationship with transit and host nations

- 4029 **Diplomatic clearance (DIPCLEAR).** The requirement to obtain clearance prior to entering or transiting a nation's airspace, territory or territorial waters affects all aspects of force planning and deployment. Overflight constraints have often

undermined air power's access to required airspace. The 1944 Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation declared that every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory. No Alliance aircraft may fly over, or land on, the territory of a foreign nation without prior authorisation, known as Diplomatic Clearance. Before TOA DIPCLEAR is a national responsibility. After TOA DIPCLEAR for the forces is normally a responsibility for the relevant NATO Command Authorities. In periods of increased tension or conflict, it may not be possible to obtain DIPCLEAR from some nations. In order to prevent possible threats to aircraft or ship security and prejudicing diplomatic relations further, alternative routings should be used if practicable. However, in some circumstances, it may be necessary to ignore diplomatic constraints and plan to establish and maintain LOC through potentially hostile environments. This may also be the case for maritime assets and a certain degree of sea control may be required to allow safe transit along SLOC. This may be established during the transit phase by the dispatch of a sea control group in advance of the main force deployment. However, as laid out in the UN Conference on Laws of the Sea 3, naval vessels are entitled to exercise Right of Innocent Passage through another nation's territorial water. During this passage the vessels are to undertake no military activity and use a recognised route. An alternative to gaining sea control is to employ the use of convoys to protect chartered or requisitioned shipping.

- 4030 **Transit Nation.** The deployment of the elements of the JF from their respective home bases to the JOA will often depend on the use of the infrastructure of non-NATO nations. Early liaison by the SC HQ with the nations identified as being critical to the successful deployment of the forces, facilitates the actual use of these transit nations' infrastructure. Legal and financial aspects must be negotiated between NATO representatives and the transit nations' authorities, but equally important are arrangements concerning the safety and security of personnel and equipment, while on the territory of the transit nation.
- 4031 **Host Nation Support.** The deployment of a JF into the JOA will often depend upon HNS and local resources, as well as mobile, flexible and reusable infrastructures to support forces. However, HNS and local resources may be minimal or scarce. Based upon the initial assessment of the HNS available in the JOA, the JFC must ascertain the viability of HNS before the deployment of Enabling Forces. Early planning by the SC HQ and the CJTF Parent HQ should identify the capabilities and shortfalls of HNS and local resources including resources used by IOs and NGOs to provide humanitarian support, so the Strategic Commander and the JFC are capable of channelling national and NATO resources to meet the shortfalls. The process that is used to this end, the Capability Package, is described in detail in the AJP-4.

Deployment responsibilities

- 4032 The TCNs are primarily responsible, in close conjunction and co-ordination with the SC, for the deployment of their national contingents from the respective home bases to the PODs. The SC, in conjunction with the nations providing the strategic lift assets,- creates the conditions for the safe and timely deployment. Furthermore, the SC co-ordinates the flow of personnel and equipment according to the Allied Disposition List thereby co-ordinating the orderly flow of forces into the JOA.

Transport Arrangements

- 4033 For large scale operations, the NATO nations would need to provide significant strategic lift either from military resources or commercial charter. Another option, but one that is only likely to be implemented in an extreme situation is the use of Ships/Aircraft Taken Up from Trade (STUFT/ATUFT). STUFT/ATUFT differ significantly from chartering because they require government legislation, and the nations are required to return the vessel/aircraft back to its owner in its original state. When vessels or aircraft are chartered the obligation/responsibility for its condition remains with the owner.
- 4034 Commercially hired lift will be required to deploy the forces to the JOA, since most NATO nations do not have sufficient strategic lift capacity to transport their own national contingents, let alone support other nations. However, the use of commercial resources is not the panacea for military deficiencies since the use of commercially chartered assets, aircraft in particular, involves special considerations.
- a. **Cargo.** Civil aircraft normally have limitations in their cargo-carrying capability, especially in relation to bulky or heavy items of military equipment.
 - b. **Infrastructure.** Modern civil aircraft are designed to utilise well equipped civil airports.
 - c. **Flight Safety.** Commercial aircraft are not fitted with any form of self-defence, and may be restricted in conflict by flight safety factors.
 - d. **Legislation and Costs.** Insurance and indemnity provisions, Civil Aviation Authority regulations, legal requirements demanded by aircraft owners, and civilian involvement in danger areas could pose problems with the use of civilian aircraft. Both STUFT/ATUFT and commercial charter may attract high costs, though in different ways.
 - e. **Third Geneva Convention (1949).** Civil crews are entitled to protection under the art. 4.a.(4) and (5) of the Third Geneva Convention and must be briefed accordingly and issued with the appropriate identity cards by the hiring, chartering or commandeering authority.
- 4035 During the planning phase of a deployment, the SC's AMCC will be able to co-ordinate acquisition timelines for both aircraft and shipping. A key factor in the acquisition of commercial shipping is the seaworthiness of the vessel. Unlike aircraft, maritime vessels do not have to undergo such rigorous maintenance inspections and schedules.
- 4036 Since strategic lift, whether military, chartered, STUFT/ATUFT or otherwise obtained, is scarce, its vulnerability for attack and/or sabotage is obvious. Therefore, all efforts must be made to protect and defend the available lift capacity. The SPODs and APODs and those parts of the strategic LOC that lie within the JOA must be secured and protected by dedicated forces.

Intra-JOA deployment

- 4037 The onward movement of the national land contingents and/or the established formations from the PODs via HAs and Assembly Areas (AAs) into AOs requires an intra-JOA lift capacity, which is different in nature from strategic lift. The requirements of operational lift (i.e., size, dimensions, numbers, operational reach, defensive capabilities) demand a different type of asset both in quality and quantity. As with the strategic deployment, the intra-JOA deployment will be facilitated by national lift capacity, usually provided to the national contingents, but on a case-to-case basis also made available for other contingents and/or formations.
- 4038 Certain elements of the JF are capable of self-deployment within the JOA. The limits of this relative autonomy are determined by the scale of the supporting equipment, the distance between the reception facilities and the ordered new location, whether HA, AA or AO, as well as by the size of the formation. In specific operations however, an autonomous intra-JOA deployment may not be acceptable, e.g. for political reasons or for damage control purposes.

Section V - Build up of Force

- 4039 The appropriate mix of JFs must flow into the JOA to achieve the right balance of capability to task. This will be reflected in the Allied Force List (AFL) and the ADL, which support the JFC's intent by providing the required disciplines at the right time. Since the JF will only be able to conduct its subsequent operations when a sufficient sustainment capacity has been established, the JFC is forced to set initial priorities for the sustainment of the operations of the JF. This implies that the required sustainment capacity quite often determines the initial available manoeuvre capacity. The JFC could, as part of his decision-making process, increase the level of acceptable risks in this phase of the operation.
- 4040 However, in any emerging crisis, there will need to be a range of force options available to ensure quick and effective exploitation or reaction to changing events. As in any multinational operation, force balance must reflect overall force availability and make best use of burden sharing. There will be considerable temptation for the potential misuse of relatively small, high value, assets with unique capabilities. Force levels may include both those forces deployed and those held at a reduced Notice To Move (NTM) in the JRA, a HA, an FMB or even back in the national home bases. Lastly, it must be remembered that, even though an operation may have been approved by the NAC, further approval may be required for the deployment of assigned reinforcement forces; lead time to obtain approval may impact operational availability and must be highlighted in the deployment timeline.
- 4041 During the build up of the forces, the JF expands rapidly in size, which implies that the level of burden by the forces on the host nation(s) will increase dramatically. The JFC will endeavour to keep relations with the leadership of the host nation(s) as close and comfortable as possible and maintain support for the JF's presence at a high level. Public Information initiatives in the JOA can possibly facilitate the achievement of this aim. Under no circumstances must the JF adversely influence life in the host nation(s) to such a degree that the public and political support within

the host nation(s) is weakened or, even worse, lost permanently. This requires restraint, consideration for local customs and traditions and a flexible conduct of all activities by all members of the JF.

Section VI - Preparation and Training

4042 The following factors apply to the JF's preparation and training which should be:

- a. Preferably multinational and joint as well as involving the host nation where possible.
- b. Responsibility of the JFC and the Component Commanders.
- c. Preferably intra-JOA, to confront the forces with the reality (e.g., topography, geography, weather) in the JOA.
- d. Providing the opponent/parties with a signal of the intentions and capabilities of the forces.
- e. Not just focused on manoeuvre elements and combat support elements, but must also include logistic elements and HQs.

4043 The scale and level of reality of the preparation and training program can be limited by OPSEC measures.

Training Responsibilities.

4044 The JFC is responsible for the direction and guidance of the intra-JOA training programme to be implemented if time and opportunity permit. The JFC will promulgate the directives for the training programme after consultation with the Component Commanders and the Strategic Commander. These directives will include standardisation requirements to ensure equal standards for all TCNs, including non-NATO nations. The JFC, together with his Component Commanders, will oversee the training programme to verify the readiness of his forces.

4045 The TCNs are responsible for providing ready trained and equipped forces to meet the operational requirements. The nature of an operation may create specific and unforeseen demands, particularly on logistic and equipment preparation, while unanticipated availability of HNS may simplify it. Prior information on these aspects should be validated by survey parties, and communicated to the JFC and TCNs as quickly as possible.

Training and Exercises

4046 **Training.** Ideally, forces should be fully trained prior to deployment, but intra-JOA training specific to that operation may be required and is encouraged. Training, which may of itself act as a deterrent, must be balanced against the possible escalation in the level of tension in a region. The JFC will provide the operational level guidance on the conduct of training, although individual Component Commanders will be responsible for the execution of the training programme and the measurement of

performance. A balance must also be struck between security, the training aspirations and the cumulative effects of fatigue from training and operating in an austere environment. The benefits gained from training must also be balanced against any penalties or costs involved as training will almost always require the deployment of specially qualified personnel and additional resources. Such an intention must be identified at the earliest opportunity and be brought to the attention of the JFHQ, the Strategic Commander, and the TCNs, in order to ensure adequate financial provision.

- 4047 Training may be an ongoing requirement during a more complex operation as forces are phased for different stages of the OPLAN, or require replacement or roulement. Indeed, training requirements may stem from such things as political redirection or lessons identified from the current or other operations. Training under these circumstances should include the lessons learned during the initial phases of operations, and may be developed by an outgoing staff for execution by an incoming staff.
- 4048 **Live Firing Ranges.** The host nation may be able and willing to provide access to existing establishments, or the JFC may be required to set up new ranges of his own, in co-operation with the host nation.
- 4049 **Exercises.** The purpose of exercises is to integrate, synchronise, test, evaluate and assess operations, tactics, techniques, and procedures. The most important aim of exercises is to practice the chain of Command and Control, initiate understanding for the JFC's routines for control of the operation, and practice ROE. The utility of exercises for deception, Media Operations, and deterrence can be considerable. Operations that include non-NATO nations will increase the requirement for exercises in order to practice NATO's doctrine and Command and Control procedures. Exercises may include the generation and deployment of reserves.
- 4050 **Rehearsals.** Rehearsals, at all levels, and of all tasks, are essential to ensure that all personnel know what the JFC intends to accomplish, and how he intends to accomplish it. Rehearsals provide substance to the written OPLAN and provide the foundation upon which effective synchronisation of the elements of the JF is based.

Section VII - Preliminary Operations

- 4051 The JFC may wish to conduct Preliminary Operations, prior to the engagement of his main forces or the commencement of hostilities. The aim of Preliminary Operations is to improve the leverage he can achieve with his main force. They will frequently involve the deliberate application of unexpected capabilities or their use in unusual circumstances. The Initiating Directive will most likely give guidance to the JFC in the form of restraints.
- 4052 Activity at all levels, from the diplomatic, through sanctions and economic measures, to the exploitation of events in theatre and the build-up of forces will be used to try to isolate the adversary by denying him allies and sanctuary. The intent is to reduce his support and freedom of action. The JFC has a critical role to play by exploiting local opportunities and warning of looming difficulties.

- 4053 Establishing a dominating air and maritime presence and/or information superiority/supremacy prior to engagement in combat is likely to make the JFC's mission easier to achieve. These offer the further advantage that they can usually be sought prior to the engagement in combat and can therefore still allow substantial scope for diplomatic manoeuvre and hence 'a way out of confrontation', which could lead to a negotiated settlement before major casualties occur.
- 4054 If there is a substantial distance from the PODs to the actual AOs, or if any particular adversary vulnerabilities are identified early on, there may be merit in establishing FOBs, from which to strike at an adversary's centre of gravity or decisive points. FOBs may also be required for the build-up of sufficient logistic resources to establish the logistic poise with which to sustain combat power for forthcoming operations. The disadvantage caused by the length of time it takes to establish strong logistic FOBs can be compensated by the signal advantages gained in conducting deterrent, deception, PSYOPS or media operations.
- 4055 SOF operations will frequently be required prior to the full engagement of the JF. SOF operations will almost always have operational or strategic aims rather than tactical ones. During Preliminary Operations their use will primarily be for intelligence gathering purposes and will usually require approval at least by the JFC, if not political approval from the NAC, due to the high risks associated with being compromised.

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CHAPTER 5 – THE CONDUCT OF ALLIED JOINT OPERATIONS

Section I - Introduction

- 5001 In broad terms, the JFC must address three key operational functions if he is to be successful. He must be capable of preparing and shaping the battlespace, in all dimensions, in a manner most likely to enable him to achieve the military end-state at minimum cost; he must be able to successfully conduct the operation (may or may not entail combat), ideally on his own terms and at a time and place of his choosing; and he must preserve and protect the military power of his own forces until his mission is concluded-which may be well after termination. Much of this can only be achieved by drawing together the constituent elements and components of the force, aided by a range of operational capabilities. Few, if any, of these activities are discrete. Shaping activities will continue throughout the entire operation. No particular phasing of these key operational functions is implied in this discussion. Inter-relationships between the JFC's and his Component Commanders efforts and the manner in which the emphasis and support can be shifted as the operation unfolds which is key to successful joint operations.
- 5002 Battlespace is generally considered to be the environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the sea, land, air and space environments, the included enemy and friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest. The battlespace is the multi-dimensional environment embracing the JOA. The battlespace is joint, in the sense that all military activities will be orchestrated in the context of a joint operation plan. Increasingly, these military activities cannot be planned or conducted in isolation. Other elements are also impinging upon and influencing the environment traditionally exploited by maritime, land, and air components. For example, space, cyberspace, and the electro magnetic spectrum (EMS), particularly in terms of the acquisition and control of information, are all important constituents of joint operations. Furthermore, there is now a greater range of players and bystanders within the battlespace, and possibly beyond, who will be involved in, or will influence, the course of operations. The need to integrate the efforts of the Joint Force with those of other agencies (for example, governmental and non-governmental agencies, aid agencies, etc.) implies a greater convergence of the military, civil, humanitarian, diplomatic and economic efforts, at all levels. The effect, benign or otherwise, of the needs of the indigenous populations is also likely to be inextricably linked to the mission itself. Finally, the activities of the Joint Force will be under constant media scrutiny, indeed, in many cases, both the media and a range of civilian agencies will be there before the Joint Force has even deployed.
- 5003 The boundaries of the area in which operations are conducted are becoming increasingly vague and blurred. This battlespace can be described as having six overlapping and inter-related dimensions: the two conventional dimensions of the earth's surface, land and sea (including the sub-surface under the sea); the third dimension of the air; space; the electro-magnetic spectrum; and time. Each component will require access to these dimensions, although the balance and

priorities of each will differ, requiring careful management to reduce confliction and exploit opportunities. The dimensions will also, to varying degrees, be inhabited, occupied, influenced, and sometimes dominated by many others beyond our own military forces, and not least by the adversary.

Section II - Preparing the Battlespace

- 5004 At the higher, strategic level, it will be vital that the wider operational environment has been prepared and shaped in a way that will support the conduct of operations. Primarily, the legitimacy of intended actions and the general support of the international community, must be self evident to all. Achieving this state of affairs will depend, to a large extent, upon the political and diplomatic activity and direction through NATO from the nations, that are involved in or directly supporting the operation. Inter alia, the solid stance of the international community will influence the adversary's perception of his own chances of success, although it may not necessarily discourage him from pursuing his own aims.
- 5005 At the operational level, the JFC will seek to prepare and shape the battlespace in the JOA by undermining the adversary's will and attacking his cohesion. He will aim to erode the adversary's resolve, persuading him that military action is unlikely to be successful. To achieve this, the JFC and his staff will draw on own intelligence assets in order to identify the adversary's vulnerabilities and weaknesses, and then attack them. Offensive action (for example, interdiction) is just one means of shaping the battlespace. INFO OPS, in its widest sense, will be conducted both to undermine the adversary and to ensure, both within and beyond the JOA, that NATO's aims are understood and supported. The requirement to provide PI and to establish mechanisms for CIMIC will also be essential prerequisites to the conduct of operations. All aspects of C2W, the military application of INFO OPS, will be used to degrade the adversary's decision-making process, morale, the effectiveness of his weapon systems, and his ability to gather and maintain intelligence.

Commander's Critical Information Requirements.

- 5006 At the outset of an operation, possibly even prior to deployment, the commander will begin to formulate questions to which he will require answers in order to conduct the operation successfully. As he conducts his Mission Analysis, this process will continue with more questions being added and existing questions changed as he conducts his decision process and makes a plan. These questions are the Commanders Critical Information Requirements and will cover such areas as; own troops strengths; casualty states and morale; Adversary locations; strengths, equipment, capabilities and intentions; Own troops locations, combat readiness; Own troops equipment and sustainability state.
- 5007 Many of the questions contained in the CCIRs will simply demand facts and can be answered by the collection and dissemination of information. There will, however, be some questions of over-riding importance to the commander which seek to discover, for example, what the adversary's intentions might be or which require an assessment of the adversary's operational capability. Such questions cannot be answered by simple facts and will require information to be processed into

intelligence in order to provide answers. Because of the importance of this intelligence to the commander in assisting him to reach a decision as to his best CoA, these questions are called the Priority Intelligence Requirements. Both CCIRs and PIRs will continue to be developed throughout the course of operations in response to developing and changing operational situations.

Intelligence

- 5008 The architecture that provides the framework for the delivery of intelligence in joint operations must be flexible and tailored to the demands and circumstances of the operation. It needs to be secure, robust, and include an operational framework, both within and beyond the JOA and, as such, may not be exclusively hierarchical in nature. For example, it will need to provide linkages to agencies outside the normal military chain of command (e.g. NGOs), as well as appropriate access to NATO and National intelligence databases and National Intelligence Centres. The intelligence architecture will be determined by three principal factors: the likely nature of PIRs; the requirements of the Collection, Co-ordination and Intelligence Requirement Management process to meet these requirements; and the availability of resources. The manner in which the intelligence architecture is developed, and the critical inter-relationships between its components, particularly where these cross national lines, will be critical to the process of meeting the JFC's PIRs. Clearly, for the JFC, the key will be identifying those PIRs, which are required to formulate his campaign plan and then support the process of developing the campaign and its execution. This will be an ongoing priority from the outset.
- 5009 In order to deal with all the information which is available, to identify that which is relevant, to seek for that which is not present, and then to process the right information into intelligence before distributing it, requires a series of structured tasks. The intelligence cycle is the framework within which four discrete tasks are conducted, culminating in the distribution of finished intelligence. The sequence is cyclic in nature since intelligence requires constant reappraisal and updating if it is to remain current and relevant to the commander's needs. The tasks are discrete, but as information begins to flow and it is processed and disseminated as intelligence, the tasks will overlap and coincide, in a concurrent and continuous rather than sequential manner. The tasks, more usually described as 'stages' or 'steps' are direction, collection, processing, and dissemination.
- 5010 Direction is the first stage in the intelligence cycle, and is determination of intelligence requirements, planning the collection effort, issuance of orders and requests to collection agencies, and maintenance of a continuous check on the productivity of such agencies. In order to enable the commander and his J2 staff to focus their intelligence effort, geographical Areas of Intelligence Responsibility and Areas of Intelligence Interest are established in relation to the JOA.
- 5011 Collection is the second stage in the intelligence cycle. It is the exploitation of sources by collection agencies and the delivery of the information obtained to the appropriate processing unit for use in the production of intelligence". It is the basis of the Collection Plan and is the process by which information is collected in order to meet the commander's PIRs identified in the Direction stage of the intelligence cycle.

- 5012 Processing is the third stage in the intelligence cycle, and is described, in its component parts, as: the conversion of information into intelligence through collation, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of information and/or other intelligence. It is a structured series of actions which, although set out sequentially, may also take place concurrently. Processing is carried out at a number of points in the information and intelligence chain. It may range from initial, single-source processing carried out within a collection agency, involving nothing more than changing raw data into an intelligible form, to the processing of all-source information and intelligence received from multiple tactical, operational and strategic feeds.
- 5013 Dissemination is the fourth stage in the intelligence cycle, and is timely conveyance of intelligence, in an appropriate form and by any suitable means, to those who need it.
- 5014 Data is collected by; Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)/Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR). ISR is a system that integrates sensor/collectors capabilities and the intelligence process that provides the direction and processing of sensor data. ISR is also often referred to as Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Target Acquisition or ISTAR. The role of ISR/ISTAR is to link the intelligence process, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance in order to provide a Commander with Situational Awareness and to cue manoeuvre, strike and collection assets. Planning for ISR/ISTAR supports the overall Operational Planning Process (OPP) as a sub-process. ISR/ISTAR starts with a Commander giving direction or Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs), these are then assessed and a plan is made as to how best collect the information to answer the Commander's requirements. ISR/ISTAR is also related to the targeting process. The collection and analysis aspects of ISR/ISTAR lead to the ability to execute the targeting process.
- 5015 ISR/ISTAR is Commander driven process. The architecture to support the process must include the sensors/collectors, a robust data fusion capability, the Information System that has enough bandwidth to pass data and the people to carry it out. ISR/ISTAR can be used throughout the full spectrum of conflict. In peace it can be used to support Situational Awareness and Indications and Warning (I&W) and in times of conflict ISR/ISTAR can be an extremely effective battle space management system.

Public Information

- 5016 The role of Public Information is to increase knowledge and promote further understanding of the mission among all key audiences, both within and beyond the JOA. The operation will almost certainly attract international media interest, although this may ebb and flow in response to operational tempo and the general situation. The media are likely to be already present within the JOA prior to the deployment of NATO troops, and the style and nature of their reporting will have a predominant effect upon public perceptions and the utility of such forces.
- 5017 Information Release. Prior to NAC formal approval to execute an operation, information release will be retained at the Strategic-Political levels. The JFC should

anticipate a passive PI policy at the operational and lower levels during initial operational planning, and possibly up to approval for mission execution. Following NAC approval, an Active PI policy for the operation in general, and at all NATO military levels, will be in effect.

- 5018 PI Guidance. Development and dissemination of NAC approved PI Guidance ensures that all PI and policy is consistent, and that, where practicable, all participating organisations maintain a consistent line on the major issues. Ideally, initial PI Guidance development begins with the JFC, who may recommend PI policy, draft appropriate statements, and identify issues of interest to external and internal audiences. PI Guidance with strategic or political overtones will be approved at NATO level. At the operational and tactical levels, OPSEC will be an important issue, balancing the need, where possible, particularly in PSO, and the security of the operation. Commanders and their PI personnel at the tactical and operational levels are most likely to deal with detailed information about Joint Force involvement, capabilities and immediate actions and objectives. The strategic level will generally be concerned with issues of wider policy and political considerations.
- 5019 News Media Access. Media will expect access to operations in order to report fully. Establishment of Public Information Centres or other PI facilities is only the initial step in developing the right relationship with the media. The communications challenge is complicated by limited resources that often restrict transportation, communications, logistics support, and the number of trained PI personnel at the time and location of maximum news interest. Therefore, planning must include provisions for support of the news media with widely dispersed units – away from established PI offices – and their handling by military officials without formal PI backgrounds. The lack of a trained PI escort should not, by itself, be used as a reason for a commander to decline supporting the media.
- 5020 PI Co-ordination. Upon the establishment of the JOA, the JFC assumes responsibility for all PI activities within this area. The JFC's Chief Public Information Officer (CPIO) should co-ordinate all PI activities within the JOA. Some considerations are as follows:
- a. A cross-functional committee, ideally chaired by the CPIO, should meet routinely to co-ordinate development and dissemination of PI within the JOA. Membership should include operations, intelligence, legal political affairs, CIMIC representatives, and others who may have a role in public communications issues. Clearly the policy agreed at these meetings should be consistent with the higher level direction, to ensure a common and coherent approach.
 - b. An inter-agency working group may also be required, in order to develop linkages with international non-governmental, and other organisations operating in the JOA.
- 5021 Evaluating PI Feedback. Success of the PI effort is inextricably linked to overall mission success, and while PI cannot guarantee this, it can certainly be a significant factor in its failure. Objective assessment of media coverage, together with the

monitoring of available public opinion polls, will give an indication of how successful the PI policy is, and whether adjustments and improvements must be made.

Civil-Military Co-operation

- 5022 CIMIC is, the resources and arrangements which support the relationship between commanders and the national authorities, civil and military, and civil populations in an area where military forces are or plan to be employed. Such arrangements include co-operation with non-governmental or international agencies, organisations and authorities.
- 5023 Joint force commanders need to establish relationships with a variety of civilian authorities and organisations. Civil-military co-operation may be a central part of the mission, as in the case of disaster or humanitarian relief. The force may be partially dependent on the civilian population for resources and information, and rely on the civil authorities to provide security in certain areas. It may even be impossible to gain full freedom of action and movement without their co-operation. However, merely establishing good relations might be enough to deny the same advantages to hostile or potentially hostile forces. Whatever the situation, commanders have a moral and legal responsibility towards the civilian populations in their area that can only be met by co-operating with the civil government and international bodies.
- 5024 The aim of Civil-Military Co-operation is to establish and maintain the full co-operation of the civilian population and institutions within the JOA in order to create civil-military conditions that offer the JFC the greatest possible moral, material and tactical advantages. Implicit in this is the denial of such advantages to an actual or potential adversary. The long term purpose of CIMIC is to create and sustain conditions that will support the achievement of a lasting solution of the crisis. In essence, CIMIC is a force multiplier in that it reduces the reliance on military force to achieve the mission while minimising public interference with the effective conduct of military operations.
- 5025 A major part of CIMIC activity will be conducted by deployed troops, with J3 in the JFHQ as the principal staff focus. To be effective, however, CIMIC will depend upon a multi-functional approach within and beyond the HQ. Thus, CIMIC should not be seen as a separate function. There will be a requirement for close working relationships across staff branches, and, where necessary, the involvement of senior commanders, and principally the JFC. For instance, a CIMIC project is reported factually by Public Affairs. If it is important enough, the project is reported by the international media which creates international public support for the mission and its objectives. Public awareness also creates support for the international donor agencies as well as the IOs and NGOs when they launch their respective funding campaign at home. As an other example, PSYOPS, for its part, links the project to key theme(s) and messages addressed to designated target audience(s), as part of the JFCs Communication Plan.

Information Operations

- 5026 INFO OPS are actions taken to influence decision makers in support of political and military objectives by affecting other's information, information based processes, C2 systems and CIS while exploiting and protecting one's own information and/or information systems. There are two main categories of INFO OPS: defensive INFO OPS and offensive INFO OPS depending on the nature of action involved.
- a. Defensive INFO OPS – Actions taken to maintain access to and effective use of information, information-based processes, C2 systems and CIS during peace, crises or conflict and to protect Alliance information critical to achieving specific objectives.
 - b. Offensive INFO OPS – Actions taken to influence a potential adversary's information, information based processes, C2 systems, and CIS, during peace, crisis, or conflict, in pursuit of specific objectives or in reaction to a specific threat.
- 5027 The scope of INFO OPS is extremely wide. INFO OPS are considered at the strategic and operational levels of the Alliance and are practised at all levels. By their nature offensive INFO OPS require approval and co-ordination at the highest level. The JFC and his staff will focus upon INFO OPS within the JOA, in recognition that the JOA and beyond is an INFO OPS environment. Within the JFC's responsibilities and possibilities non-military capabilities supporting INFO OPS (e.g. political influences, diplomatic overtures, public information, civil-military co-operation) and military capabilities supporting INFO OPS (e.g. physical destruction, electronic warfare, deception, operations security, psychological operations) are to be closely coordinated in support of the strategic objectives.
- 5028 **Command and Control Warfare** is the integrated use of all military capabilities including operations security, deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, supported by all-source intelligence and Communication and Information Systems, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy an adversary's Command and Control capabilities while protecting friendly capabilities against similar actions.
- 5029 Effective C2W provides the JFC with the ability to shape the adversary commander's perception, and may even convince him to avoid hostilities altogether. A successful C2W effort will place the adversary at a disadvantage by exploiting his vulnerabilities, will assist the JFC to seize and maintain the initiative, and will contribute to Force Protection. C2W planning must be consistent with, and be an integral part of, the JFC's operation planning from the outset. It is also essential that C2W activity is controlled at the highest level; PSYOPS and deception, for example, will require political direction and, thus, planning must take account of the necessary lead times to take account of this.
- 5030 At best, the co-ordinated use of the five elements of C2W may provide the JFC with the potential to deliver a decisive blow against an adversary before the outbreak of armed conflict or during its initial period. As a minimum, however, C2W should assist

the JFC to shape the battlespace by allowing him to think, plan, communicate, and act faster than his opponents. To be effective, C2W needs to be fully integrated into the JFC's concept of operations and co-ordinated throughout the force. The synchronisation of these actions will require rapid and reliable intelligence support and communications. The JFC should ensure that the C2W objectives are part of the planning guidance and priorities.

- 5031 **Operations Security** is the process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using passive or active means, to deny an adversary knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces. OPSEC is not a process to ensure protection of all information. A balance of risk is inevitable, and making this judgement is, ultimately, the responsibility of the JFC. Unduly oppressive OPSEC runs the risk of being counter-productive in terms of resource costs and limitations on friendly activity. Conversely, relaxed OPSEC allows greater freedom of action for friendly forces but increases the risk of compromise. Thus, while much of the detail of OPSEC will be managed by the staff J3, the JFC will need to be aware of some of the more sensitive issues at the operational level. These might include the effects that restrictive OPSEC may have upon the relationship with the media, and how this might influence the maintenance of public support. The need to balance national concerns about OPSEC against the overall requirements of the Joint Force and the harmonising of efforts across components and contingents, will also require the attentions of the JFC.
- 5032 **Deception** is measures designed to mislead the adversary by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. At the strategic level, deception is a national and political issue; at the operational level, it may complement a strategic deception plan, and is normally focused on a particular aspect or phase of an operation; at the tactical level, deception is usually short-term and may take the form of camouflage, concealment or tactical manoeuvre. Deception is not an intellectual battle of wits for its own sake, neither is it a device merely to confuse the adversary; the object of deception is to convince the adversary that one's forces will take a specific course of action and thus persuade him to react, to his disadvantage. It follows, then, that any deception plan must be derived from, and be directly supportive of, the JFC's mission. At the same time, it also aims to achieve surprise, security, and freedom of action.
- 5033 Limitations or constraints on the use of deception will often exist. There may be political reasons why deception is inappropriate, for example, where it might undermine subsequent diplomatic negotiations with an adversary or party to a conflict. Deception operations are likely to be more controversial in PSO, where the principle of impartiality is often vital. Their dissemination must be limited based on 'need to know'.
- 5034 **Psychological operations** are planned psychological activities in peace, crisis and conflict directed to adversary, friendly, and neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. They include Strategic Psychological Activities (SPA), Psychological Consolidation Activities (PCA), Battlefield Psychological Activities (BPA) and Peace Support Psychological Activities (PSPA). They are designed to influence the emotions,

motives, reasoning, and, ultimately, the behaviour of selected organisations, groups, and individuals. PSYOPS have strategic, operational, and tactical applications, including support to deception operations. Inter alia, PSYOPS seeks also to gain approval and foster support of neutral and friendly audiences.

- 5035 The purpose of PSYOPS is to weaken the will of the adversary, bolster any support for allied objectives within the opposition's camp, and gain the support of the unsure or uncommitted by influencing the behaviour and attitude of the adversarial audiences. For example at the operational level PSYOPS may be directed at the adversary's military audience with the aim of lowering morale, creating apathy, defeatism and discord and promoting dissension, subversion, uncertainty, defection and surrender. PSYOPS is delivered through the complementary use of various media and must be consistent with associated PI activities and the strategic level information plan. If planned and executed properly, PSYOPS will create doubt in the minds of the adversary, doubt regarding the righteousness of their cause, competence and integrity of their leaders, the dependability of their allies, the outcome of hostilities and, most important, the likelihood of their own survival.
- 5036 Counter PSYOPS. The aim of Counter PSYOPS is to shield audiences from hostile messages or lessen their impact. Counter PSYOPS use assets to analyse the adversary's PSYOPS and its effect on the friendly population and the Joint Force. Analysis of PSYOPS source (black, grey and white), content, intended audience, media selection and effectiveness are done using subjective and/or objective methods. Subjective methods are based on the background, experience and judgement of the analyst while objective methods use classification systems and statistical databases over a period of time. The analysis should determine appropriate themes to reduce the effect of an adversary's use of PSYOPS and inform audiences about a JFC's intentions. While PSYOPS forces and assets may be used in the analysis of an adversary's PSYOPS, such analysis will not be used to examine the PI produced by friendly forces. The JFC direction and subsequent close co-ordination is required between PSYOPS and PI staff and Troop Information activities in the employment of counter PSYOPS techniques audiences.
- 5037 PSYOPS will require the close attention of the JFC because of the need, at the higher levels, to establish an agreed policy throughout the Joint Force, taking account of national variations and sensitivities, and to ensure that all activities are co-ordinated effectively across components and contingents.
- 5038 **Electronic Warfare.** EW is military action to exploit the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum encompassing: the search for, interception and identification of EM emissions, the employment of EM energy, including Directed Energy (DE), to reduce or prevent hostile use of the EM spectrum and actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces. The three elements of EW, Electronic Counter Measures (ECM), Electronic Protection Measures (EPM), and Electronic Support Measures (ESM), contribute to the C2W effort. EW operations should not be regarded as a function which only occurs during hostilities. ESM and EPM in particular are likely to commence before the Joint Force deploys. Control of the electromagnetic spectrum ranges from protecting friendly systems to countering adversary systems. This

control is not limited to radio or radar frequencies, but includes optical and infrared regions as well as those regions in which directed-energy weapons might function.

- 5039 EW should be employed to attack the adversary according to established principles of warfare. The decision to employ EW should be based not only on the JFC's operational objectives but also the risks of possible adversary responses and other effects on the operational effort. The JFC should ensure maximum co-ordination among EW and other operations activities, and intelligence and communications (including frequency management) support activities for maximum effect. This co-ordination is necessary to ensure effective exchange of information, eliminate undesirable duplication of effort, and provide for mutual support.
- 5040 **Physical Destruction.** Physical destruction is co-ordinated through the Joint Targeting process, with the aim of destroying or degrading rather than influencing the adversary's C2. The priorities for physical destruction, in terms of resources and targets, will be laid down by the JFC, and are critical to ensuring the appropriate apportionment of assets. Once the JFC has given his guidance as part of the planning process, targets are nominated to support the targeting objectives and priorities. Total destruction of an adversary's C2 nodes is often not attainable, or only effective for a short time, or in some cases undesirable because it denies other C2W opportunities and may be politically constrained. Physical destruction may be effected by a range of weapon systems. C2W planners should work with the component planners to ensure optimum target planning to achieve the desired effect, the key to this being a thorough co-ordination and identification of critical and vulnerable nodes.

Section III – Counter Air Operations, Strategic Attack and Interdiction

- 5041 **Counter Air Operations.** Counter air operations are those operations directed against the enemy's air and missile capability in order to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority. A favourable air situation enables the conduct of combat operations. The aim of counter air operations is to protect friendly forces from enemy air and missile attack, maintain the degree of freedom necessary to conduct other missions, and deny the use of the air to the enemy.
- 5042 **Strategic Attack.** Strategic Attack is military action carried out against an adversary center(s) of gravity in an attempt to affect a level of destruction and degradation of the adversary's military capacity and/or will to wage war or carry out aggressive activity.
- 5043 **Interdiction.** Interdiction is one of the means by which the JFC can shape his battlespace, focusing on operational level objectives which support his OPLAN. It is designed to be used to simultaneously attack the enemy from all dimensions in a timed, cumulative manner which, when synchronised with other military activities, overwhelms his will to resist. Interdiction diverts, disrupts, delays, or destroys the adversary's surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. Air Interdiction is usually the largest contributor to the interdiction process, but other components, particularly SOF, can also have a critical part to play. Air, land, maritime and special operations forces can conduct interdiction operations as part of their larger or overall mission. For example, naval expeditionary forces charged with

seizing and securing a lodgement along a coast may include the interdiction of opposing forces as part of the overall amphibious plan. Interdiction-capable forces include land- and sea-based offensive aircraft and bombers; ships and submarines; conventional airborne, air assault, or other ground manoeuvre forces; special operations forces; and amphibious raiding forces.

- 5044 Interdiction allows the JFC to create simultaneous and competing demands on the adversary, in all dimensions. The concept of depth applies to time as well as space. The battlespace is increasingly non-linear and hence open to imaginative non-linear and/or asymmetric exploitation. Operations extended in depth, time and space shape future conditions and can disrupt an adversary's decision cycle as well as his ability to execute operations.
- 5045 The starting point of the interdiction plan will be the targeting direction given to the JFC by the Strategic Commander, and his own estimate and operation plan, which will establish broad planning objectives and guidance for the interdiction of adversary forces. Component Commanders will recommend to the JFC how best to use their assets to that end. The JFC will then set interdiction priorities, provide targeting guidance, and make apportionment decisions. The JFC will usually designate the weight of interdiction effort that should be applied, possibly as a percentage of total available resources with respect to other military activities in his operations plan.
- 5046 The ACC is usually the largest contributor to the air interdiction plan, and will normally be the supported commander responsible for the control and co-ordination of the Air Interdiction Plan. The MCC and LCC are supported commanders responsible for interdiction within their AOOs. To facilitate this, supported commanders synchronize interdiction operations by designating the target priorities timing and effects necessary for the co-ordination and the effectiveness of interdiction within their AOOs. Notwithstanding, they should leave as much latitude as practicable to the supporting commanders. Judicious employment of fire support co-ordination measures will assist CCs to conduct effective interdiction. Centralised planning and decentralised execution of all interdiction ensure coherence and assists the effective use of force; enhances the exploitation of tactical events and economy of effort; and maximises the CCs' capabilities.

Section IV – Manoeuvre and Fires

- 5047 Ultimately, the JFC and his forces must be capable of attacking the adversary, either directly or indirectly, by the application of physical force, and be able to sustain such warfighting operations for as long as is necessary to achieve operational objectives. The principal methods by which this capability is delivered is through the combination of manoeuvre and fires in conjunction with, where appropriate, other operational capabilities and a range of mechanisms and control measures.

Manoeuvre

- 5048 At the operational level, manoeuvre is a means by which the JFC aims to set the terms of battle by time and location. This includes, where appropriate, the decision to

avoid battle or adopt a defensive posture, in order to impose offensive (and possibly decisive) action at a time of his own choosing.

- 5049 Manoeuvre is the gaining of a position of advantage with respect to an adversary from which force can be threaded or applied; it is, in effect, the process by which combat power is employed to achieve decision. In some circumstances, the psychological effect of manoeuvre can be so overwhelming as to render the adversary's subsequent actions futile; a bold and skilful manoeuvre at the outset of an operation may encourage the adversary to capitulate without ever fighting. Rarely, however, is this the case. Manoeuvre can be accomplished by any military force element; but to be effective, it usually must be accompanied by the ability to apply force, usually in the form of potential fires to produce operational and decisive effect.
- 5050 Manoeuvre is more than just movement with fire; it is the process by which combat power is focused where it can have decisive effect, to pre-empt, dislocate, or disrupt. It involves trade-offs (e.g. speed vs time, width vs depth, and concentration vs dispersion) and, thus requires an evaluation and acceptance of risk.
- 5051 Manoeuvre seeks to render opponents incapable than to destroy them through attrition. Increasingly, manoeuvre should be seen as a blend of the joint capabilities. At the operational level, manoeuvre should be directed towards a decisive point or directly at the centre of gravity.
- 5052 Rendering opponents incapable should be achieved by engaging adversary forces throughout the six dimensions of the battlespace. It may require a direct and inherently violent approach, or more indirect approaches, for example, the threat of action through the use of Information Operations. Generally, however, decisive manoeuvre will require range of mutually supporting joint assets, whereby the JFC will seek to impose his will and influence throughout the breadth and depth of the JOA. In, for example, the preparatory phases, air operations may be the JFC's main effort, with other components in support.
- 5053 Successful manoeuvre places a premium on good reconnaissance and intelligence. It relies on the ability to anticipate events and opportunities, together with a flexible, agile, and versatile approach to operations. Inherent in this approach, is the need for well-developed command relationships, and a common understanding of the JFC's overall campaign plan. This, in turn, leads to a need for a decentralised control that is essential for high tempo operations and the grasping of fleeting opportunities. However, the degree or level of decentralisation may vary with the environment. For example, the inherent frictions and uncertainties experienced in land operations generally call for a much greater level of decentralisation than in the highly interdependent nature of air operations.
- 5054 Inherent in the ability to conduct successful joint manoeuvre operations is an understanding of operational art, and how this integrates the various dynamic elements of the campaign plan. For example, it is essential that the JFC can articulate his campaign plan and intent, to include all inter-related lines of operation and projected sequencing, in a manner which is not prescriptive but is, nonetheless, clear to all. Manoeuvre operations, particularly those conducted at a high tempo, are

extremely demanding, and the challenge of such operations will be at its greatest in the multinational environment.

- 5055 While the ability to manoeuvre is clearly vital to combat forces, this is also a quality that must also be matched by other elements of the force. Furthermore, the ability to take the initiative by grasping unexpected and fleeting opportunities (an essential characteristic of 'manoeuvre warfare') is one that should be developed throughout the force.

Joint Fires

- 5056 Joint fires are fires produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in co-ordinated action towards a common objective. The skilful use and exploitation of the firepower assets available within the Joint Force will maximise leverage, achieve synergy, and enable decisive manoeuvre at the operational level. Joint fires may provide lethal or non-lethal effects, delivered by air, land and maritime forces and SOF, in such a way as to have a synergistic effect on operations. Lethal weapon effects include those from naval surface fire support, indirect fire support, SOF direct action operations and air operations. Non-lethal weapons effects include those from EW, C2W, such as disrupting the adversary's information networks. Joint fires may be used by the JFC to help shape the JOA and attack the adversary's cohesion. In order to deconflict fires, and to use the available firepower as efficiently as possible, the process of selecting and prioritising targets forms part of a joint targeting process.
- 5057 Fires destroy, neutralise, suppress and demoralise; it is the most violent manifestation of military force, and, as such, must be controlled to be effective. In joint operations, the synergy from mutually supporting fires from other components is known as joint fires, and provides a powerful tool for the JFC to increase the effectiveness of his force. For this reason, the various mechanisms of control, for example, the processes of selecting and attacking targets through the joint targeting process is as important as the physical means of delivering fires.
- 5058 Fires do not necessarily imply destruction. Although there will often be occasions when the adversary (for example, elements of his military capability) must be physically destroyed, this may not always be desirable. The key is to identify those effects required and, that are achievable, and that are most likely to succeed under the circumstances in order to achieve the end-state.

Synchronising Manoeuvre and Fires

- 5059 A critical prerequisite for the co-ordination of joint fires is the JFC's selection of, and adjustments to, the AOOs allocated to his CCs. Indeed, this is one of the means, together with designating supported and supporting relationships, by which the JFC develops his campaign. Good communications and liaison are also vital. Fire Support Co-ordinating Measures (FSCM) and their associated procedures, are measures employed by land or amphibious commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. Within their AOOs, these commanders, in consultation with all others, employ FSCM to enhance the

expeditious attack of targets. FSCM may also protect forces and populations, critical infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural significance; and set the stage for future operations. FSCM and the procedures associated with those measures assist in the actions and manoeuvre of joint forces. Land and amphibious commanders position and adjust FSCM consistent with the operational situation and in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. FSCM include No-fire areas (NFAs) ; Free-fire areas (FFAs); Restricted fire areas (RFAs); Fire Support Co-ordination Lines (FSCLs); and Waterspace management.

- 5060 The JFC will normally designate a main effort in order to mass his forces, accepting an economy of force elsewhere, while retaining the ability to shift his main effort rapidly to take account of the evolving situation. As circumstances change, so the main effort will shift, and it is the speed and poise with which this can be achieved that is the essence of successful joint operations. Generating a high tempo will, in itself, present opportunities for decisive action. To achieve this degree of tempo will require the synchronisation of joint forces at all levels.
- 5061 Tempo is the rhythm or rate of activity, relative to the adversary. Tempo comprises three elements: speed of decision (i.e. getting within the adversary's decision cycle); speed of execution; and speed transition from one activity to another which includes the ability to shift the main effort rapidly and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces.
- 5062 FSCM, and the need to co-ordinate the application and placement of FSCM are the province of Component Commanders. The JFC will need to exercise considerable judgement over these issues, for they will affect all components' abilities to contribute to the operation. He should avoid becoming involved in the co-ordination of FSCM unless he is required to adjudicate between Component Commanders who cannot agree.
- 5063 The co-ordination of joint fires requires extensive CIS support, augmented by liaison, in order that approval can be obtained as rapidly as possible to maintain tempo effectively. The CIS system provided to the JFC should be capable of providing the necessary connectivity for most operations. The resources for special links to facilitate specific joint fires, particularly between force elements temporarily reassigned to support different CCs, are inevitably limited. Multinational operations will place additional demands upon the information exchange and CIS support requirement.

Section V-Joint Targeting

- 5064 Targeting is the process of identifying potential targets/target sets by the analysis of available intelligence about the adversary, leading to proposals for the engagement of specific targets. This analysis is conducted with regard to the capabilities at the JFC's disposal, in order to identify and nominate specific vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will help to accomplish the end state. Targeting considers a wider range of activities other than purely destruction by air launched weapons. It includes use of Special Operations Forces, surface forces, EW and other non-lethal attack techniques that may also be part of INFO OPS.

- 5065 The carefully directed attack of key targets can have considerable benefits for the JFC's operation. However, due to political sensitivities surrounding targeting policy, direction for targeting will often be retained at the highest levels. Hence, where targeting decisions are made at the operational and tactical levels, they must conform to the strategic direction and framework. Modern technology is steadily increasing the effectiveness with which conventional and non-lethal weapons can be used to strike strategic and operational targets. The result has been the development of the targeting process, the mechanism by which political, strategic and operational level control is exercised over the application of firepower. The targeting process defines what targets are to be engaged by which assets and in which priority order. It also specifies targets that are restricted or may not be engaged at all. Above all, the process aims to ensure all involved are entirely clear about their targeting and co-ordination responsibilities and constraints, in time and space.
- 5066 The relationship between the selection of targets and the objectives is key; it is the focus which ensures that the application of force is both relevant and the most efficient in progressing the Joint operation. As with all actions, the conduct of attacks must comply with the Law of Armed Conflict and the use of force permitted by ROE approved by the NAC for a particular operation. Those assembling the attack plan (commanders, planners and legal staff) must consider the desired end state and political aims when making targeting decisions and therefore need to be conscious of the political and presentational dimensions of the plan. Success or failure in this respect can influence the operation as much as failure to achieve the required level of damage to a selected target. Furthermore, not only will it be necessary to ensure that targeting is politically acceptable, militarily appropriate, and legally permissible, but targeting must also be militarily effective in terms of its synchronisation and deconfliction within the overall OPLAN.
- 5067 **Joint Targeting Co-ordination Board.** The JFC may establish and task an organisation to accomplish targeting oversight functions or may delegate the responsibility to a subordinate commander. Typically, the JFC may create a Joint Targeting Co-ordination Board comprised of representatives from the JFHQ and all components of the Joint Force and, if required, national liaison representatives. If the JFC so designates, a JTCB would be an integrating centre providing a macro-level targeting review mechanism. This should be a joint activity comprised of representatives from the JFHQ and all components of the Joint Force, and, if required their subordinate units.
- 5068 The JFC defines the role of the JTCB. Typically, the JTCB would review target information, develops targeting guidance, priorities, and may prepare and refine joint target lists for recommendation to the JFC. During operations, the JTCB should also maintain a complete list of restricted targets and areas where special operations forces (SOF) are operating to avoid endangering current or future operations.
- 5069 **Targets are considered under the following groupings:**
- a. **Strategic Targets.** Targets, which may effect the adversary's strategic CoG and long term capacities to sustain hostilities. In addition, all targets

associated with weapons of mass destruction or nuclear energy are classed as strategic in nature.

- b. **Operational Targets.** Targets, which affect an adversary's military capability, (e.g. air defence systems, ammunition storage etc), or directly supporting an opponent's ability to sustain hostilities, (e.g. lines of communication). Close Air Support targets are not considered within the targeting process
- c. **Tactical Targets.** An opponent's military capabilities which have the potential to influence the tactical commander's battlespace, but excluding close air support targets, e.g. echelon forces and resupply areas.

The Targeting Cycle

- 5070 The inter-relationship of the functions required to direct military force against a target is referred to as the Targeting Cycle (See Figure 5-1).
- 5071 The ability to control the Targeting Cycle effectively, while responding to the need for changes of operational emphasis, is fundamental to successful military operations. If an adversary is allowed to organise his activities at a faster rate than the JFC he will gain control of the operational tempo. Equally, within an alliance, individual national contingents must have the capability to participate in the Targeting Cycle at the same tempo, or cohesion will break down. The key elements of the targeting cycle are the ability to detect and evaluate potential targets, trained personnel, robust communications and data management and the ability to provide accurate Combat Assessment (CA). CA will in turn permit commanders to evaluate the success of the attacks towards the operational objectives and will help to maintain political and public support for Allied operations.
- 5072 The targeting process is cyclic. It begins with guidance and priorities issued by the SC to the JFC and continues with identification of operational and tactical targets by the JFC and CCs. The integration and approval of the target list is followed by the prioritisation; the weapon-to-target matching (weapon-eering); the acquisition of targets or target sets; the attack of targets by component forces; the assessment of the effects of those missions by both CCs and the JFC, followed by further guidance by the JFC for the next targeting cycle. CCs identify requirements, nominate targets that are outside their boundaries or exceed the capabilities of their organic assets. After the JFC makes the targeting and apportionment decisions, components plan and execute assigned missions. For the targeting cycle to be achieved in the shortest possible time, it is essential that the JFC is given delegated approval for specified target sets. Intelligence support to the Targeting Cycle is critical. In order to properly support the Targeting Cycle, the Intelligence Cycle must complete one full cycle to support each Targeting Cycle Function in Figure 5.1.

Targeting and the Operation Plan

5073 The JFC states his operational objectives, and the component commanders recommend to the JFC how to use their combat power most effectively to achieve those objectives. The JFC then establishes broad planning objectives and guidance for attack of adversary strategic and operational centres of gravity and interdiction of adversary forces as inter-related lines of operation within his joint operation plan. Achievement of objectives should be measurable to help assessment of the progress of the campaign. With the advice of subordinate commanders, the JFC sets priorities, provides targeting guidance, and determines the weight of effort to be provided to the various lines of operations. Weight of effort for any aspect of joint targeting may, for instance be expressed: in terms of percentage of total available resources, by assigning priorities for resources used with respect to the other aspects of the operation, or as otherwise determined by the JFC.

Target Lists and Tasking Orders

5074 **Joint Target List (JTL).** The JTL is the primary target list for supporting a particular operation. It is usually compiled by the JFHQ in collaboration with NATO HQ and National authorities. This target development phase draws upon all available sources including contingency targeting and relevant target systems analysis. The JTL represents the compendium of available targets to achieve strategic and operational effects that could be attacked in pursuit of the operational objectives. It is normally reviewed by the JTCB and approved by the JFC.

5075 **Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List.** Once the JTL is expanded with the addition of targets drawn from the component operations plans, it becomes the Joint Integrated Target List (JITL). If the JITL contains targets outside the delegated target approval authority, obtained from the NAC by the SC on behalf of the JFC, it is forwarded to the NAC/MC for military, legal and political approval. Once approved, the JTCB prioritises the JITL to become the JIPTL, in accordance with the operations objectives and the detailed guidance from the JFC. The JIPTL will include reference to all methods of attack being undertaken including SF, surface force capabilities TLAM and non-lethal techniques, however, the majority of targets will be prosecuted by air attack. The JIPTL is the basis for weaponeering assessment calculations that yield the Desired Mean Point of Impact and select the number and types of weapon/fusing combinations to achieve the desired effect. The selection of targets from the JIPTL forms the Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP) for a particular period. The MAAP is the basis of the joint Air Tasking Order compiled by the ACC and is submitted to the JFC for approval as part of the apportionment process.

5076 **The Air Tasking Order.** The joint ATO provides an opportunity to de-conflict the air activities of the various components. The apportionment process is a major tool of the JFC to direct and co-ordinate the activities of the Joint Force. An ATO may be compiled to cover a specific 24 hour period of activity, or the time scale in which that activity is to be completed having being established in the JFC guidance to his Component Commanders. Timelines for compilation of the ATO will be established by the JFC as a part of his battle rhythm. Approval of the ATO is a key step in the execution of joint air operations. It will also give as much detail as possible of other

component air missions to facilitate co-ordination and to give a single source document showing all air activity.

- 5077 **Unrestricted Targets.** The Unrestricted Targets are target sets, types or areas for which approval to engage has been delegated by the NAC to the JFC without further higher military or political approval, but remain subject to legal validation. Targets may form part of the JIPTL.
- 5078 **Restricted Target.** Restricted Targets are a sub set of the targets on the JITL which require special consideration, usually where simple destruction is not sought. Special consideration may be warranted because of the particular sensitivity of the site, the need to deconflict any proposed action with other activities, or because the site is assessed to have a significant intelligence value, the wish to use a unique weapon, or the desire to exploit the target or post-conflict reconstruction considerations. A proposal to attack a Restricted Target will need to be co-ordinated through the JFHQ
- 5079 **No-strike Target List (NSTL).** A list of no-strike targets nominated by elements of the Joint Force and approved by the JFC. This list also includes no-strike targets directed by higher authorities. This list contains objects or targets not to be destroyed. Destroying objects or targets on the list may interfere with or unduly hamper projected friendly military operations or friendly relations with indigenous personnel or governments. Ideally, the NSTL would contain both no-strike targets and restricted targets and serve as a comprehensive list of objects or targets not to be attacked. Additions or deletions to the NSTL must be carefully controlled and co-ordinated to minimize fratricide and maximize combat effectiveness.

Principles of Lawful Targeting

- 5080 The conduct of lawful targeting is based on four fundamental principles: Distinction, Proportionality, Military necessity and Humanity.
- 5081 **Distinction.** Attacks are limited to combatants and other military objectives; the civilian population and civilian “objects” must not be attacked unless they contain military personnel or equipment or supplies, or are otherwise associated with combat activity incompatible with their civilian status. (the principle of distinction). Military objectives are defined as those which by their nature, location, purpose, or use, makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction in the circumstances ruling at the time offers a definite military advantage.
- 5082 **Proportionality.** The principle of proportionality requires that military objectives shall not be attacked if the attack is likely to cause civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects (otherwise known as “collateral” casualties and damage”) that would be excessive in relation to the direct military advantage which the attack is expected to produce. The military advantage anticipated refers to the advantage to be gained from military actions considered as a whole, and not from isolated or particular

actions. Generally, military advantage is not restricted to tactical gains, but linked to wider strategies.

- 5083 **Military necessity.** Military necessity requires that any military action must be demanded by the necessities of military operations and should be the minimum required and not otherwise prohibited by the Law of Armed Conflict, these only permits attack on objectives of military importance, and in circumstances where civilians and civilian objects are spared as far as possible from the effects of war.
- 5084 **Humanity.** As one of the prime motivators for law in conflict this principle forbids any attack on an adversary that inflicts unnecessary suffering, injury or destruction that might otherwise be justified by military necessity.

Section VI - Preserving and Protecting the Force

- 5085 In order to preserve and protect his fighting power, the JFC must be able to protect the cohesion of the Joint Force in both the moral and physical sense. Clearly, this is one of the most significant challenges for a commander of a multinational force, for it is the political and military relationships and fault-lines between individual nations that an adversary will seek to exploit and undermine for his own ends.
- 5086 One of the means by which the JFC preserves and protects his force is through an adherence to the Principles of War. He selects and maintains the aim in a manner that ensures the whole force is focused relentlessly on the common aim and mission, derived from the strategic end-state. Co-operation is particularly important in multinational operations; it is the ability to develop a good command and working relationship between national contingents, a relationship based upon an understanding of differences, but bound together and harmonised by a common purpose. Maintenance of morale will be a greater challenge in multinational operations because the adversary will attempt to exploit the vulnerabilities exposed through our difficulties in following the Principles mentioned above. For example, he might choose to attack the weakest national contingent of the Joint Force as a means of fragmenting overall cohesion. Finally, without adequate Sustainability, a significant proportion of the means to fight and win will be lost, with a consequent undermining of the Joint Force itself.

Force Protection

- 5087 Force Protection aims to conserve the fighting potential of the deployed force by countering the wider threat to all its elements from adversary, natural and human hazards, and fratricide². It minimises, and mitigates the effects of the threat from: overhead attack systems; weapons of mass destruction and environmental hazards. It also reduces the interference with military operations by the civil population, and the threat of attacks by extremists.

² Note that this definition focuses on the *deployed* force.

5088 Force Protection should be guided by the following principles:

- a. **Measured Assessment of the Threat.** A threat assessment based on accurate and timely all-source intelligence must be conducted as the basis for selection of Force Protection measures.
- b. **Risk Management.** Force Protection should be based on risk management, not risk elimination. Casualties, deliberate or accidental, are a reality of military operations, and the desire to avoid them totally may well impact adversely on the achievement of the mission. A balance of risk is required.
- c. **Joint and Multinational Concept.** Force Protection must embrace all force components, including civilian support, within the JOA, and address all aspects of the threat.
- d. **Prioritisation.** Notwithstanding the above, it is unlikely that the capability will exist to protect all force elements to the same degree. Priority should be given to their own Centres of Gravity, both tangible (e.g. logistics), and intangible (such as campaign cohesion or political will as influenced by public opinion).
- e. **Flexibility.** The Force Protection policy and measures must be flexible and capable of responding to a rapidly changing threat, although availability of resources may limit that flexibility.

5089 Establishing an integrated approach to Force Protection in a multinational Joint Force will present particular challenges to the JFC. Some nations will impose more restrictive Force Protection measures on their deployed forces than others, and, in some circumstances, national profiles may change unexpectedly during operations. Close liaison, particularly at senior command and national contingent levels, will reduce the detrimental effects of these different approaches. Clearly, a JFC who is forewarned of potential problems can mitigate against them. Force Protection is a risk management process based on the threat assessment, the results of which determine measures addressing: overall/collective protection; security; and health and safety. Over-protection to counter an improbable threat can divert scarce resources from achieving the mission. An overall threat assessment (which should include the protagonists' current and possible future intent derived from their aims, doctrine, culture and history) should be conducted as part of the planning process, and may take account of political guidance on the priority to be given to avoiding casualties. Once the force has deployed, the Joint Force HQ will refine this threat assessment as part of the JFC estimate and directive. Additional localised assessments will need to be conducted, particularly in PSO and humanitarian operations, where the threat may vary according to, for example, local differences in the ethnic or political affiliations of the civil population. Where more than one adversary exists, their varying intents, threats and capabilities must be included in the threat assessment. This may reveal a threat to a participating nation's country or to their forces which may include non-violent activities such as PSYOPS and other associated tactics aimed at influencing international perceptions.

- 5090 Force Protection is not an issue that can be addressed separately or in isolation; it is an integral part of operations and must be incorporated into the Commander's plan from the outset. By producing a threat assessment that is as accurate and comprehensive as possible, covering all the constituent elements in the section above, an initial set of measures can be produced which addresses the actual threat. Force Protection measures can be active and passive.
- 5091 The proposed measures must be judged and balanced against the Commander's mission and operational requirements, with the emphasis on risk management. For example, patrolling in armoured vehicles in a PSO might send an overtly aggressive message which could undermine the mission, while, in a warfighting operation, the unnecessary wearing of NBC Individual Protective Equipment (IPE) could impose severe individual and collective degradation.
- 5092 The final selection of Force Protection measures is made by the JFC. These are then included in an annex to the Operations Order. The implementation of some measures may not be force-wide; the threat, as well as the measures adopted, particularly in PSO and Humanitarian Operations, may not be uniform and may be subject to frequent review and change.
- 5093 Force Protection measures will be implemented as appropriate; force-level measures will be implemented by the Joint Force HQ; additional local measures by appropriate commanders.
- 5094 The threat assessment is a continual process. As the situation changes, or new intelligence is received, Force Protection measures will be reviewed and adapted to the new situation. As part of mission command, subordinate commanders should also be directed to conduct local reviews, although the overall co-ordination of Force Protection should remain under the control of the Joint Force HQ.

Joint Air Defence

- 5095 Air Defence (AD) is, all measures designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action. AD throughout the JOA must be based upon agreed doctrine and procedures which will apply whether the JTF is required to operate within an area of influence of an existing AD system, or where no such system exists. As an integral part of Counter-Air operations, joint AD operations seek an appropriate level of control of the air, and, thus, the protection of friendly forces from air threats. This is achieved through a joint AD plan which serves the joint campaign by integrating all assigned AD assets, while meeting the requirements of the individual Components. Active AD includes airborne, maritime, and land-based sensors and weapon systems.
- 5096 Within the concept of operations, the Air Defence Commander should be prepared to defend against the whole spectrum of air threats. This concept must endeavour to deny the adversary access to operational or tactical intelligence, obtain timely warning of a potential attack and provide defence in depth.

- 5097 In an Article 5 situation, the Regional Air Commander has been delegated the responsibilities of Air Defence Commander and Air Space Control Authority. Similarly, in a non-Article 5 operation, the JFC will normally designate the ACC as the ADC and ACA with primary responsibility to protect the Joint Force from airborne activity of an adversary.
- 5098 Joint Air Defence requires a comprehensive control and reporting organisation supported by CIS and data link facilities to facilitate the compilation of a Recognised Air Picture (RAP) that can be disseminated and exploited by AD assets throughout the JOA. Joint AD must be co-ordinated with the AD organisation of the host nation and with all other air operations to minimise interference between defensive and offensive/support air.
- 5099 Maritime Component. Maritime AD –Anti Air Warfare (AAW)- capabilities may include fighters, AEW, and EW support, long or medium range surface to air missiles, possibly with a Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) capability, Point Defence Missiles System (PDMS) and Close-In Weapons System (CIWS). Sensors will include radar, possibly with target recognition features, sophisticated ESM surveillance and integrated data exchange facilities.
- 5100 Land Component. Land AD capabilities may include EW systems, long or medium range GBAD , Short range AD (SHORAD) systems and Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) or Very Short Range AD (VSHORAD) systems. The deployment of AD systems will need to be co-ordinated with the ADC to create a fully integrated AD plan for the Joint Force. All AD systems will operate within the joint ADP and will exploit positive control where the C2, CIS and Situational Awareness (SA) systems will support this, reverting to procedural control where they do not.
- 5101 Air Component. The AD capability of the air component may include fighters, Airborne Early Warning (AEW), and EW support, ground based mobile or established surveillance radars, ESM and data exchange facilities. Additionally, integrated long and medium range AD as well as SHORAD, MANPADS/SHORAD may be deployed by the ACC in accordance with the JFC AD-priorities to protect own forces, population or specific sites of operational interest. TMD capable systems may be employed to protect points of strategic significance against ballistic missile threat.

Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence

- 5102 The triad of NBC weapons offers the potential to inflict much greater harm than conventional weapons, and their proliferation continues world-wide, despite sustained efforts at arms control and verification. Consequently, there remains a possibility that deployed military forces may be required to operate in areas where there are NBC risks, through either the deliberate or accidental release of radiation, toxic industrial materials, biological agents and similar releases other than NBC attacks. Accordingly, joint operations must be planned, conducted, and supported, against these possible threats.

- 5103 There will be a number of complex, and potentially sensitive, NBC policy issues which will involve the JFC and require consultation at the highest levels. Individual nations may adopt different approaches to medical countermeasure, for example, the levels of protection given to individuals may, in some cases, be voluntary, and others compulsory. The levels, availability, and quality of NBC equipments may vary, particularly if non-NATO nations are contributing to the operation. There may be a requirement to extend NBC protection beyond the Joint Force, to include civilians in support of the operation, or neutrals in the JOA. Media attention will also be intense, and the identified or perceived threat of NBC will generate considerable disquiet both in JOA and at home. Clearly, these factors will have a significant impact upon the JFC's campaign planning and the manner in which he employs his forces.
- 5104 Commanders at all levels will have to assess what specific actions and activities they can order to achieve their objectives, allowing at the same time a reasonable safeguard against hazards presented by ROTA or an adversary's use of NBC weapons. In PSO there will be a need to apply more stringent standards of personal protection than would be the case in War. They must be aware of the degradation in performance which results from the wearing of NBC Individual Protective Equipment for protracted periods, and the hazards of bodily fluid loss in hot or humid conditions. Physical and psychological isolation and problems of personal recognition may cause difficulty in exercising command functions, and communication equipment will become more difficult to use. During operations other than war, commanders have particular responsibility to avoid the exposure of individuals to radiation, but, if this is not possible, to minimise the exposure to the lowest degree possible. Often legal peacetime regulations could apply.
- 5105 A Joint Force should be self-sustainable in NBC defence. Each individual and unit should be equipped and trained in accordance with requirements for reaction forces. Specialist units, with detection systems, reconnaissance, survey and decontamination capabilities should be available to the JFC and component commanders to provide early warning and detection and allow for flexible deployment to areas subjected to NBC attacks.
- 5106 The JFC should keep the NBC threat and the risk under constant review, and promulgate an up-dated threat assessment as the situation dictates, so subordinate commanders can take informed decisions on the protective measures required. In PSO special attendance should be paid to personnel risk to toxic industrial materials and low level radiation. This will ensure that the Joint Force is properly prepared to meet the NBC hazards whilst avoiding unnecessary degradation of operational performance.

Combat Identification (ID)

- 5107 Combat identification is the process of combining Target Identification (TID), Situational Awareness, specific tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) to increase the operational effectiveness of weapon systems and reduce the incidence of casualties caused by friendly fire. Combat ID has the inherent ability to assist in the process of presenting commanders at all levels with a valid, force wide picture of friend, foe and neutral. By establishing identity, if not intent, it removes some of the

potential confusion surrounding the decision to engage or not. Clearly, in this sense, Combat ID has a close application and linkage to ROE which are not intended to be used to assign specific tasks or as a means of issuing tactical instructions, but underpin all operations across the full spectrum of conflict. Related Combat ID definitions are as follows:

- a. **Target Identification.** The process that allows the immediate determination of a contact's identity by friendly, discrete platforms or individuals.
- b. **Situational Awareness.** The cognisance of the available information about an operational situation in order to achieve superiority in the decision making capability and its synthesis into possible courses of action.
- c. **Friendly Fire.** Fire originating from own or friendly forces within, or across, environmental boundaries.
- d. **Collateral Damage.** Damage to people and property adjacent to, but not forming part of, an authorised target.

5108 The JFC's aim must be to strive for a complete absence of casualties caused by friendly fire and collateral damage, or, at the very least, to reduce these casualties to an absolute minimum. An effective Combat ID process should aim to establish, quickly, the identity of any contact to a high degree of confidence, thus reducing the uncertainty associated with a commander's decision to fire to a level that is acceptable within the prevailing circumstances. It must be reliable and operate across the spectrum of conflict.

5109 In formulating the Combat ID aspects of his operational plan the JFC must consider a number of factors:

- a. Friendly fire incidents and collateral damage will inevitably be controversial, risking criticisms of individual nations (where they can be identified as being to blame) and to NATO itself. More importantly, such incidents undermine the legitimacy of the operations being conducted.
- b. Individual nations will have varying capabilities in respect to their ability to minimise the dangers of friendly fire and collateral damage. For example, some will employ a more restrictive set of ROE, or through their doctrine, training and technical approach, are less likely to be the cause of such incidents. Some nations may accept casualties as an inevitable consequence of military operations. Others may regard such incidents as highly controversial, and a cause to doubt their continuing involvement in operations. The JFC should be aware of strengths, weaknesses, and perceptions in this respect, and, where possible, should apportion missions, and allocate AOOs, appropriately.
- c. Establishing a robust and effective approach to Combat ID in multinational formations will pose particular challenges. An early identification of optimum measures, given the type and nature of the operation, the level of participation

and interoperability, will be a important element of preparing the force. Training and liaison will be a key means of reducing the risks.

- d. Adversaries may seek to maximise the propaganda potential of incidents of collateral damage, in some cases by deliberately encouraging the attack on military targets that will result in civilian casualties. In these circumstances, the potential military advantage of certain actions must be balanced against the wider effects of these actions. Such considerations will form part of the targeting process.
- e. In all circumstances where there is a risk of collateral damage, there will be a need for transparency where genuine mistakes have been made, together with the capability rapidly to establish the true facts of each situation. Linked to this is the requirement for a responsive Media approach which is authoritative, informed, well co-ordinated, and timely.

5110 Maintaining an appropriate and workable approach to Combat ID will be an ongoing concern for the JFC, his staff and subordinates, particularly as circumstances and the level and nature of participation in the operation changes. For example, cross-environmental issues may require resolution at the Joint Force level.

Section VII - Logistics

5111 The type of operation will impact significantly on the conduct of the logistic operation and the specific C2 organisations that are implemented. The NATO logistic support concept, in support of the JFC's OPLAN, must be flexible, take account of individual national approaches and strengths, and where possible, achieve efficiencies and economies of scale.

5112 Effective logistic support is fundamental to the success of any operation, and therefore must be an integral part of all operational planning. While nations are ultimately responsible for the provision of resources to support their forces, NATO commanders will ensure that the logistic force structure is capable of supporting the operation, and will co-ordinate support among contributing nations and with the host nation to ensure operational success. They also must be given, at the appropriate level, sufficient authority over the logistic resources necessary to enable the NATO commander to employ and sustain the forces under command in the most effective manner.

5113 The NATO logistic support concept is structured to meet the demands of a Joint Commander's operational concept. It is flexible, functional and designed to assist in exploiting tactical success. It also achieves efficiencies and economies of scale resulting from the effective co-ordination of national logistic support and integration of multinational logistics.

5114 The logistic plan, structures and procedures must be tailored to the respective forces and their related employment options. A variety of support options and command and control arrangements are available under the NATO logistic support concept, providing innovative and effectual co-operative support arrangements to meet the

alliance's logistic requirements across the operational spectrum. The logistic support concept must meet the mission and be flexible enough to facilitate a variety of national approaches, take advantage of national strengths, and clearly indicate that it is beneficial to both the contributing nations and NATO authorities.

- 5115 Allied joint operations also require that the JFC fulfils a co-ordinating role in all in JOA movement and transportation for the assigned forces. Theatre movement systems and the JFC's transportation resources, including airlift assets, must be able to respond to force deployment and logistic support requirements set out in the operational plan. The JFC should ensure that the logistic bases and rear areas of the Joint Force are secure.

Medical/Health Service Support

- 5116 Medical/health service support is a crucial aspect of allied joint operations. While logistic support principles apply to medical/health service support, medical staffs generally face unique problems affecting the health, and therefore the effectiveness, of multinational personnel deployed on allied joint operations. The overall objectives of medical/health service support are the conservation of manpower, prevention of disease, preservation of life and limb, and the limiting of residual physical and mental disabilities. Options such as HNS and Lead Nation Support should be used, if available, and at acceptable standards. Options such as HNS and Lead Nation Support should be used, if available, and at acceptable standards
- 5117 Medical C2IS must be so organised that each level of operational command has a designated Senior Medical Officer, usually designated as the "Formation Surgeon", accountable to and with direct access to the operational commander.
- 5118 The provision of medical and health service support across the range of multinational force deployments must be at a standard of care as close as possible to that prevailing in peacetime. To ensure this on a multinational level and in order to save the scarce medical assets, a medical force planning and force generation process at an early stage of force planning is crucial.
- 5119 The provision of medical and health service support across the spectrum of multinational force deployments, at a standard acceptable to all participating nations, implies three specific tasks:
- a. Maintenance of health and the prevention of disease.
 - b. Treatment and evacuation of the sick and wounded.
 - c. Resupply of medical/health service support materiel.

Movement and Transportation.

- 5200 The JFC staff is to develop and implement movement and transportation plans and directives, and to prioritise movement requirements as they apply to the JFC tasks. The M&T Staff is the focus for all aspects of operational movements within the JOA.

Chapter 6 – TERMINATION AND POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS

Section I – Introduction

- 6001 Recognising when the military end state has been reached and how to preserve that which has been achieved, combines both strategy and operational art. The JFC must understand the strategy the NAC/MC has in mind to terminate the operation and ensure its outcomes endure, before deciding how to implement that strategic design at the operational level. The design of post conflict operations is driven in part by the nature of the conflict itself. Conflicts over territorial disputes or economic advantage tend to be interest-based and lend themselves to negotiation, persuasion, and coercion. Conflicts started in the name of ideology, ethnicity, or religious or cultural primacy tend to be value-based and reflect demands that are seldom negotiable. Often, conflicts are a result of both value and interest-based differences.
- 6002 Military operations will normally conclude with attainment of the strategic end-state for which the NAC/MC has committed forces. In some cases, these aims will be military strategic aims that, once achieved, allow transition to other instruments of power and agencies as the means to achieve broader aims.
- 6003 Commanders strive to end combat operations on terms favourable to the alliance. The basic element of this goal is gaining control over the enemy in the final stages of combat. When friendly forces can freely impose their will on the enemy, the opponent may have to accept defeat, terminate active hostilities, or revert to other types of conflict such as geopolitical actions or guerrilla warfare. Nonetheless, a hasty or ill-designed end to the operation may bring with it the possibility that related disputes will arise, leading to further conflict. There is a delicate balance between the desire for quick victory and termination on truly favourable terms.
- 6004 If the SC and JFC have correctly interpreted the political aims into a sound military strategy and operational design, then the conditions existing at the end of the conflict should prevent the adversary from renewing hostilities. If the conditions have been properly set and met for ending the conflict, the necessary leverage should exist to prevent the enemy from renewing hostilities. Conflicts are based on contrivertial political aims. Conflicts are only successfully ended when political aims are achieved and these aims endure.
- 6005 Even when all parties are unanimous in defining the initial aim, the nature of the mission may shift as the situation develops (depending upon the complexity of the operation). This tendency is referred to as mission creep. Commanders must be vigilant in ensuring maintenance of the objective; if the situation has changed sufficiently, it may be necessary to re-define the objective. Establishing realistic measures of effectiveness will assist monitoring mission success, yet it can be very difficult to determine when a mission is over (when the conditions of success have been satisfied). PSO and humanitarian operations are particularly susceptible to mission creep. For example, during disaster relief operations, in which measures of effectiveness are often arbitrary, mission creep may occur as the operation gradually

changes from relief to reconstruction to protection of refugees. To limit mission creep, commanders have a critical responsibility to advise superiors and political advisers when the original objective of the joint operation has been reached.

Section II- Post-conflict operations

- 6006 Post-conflict operations are those which follow on immediately from a successful operation and are designed to lead ultimately to the strategic end state desired by the political leaders. Article 5 post conflict operations will be conducted regarding the political situation of the respective NATO member states. A post-conflict operation under non-Article 5 CRO generally ends with the transfer of responsibility to the designated civilian organisations. The JFC must identify post-operation activities and their implications for the Component Commanders as early as possible to ensure that all activities (e.g. redeployment) are co-ordinated and performed efficiently and harmoniously. The JFC must also ensure that lessons learned from the operation are collected and that all costs of the joint multinational operation are properly audited and contracts terminated. For his operations at the tactical level, the commander must be aware of the intent of the higher levels in order to be able to prepare a post-conflict operation properly. A post-conflict operation ends with the transfer of responsibility to the designated civilian organisations. The activities of CJ9 (CIMIC) in this stage of any conflict is vital to the success of the operation.
- 6007 The post-conflict phase of any operation can be lengthy and the JFC will retain responsibility for preventing a resurgence of the crisis until the physical recovery of his forces from the JOA. This is a period of overlap where military operations have ceased and diplomatic, political and economic activities resume primacy.
- 6008 The end of an armed conflict cannot always be precisely identified. The transition from a state of war to a state of peace is sometimes very gradual. An armed conflict can be suspended or ended in the following ways:
- 6009 **Peace settlement.** The clearest way to end a state of war is to agree on a peace settlement.
- 6010 **A cease-fire** merely suspends the use of arms in a conflict temporarily, locally and above all at a particular level. It may be unilateral or agreed by more than one party, usually for a specific purpose, such as rescuing casualties or evacuating civilians.
- 6011 **General truce.** A modern method of ending a state of war is the general truce for an indefinite period, which in practice is subsequently seen as a definitive termination of the state of war. Although a general truce brings to an end combat action everywhere, it may, for example, only apply to the land forces. The termination of combat actions means that weapons are no longer used. If more is required, specific agreements must be made. The aim of a truce is usually to provide the opportunity for negotiations which can lead to peace. Although a truce does not, therefore, officially represent an end to a war, from the point of view of the development of international law, it is regarded as such.

6012 **Capitulation.** Under public international law, a capitulation is an agreement between the commanders of warring parties, whereby conditions are set under which troops will discontinue armed resistance. Every capitulation, even if it is unconditional, must contain stipulations regarding the point in time at which it enters into force and the area and units to which it applies. The capitulating units must allow the area previously controlled by themselves to be occupied by the opposing force.

Section III– Characteristics of a Transition from a Combat Operation to a Post-conflict Operation

6013 The execution of post-conflict operations bears similarities to a peace support operation. This section looks at the specific requirements that a JFC must bear in mind in the planning and the preparation for the transition from a combat operation to a post-conflict operation. The post-conflict operation is normally followed by a redeployment to the peace location, which forms part of the completion phase.

6014 A post-conflict operation consists of two distinct parts:

- a. A transition operation.
- b. A follow-up operation.

6015 **The transition operation** involves activities which, on the one hand, focus on maintaining the safety of friendly troops, preparing for and executing the re-deployment of troops and, lastly, safeguarding the transfer of responsibility to civil organisations and if necessary protecting these organisations. On the other hand, the activities are geared towards restoring public order and civil infrastructure, as well as minimising the impact of the recently terminated combat operation.

6016 **Follow-up operation.** The nature of the follow-up operation depends on the end state of the combat operation and the politically desired end state. This means that there are two options for a follow-up operation:

- a. Transferring tasks to the civil authorities, whereby the military resources may be given a peace supporting task.
- b. Operating as an occupying force.

6017 Once the fighting has ended or a truce has come into force, there must be a smooth transition from the combat operation to a post-conflict operation. During this transition, local and temporary fighting may take place in order to bring about the desired military end state.

6018 Even during the initial preparations for an operation, the JFC, together with the political leaders, must concentrate on the ultimate realisation of the strategic end state, the execution of post-conflict operations and the eventual transition to a permanent peace. Timely decisions regarding the units that are to be deployed and those that may be mobilised and their place in the combat operation as a whole are important factors for the operations at the end of the fighting. It is particularly

important to be able to anticipate the consequences of the combat operation, thus simplifying the transition from a combat operation to a post-conflict situation.

- 6019 For the execution of a post-conflict operation, the JFC should, if possible, deploy units other than those deployed during the combat operation. Personnel would, after all, be required to make an enormous mental adjustment to cooperate with what was originally the enemy. Where the intention was in the first instance to destroy his combat power and military potential, the emphasis is now on, for example, restoring public order, building or rebuilding his infrastructure and performing other tasks which are the direct result of the recently terminated combat operations. For all matters regarding public order, security and policing, JFC may employ dedicated components, or specialized units. Seen from the other side, own troops who were hostile in the eyes of the local population and warring factions will not immediately be regarded as impartial. The units deployed for the post-conflict operation must be instructed and trained in operating according to the principles more normally associated with PSO. They must also recognise the need to understand the circumstances of the local population. These units must be strictly impartial in all their actions.
- 6020 Post-conflict operations impose specific demands on commanders at all levels. Also at lower tactical levels, a commander can be asked to use the means available for combat operations to perform other tasks, such as providing humanitarian relief or maintaining public order. Commanders must co-operate with civil authorities, international organisations and non-governmental relief organisations in order to smooth the way to restoring peace.
- 6021 The following tasks can be either key tasks when the force is operating as an occupying force or supporting tasks when transfer of responsibilities from the military to the civil authorities is planned;
- a. security tasks,
 - b. restoring airports, ports and roads, restoring and maintaining public order and safety in co-operation with any civil authorities; this is to take place in the context of relevant agreements,
 - c. ensuring the basic necessities for the local population (shelter, water, food, power, etc.),
 - d. restoring airports, ports and roads,
 - e. assisting in the return and shelter of displaced civilians or civilian evacuees (transport and registration),
 - f. cooperating with civil authorities, international organisations and non-governmental relief organisations,
 - g. registration, medical care, administrative processing and supervision of the return of prisoners of war,

- h. providing emergency medical care and assisting in restoring medical facilities,
- i. marking or clearing dangerous war equipment, explosives and mines.
- j. ending local border disputes and issuing new maps,
- k. preparing the transfer of responsibilities to a unit or civil organisation to be designated later
- l. completing graves registration and preparing to transfer bodies to national authorities for removal to national sites.

6022 A new outbreak of hostilities can disrupt a post-conflict operation. The JFC must, therefore, take measures to allow his unit to recover from the combat operation as quickly as possible. He must also devote attention to the continued training of his unit. In addition, he must make contingency plans so that he is prepared for containing any new outbreak of fighting. The protection of his own unit is vitally important in this respect in order to prevent damage to either the unit or the post-conflict operation by individuals or remaining elements of enemy units with malicious intentions.

Section IV - Planning

6023 In the planning for a post-conflict operation, the JFC must take account of the following steps;

- a. The transition from a combat operation to a post-conflict operation,
- b. The transfer of tasks and authority to civil organisations,
- c. The possible need to conduct a follow-up operation.

6024 The planning of these steps forms an integral part of the operational planning before the start of the combat operation. The aim is to ensure a smooth transition to the desired political end state. Once the fighting has ended, the JFC must ensure that the suffering already undergone by non-combatants is eased as much as possible and that no additional damage is inflicted. The planning entails the synchronisation of all relevant activities and a smooth transfer of tasks and responsibilities to the civil organisations.

6025 **Key factors.** If the follow-up operation is peace supporting in nature, the JFC must apply a number of key factors that differ from those described previously in this publication in relation to combat operations. These are partly at odds with the specific basic principles for combat operations (mobility, offensive actions and surprise).

6026 **Freedom of movement.** A sufficient degree of freedom of movement is essential for post-conflict operations. A force which cannot move freely in an operational area in order to perform its tasks will fail to accomplish its mission. For example, routes must be kept free, even if they are not in use.

- 6027 **Transparency.** In a post-conflict operation, a force must act according to the announced policies that will govern the post-conflict period, so that a military operation is not misinterpreted by the parties involved in the conflict or by the local population. Military activities that contradict political statements may be exploited by resistance movements, and fuel the resistance among the rest of affected population. The potential for such contradiction of policy may reduced by effective use of public information and psychological operations specialists in all phases of operational planning and execution.
- 6028 **Necessary force.** International law on armed conflicts stipulates that force may only be used proportionally and according to military necessity. The success of a post-conflict operation requires only a minimum of (necessary) force. This requirement limits where, when and to what extent troops may use force. Achieving long-term success in post-conflict operations also depends on the controlled and proportional use of force. A tactical success as a consequence of the use of force may result in failure in the long term. The principle of 'minimum necessary force' may not be defined as no use of force.
- 6029 **Mutual respect** should not only exist between the military and civilian contingents of the multinational force, but also between them and the leaders and troops of the party or parties to the conflict. Prejudices, chauvinism and a lack of consideration for sensitivities may lead to the loss of mutual respect and can in the long term damage the prospects for the successful termination of the post-conflict operation. It is, therefore, necessary to take account of laws, beliefs, customs and culture, both of the various friendly civilian and military contingents and of the warring parties and the local population.
- 6030 **Operating as an occupying force.** The post-conflict operations described in this chapter may be wider in scope if the units operate in a situation in which they, on the basis of the law of armed conflict, can be designated as an occupying force in enemy territory. In this situation, they must be able to assume responsibility for the civil administration from the moment they occupy the area. In the preparations for the combat operation. This must be fully incorporated in operational planning, because the law of armed conflict imposes special obligation on occupying forces. Even during the conflict, while the combat operations are still in progress, it is possible for this occupation law to be brought into effect. An example would be to maintain law and order in a rear area in the interests of safety; another would be a situation in which a unit stays for a prolonged period in an assembly area. The fundamental international laws for operating as an occupying force are set out in the following documents.
- a. **Regulations attached to the 1907 Hague convention (iv) concerning the respect of laws and customs of land war.** These regulations stipulate that the occupier is obliged to take all measures within his power to restore and maintain public order and public life. These measures must, unless absolutely impossible, be taken with due regard to national laws. The measures may not interfere with life in the occupied area any further than is necessary for the occupation.

- b. **Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.** This convention protects those who, in the event of a conflict or occupation, find themselves in the power of a party involved in the conflict or of an occupying power of which they are not citizens. The convention includes the protection of the population against the effects of war, the status and treatment of all protected persons and provisions regarding the protection of inhabitants of occupied areas.
- c. **First Additional Protocol of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions.** This protocol is a further addition and extension of the protection of civilians. While not all countries are party to Protocol I, in multinational operations consideration must be made on the impact that the Protocol has on the contemplated operation. In general terms, this protocol indicates that the intended military advantage of an action must constantly be weighed against the resulting disadvantage to the civilian population. This obligation also applies to the occupying force.

6031 In the transition from a combat operation to a post-conflict operation, the JFC must take particular account of the following aspects;

- a. the safety of friendly troops, in particular immediately after hostilities have ended,
- b. the disarming and demobilisation of enemy forces,
- c. the provision of information to the local population.

A transition plan describes the way in which the units involved in the combat operation must prepare and execute this transition. This plan will be based on the predicated military end state and the expected situation regarding friendly and adversary forces at the end of combat operations.

6032 For the planning of any crisis response operation, the JFC must consider the aspects which apply to this type of operation. Special aspects which, in this situation too, require extra attention from the JFC and possibly additional measures are the protection of friendly units and the ability to continue to conduct combat operations in the event of new outbreaks of fighting.

6033 The result of the post-conflict operation planning must be an operation plan, geared towards the execution of a planned peace support operation. In this, the JFC indicates which troops he is committing for this operation and which he is keeping in reserve. In principle, units that are not needed return to the peacetime location. This plan sets out the necessary preparations, deployment, and the execution methods needed for the termination of the operation.

Section V – Post-conflict Functions

- 6034 **Area Command** After the completion of a combat operation, there is a transition from a combat organisation to an area organisation. When establishing the boundaries of these areas, the JFC must take as much account as possible of the civil structure that existed before the conflict. Ideally, the boundaries he selects are identical to municipal or other boundaries. The areas defined in this way may be considerably larger than the sectors that existed during the combat operation. If possible, the JFC will choose a location for his command post in the immediate vicinity of the most important political organisations. This simplifies communication and is extremely important in containing new outbreaks of fighting.
- 6035 **Intelligence.** Even in post-conflict operations, intelligence collection continues to be a constant activity. In order to carry out the post-conflict operation, the JFC must also have access to intelligence, which confirms the accuracy of assumptions that have been made. On the basis of this intelligence, he must be able to take measures or make timely adjustments to his planning. Information sources, which can and must be used to complete this picture, are the various civilian and non-governmental organisations. The JFC also uses all the means available to him, as far as the situation during the post-conflict operation allows. The exchange of military information with all those involved can improve and restore mutual trust. This can be seen as a special and positive gesture by the JFC towards all the civilian agencies involved. However, the trust and understanding developed in the JF's relationship with the civilian organizations and NGOs must not be violated. If the civilian organizations and NGOs perceive that they have been betrayed or used against their will, they are likely to cut off all information flowing to the JF. Information must be distributed equally among the parties involved.
- 6036 **Force protection.** In the execution of the post-conflict operation, there will be great emphasis on the protection and security of friendly units when adversary units have yet to be disarmed, demobilised or even completely disbanded. The JFC will need to apply risk management in balancing the profiles of his force activities against the requirement to achieve his post conflict objectives.

Section VI - Redeployment

- 6037 The redeployment of forces after termination of an operation is a highly complex matter, politically, militarily, economically and environmentally. It is not simply a case of reversing the deployment plan, but rather a distinct operation in its own right. Redeployment may be directed when operations have terminated or movement of the assigned force is directed by higher authority. JFCs should give the same considerations to redeployment as for deployment in regard to phasing of command and control and the desired order of departure.
- 6038 Redeployment planning is directed towards the ordered and efficient movement of forces (units or individuals) and equipment out of the AOO. As a function of the overall redeployment, recovery planning will be an integral part of the JFC's plans. This section discusses recovery planning, including tasks, responsibilities and co-ordination of redeployment planning.

Redeployment Planning Factors and Considerations

6039 One of the most important factors in planning the redeployment is timing. It will be extremely difficult to formulate a redeployment plan before the end state has either been achieved or subsequent operations have been determined. Equally, it will reflect badly upon the conduct of the operation if the redeployment is seen to be a rushed, poorly planned affair. Therefore, it is vital that it is treated in the same thorough manner as the deployment, and adequate time is given to its planning and preparation.

6040 Every operation has its own unique planning factors; however, the following factors apply to all operations and will need to be considered at the redeployment planning stage:

- a. Clear and detailed operational and logistic end-states are required as they will determine the scale of the redeployment.
- b. The establishment of a planning team.
- c. Residual commitments, for example specialist logistic personnel, may remain in the JOA in an advisory capacity, e.g. to help reconstruction.
- d. 'Earliest move' and 'All out by' timings should be clarified at the earliest stage to identify lead times and enable strategic lift planning to proceed.
- e. The establishment of specialist teams to staff the hand-over of host nation assets and also to co-ordinate termination of contracts. It must be remembered that if Joint Forces have relied upon HNS, then a duty of care to the hosts exists. Every effort must be taken to ensure that environmental, political or financial difficulties, do not degrade the relationship with the host nation.
- f. Additional enabling force elements and specialists will probably be required to deploy to the JOA to facilitate the redeployment.
- g. Identifying the strategic movement assets to be made available by the TCNs.

6041 Irrespective of how well the campaign was conducted, a poor recovery, under full scrutiny of the press media, may well be the lasting image of the campaign. There may be considerable sensitivity about when and how planning is conducted, and its effects on own forces, local civilian and military morale. Also HNS and multinational partners should be taken into account. It is, therefore, essential that the command and control of the recovery is planned in advance and given the utmost consideration. The SC will retain OPCOM of all assigned forces (except with nations non delegating OPCOM to SC due to specific restricted agreements) until TOA to the different contributing nations. TOA can be at the departure of forces from the JOA or their arrival at the PODs, dependent on the operation and the arrangements with the nations. The JFC will retain OPCON of all assigned forces deployed in the JOA, throughout the operation.

Section VII - Lessons Learned

- 6042 The effectiveness of Joint Multinational Forces and their ability to maximise synergy and leverage on joint operations is dependent on their fighting power. 'Quality control' of the way military forces operate is difficult to achieve, but one of the most reliable measures must be their performance on operations. The identification of lessons for a multinational force can be difficult when some lessons will be a national responsibility and others will be for the Alliance to address. Commanders must recognise from the outset that provision must be made for monitoring and recording force performance in all its aspects for subsequent analysis and critical review. The responsibility for lessons learned and subsequent follow-up action lies with the SC as the JFC will cease to have authority when the operation is concluded.
- 6043 The purpose of a Lessons Learned procedure is to learn efficiently from experience and to provide validated justifications for amending the existing way of doing things, in order to improve performance, both during the course of an operation and for subsequent operations. This requires lessons to be meaningful and for them to be brought to the attention of the appropriate authority able and responsible for dealing with them. It also requires the chain of command to have a clear understanding of how to prioritise lessons and how to staff them.
- 6044 Assigned commanders at all levels from sub-unit upwards are required to produce post operational reports. The JFC will be required to produce a Lessons Learned report to the SC, which in many cases will also serve as his post operational report. A Lessons Learned Annex to the SC's Mission Directive can give the JFC the necessary direction, timings and guidance. The SC can also debrief key commanders and staff officers and requires all operational and staff visitors to the JOA to provide him with visit reports.
- 6045 The JFC is responsible for ensuring his force takes into account the requirement to capture Lessons Learned during all stages of the operation and that an appropriate mechanism has been built in from the beginning. All units must be given clear direction on the capture, forwarding and storage of relevant data. This might usefully be addressed in conjunction with the need for commanders to maintain war diaries.

Section VIII– Accounting

- 6046 Accounting will attract close scrutiny from the Audit Authorities. As contracts with the host nation will involve national contingents as well as the JFHQ, it is essential that the correct accounting procedures are followed and dealt with by Allied and national specialists, as appropriate. This will also ensure that the termination of contractual support and settlement of claims are processed correctly and as expeditiously as possible.
- 6047 National Contingencies should close out all financial obligations or make arrangements to close them as expeditiously as possible.

REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS

1. The following bibliography shows the Allied Publications (APs) and other principal documents relevant to the AJP-3 and is provided to guide the reader to a source of detail concerning the content of the AJP-3.
2. The list includes, as appropriate, only ratified and promulgated publications. It should be noted that APs are identified by the number in the short title of the original edition (e.g. ATP-8); editions which have suffix letter (e.g. ATP-8(A)) are not identified as such except where the publication's title has been changed.

Military Committee Documents

MC 55	- Readiness and Sustainability Factors
MC 64	- Electronic Warfare in NATO
MC 67	- NATO Precautionary System
MC 133	- NATO's Operational Planning System
MC 313	- Guidelines for MNC-Spain Coordination Agreements
MC 317	- NATO Force Structures for the Mid-1990s and Beyond
MC 319	- NATO Principles and Policy for Logistics
MC 324	- The NATO Military Command Structure
MC 326	- Medical Support, Precepts and Guidance for NATO
MC 327	- Military Concept for NATO Peace Support Operations
MC 334	- NATO Principles and Policies for Host Nation Support Planning
MC 336	- The Movement and Transportation Concept for NATO
MC 343	- NATO Military Assistance to International Disaster Relief Operations
MC 348	- NATO Command and Control Warfare Policy
MC 362	- NATO Rules of Engagement
MC 389	- MC Directive for the Military Implementation of the Alliance's CJTF Concept
MC 400	- MC Directive for Military Implementation of Alliance Strategy
MC 402	- NATO Psychological Operations Policy
MC 411	- NATO Civil-Military Co-operation Policy
MC 422	- NATO Information Operations Policy

Allied Publications

AJP-01	- Allied Joint Doctrine
AJP-4	- Allied Joint Logistics
ATP-1	- Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures
ATP-8	- Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
ATP-27	- Air Interdiction and Close Air Support
ATP-33	- Allied Joint Air and Space Operations
ATP-34	- Tactical Air Support for Maritime Operations
ATP-35	- Land Force Tactical Doctrine
ATP-40	- Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis and War
ATP-41	- Airmobile Operations
ATP-42	- Counter Air Operations
ATP-53	- NATO Air Transport Policies and Procedures

- AlntP-1 - Intelligence Doctrine
- AlntP-2 - Security Doctrine
- AlntP-3 - Military Intelligence Data Management and Exchange Concept

- ALP-9 - Land Forces Logistic Doctrine
- ALP-11 - Multinational Maritime Force (MNMF) Logistics
- ALP-12 - Guidance for the Planning and Preparation of Host Nation Support Agreements/Arrangements

Bi-SC documents

Directive 80/80 - Joint Command and Control within the NATO Military Command Structure

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

The Glossary contains abbreviations and acronyms commonly used in joint and combined operations. It is not exhaustive, a comprehensive list of abbreviations is contained in AAP-15.

AA	Assembly Area
AAP	Allied Administrative Publication
AAW	Anti-Air Warfare
ACC	Air Component Command
ACA	Airspace Control Authority
ACE	Allied Command Europe
ACLANT	Allied Command Atlantic
ACO	Airspace Control Order
AD	Air Defence
ADC	Air Defence Commander
ADL	Allied Disposition List
ADP	Air Defence Plan
AEW	Airborne Early Warning
AFL	Allied Force List
All	Area of Intelligence Interest
AlntP	Allied Intelligence Publication
AIR	Area of Intelligence Responsibility
AJODWG	Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group
AJP	Allied Joint Publication
ALP	Allied Logistic Publication
AMCC	Allied Movement Co-ordination Centre
AOA	Amphibious Objective Area
AOI	Area of Interest
AOII	Area of Intelligence Interest
AOIR	Area of Intelligence Responsibility
AOO	Area of Operations
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AP	Allied Publication
APOD	Air Port of Debarkation
ATC	Air Traffic Control
ATF	Amphibious Task Force
ATO	Air Tasking Order
ATP	Allied Tactical Publication
ATUFT	Aircraft Taken up from Trade
BDA	Battle Damage Assessment
BPA	Battlefield Psychological Activities
CA	Combat Assessment
CC	Component Command
CCAIR	Component Command Air
CCIR	Commanders Critical Information Requirement

CCIRM	Collection, Co-ordination and Intelligence Requirements Management
CCI	Command, Control Information Systems
CNAV	Component Command Naval
IMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation
CIS	Communications and Information Systems
CIWS	Close-In Weapon System
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CoA	Course of Action
CoG	Centre of Gravity
COMJC	Commander Joint Command
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
COP	Contingency Operation Plan
CPIO	Chief Public Information Officer
CRD	Commanders Required Date
CRO	Crisis Response Operation
C2	Command and Control
C2IS	Command and Control Information Systems
C2W	Command and Control Warfare
C3	Command, Control and Communications
C3I	Command, Control, Communications and Information
C3S	Command and Control Communications System
DCA	Defensive Counter-Air (also referred to as Air Defence (AD))
DE	Directed Energy
DIPCLEAR	Diplomatic Clearance
DP	Decisive Point
ECM	Electronic Countermeasures
EM	Electromagnetic
EPM	Electronic Protective Measures
ESM	Electronic Support Measures
EW	Electronic Warfare
FFA	Free Fire Area
FMB	Forward Mounting Base
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FSCL	Fire Support Co-ordination Line
FSCM	Fire Support Co-ordination Measures
GBAD	Ground Based Air Defence
GOP	Bi-SC Guidelines for Operational Planning
HA	Holding Area
HNS	Host Nation Support
HOC	Head of Contracts
HQ	Headquarters
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organisation

ID	Identification
INFO OPS	Information Operations
IO	International Organisation
IPE	Individual Protection Equipment
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
ISTAR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
I&W	Indication and Warning
JF	Joint Force
JFACC	Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JFLCC	Joint Force Land Component Commander
JFMCC	Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
JFSOCC	Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander
JIPTL	Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List
JITL	Joint Integrated Target List
JOA	Joint Operations Area
JRA	Joint Rear Area
JSRC	Joint Sub-Regional Command
JTCB	Joint Targeting Co-ordination Board
JTL	Joint Target List
LCC	Land Component Commander
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
LOC	Lines of Communications
MAAP	Master Air Attack Plan
MANPADS	Man-Portable Air Defence System
MC	Military Committee
MCC	Maritime Component Commander
MJLC	Multinational Joint Logistic Centre
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
M&T	Movement and Transportation
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBC	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
NBCD	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Damage (Control)
NCC	National Contingent Command
NCS	Naval Control of Shipping
NEO	Non-combatant Evacuation Operation
NFA	No Fire Area
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIC	National Intelligence Cell
NSE	National Support Element
NSTL	No-Strike List
NTM	Notice to Move

OA	Operational Analysis
OPCOM	Operational Command
OPCON	Operational Control (also used to denote the NSTN (MHS))
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPORD	Operation Order
OPP	Operational Planning Process
OPSEC	Operations Security
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PANDA	Personnel and Administration
PCA	Psychological Consolidation Activities
PDMS	Point Defence Missile System
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PI	Public Information
PIR	Priority Intelligence Requirement
POD	Point of Debarkation
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PSPA	Peace Support Psychological Activities
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
RAP	Recognised Air Picture
RC	Regional Command
RFA	Restricted Fire Area
RHQ	Regional Headquarters
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RPOD	Rail Point of Debarkation
SA	Situational awareness
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SC	Strategic Command
SDP	Standing Defence Plan
SHORAD	Short Range Air Defence
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SLOC	Sea Lines Of Communications
SOCC	Special Operations Component Commander
SOF	Special Operations Force
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SPA	Strategic Psychological Activities
SPOD	Sea Port of Disembarkation
STRIKFLTANT	Striking Fleet Atlantic
STUFT	Ships Taken up from Trade
SUBACLANT	Submarine Allied Command Atlantic
SUPLAN	Supporting Plan
TACO	Theatre Allied Contracting Office
TACOM	Tactical Command

TACON	Tactical Control
TCN	Troop Contributing Nation
TID	Target Identification
TLAM	Theatre Land Attack Missile
TMD	Theatre Missile defence
TOA	Transfer of Authority
TOR	Terms of Reference
TTP	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN	United Nations
VSHORAD	Very Short-Range Air Defence
WEA	Weapons Effect Analysis
WEU	Western European Union

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

The Glossary contains terms and their definitions used within AJP-3.

administrative control

Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organisations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organisations. (AAP-6)

air component commander

A commander, designated by the JFC or higher authority, who would be responsible for making recommendations to the JFC on the employment of air forces and assets, planning and co-ordinating air operations and accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned to him. The air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the designating commander. *Note:* Air component command is used as a generic term covering the specific terms component command air and joint force air component command. (AJP-3)

air defence

All measures designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action. (AAP-6)

allied joint publication

A publication of joint interest containing doctrine applicable to NATO-led multinational forces, conducting operations involving more than one Service. It is used by Commanders of Allied joint forces, their subordinate commanders and staffs. (AJODWG 98)

allied joint operation

An operation carried out by forces of two or more NATO nations, in which elements of more than one service participate. (AAP-6)

alliance

The result of formal agreement (e.g. a treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which further the common interests of its members. When the word 'alliance' is written with a capital 'A' ('Alliance'), it refers specifically to NATO. (AJODWP 97) *See also combined; multinational.*

Allocation

The translation of the apportionment into total numbers of sorties by aircraft type available for each operation or mission. (AAP-6)

Allotment

The temporary change of assignment of tactical air forces between subordinate commands. The authority to allot is vested in the commander having operational command. (AAP-6)

amphibious objective area

A geographical area, delineated in the initiating directive, for purposes of command and control, within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by the amphibious task force. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious task force's mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air and land operations. (AAP-6)

area of intelligence interest

That area concerning which a commander requires intelligence on those factors and developments likely to affect the outcome of his current or future operations. (AJODWP 96) *See also area of intelligence responsibility.*

area of intelligence responsibility

An area allocated to a commander, in which he is responsible for the provision of intelligence, within the means at his disposal. (AAP-6) *See also area of intelligence interest.*

area of interest

That area of concern to the commander relative to the objectives of current or planned operations, including his areas of influence, operations and/or responsibility, and areas adjacent thereto. (AAP-6) *See also area of responsibility.*

Area of operations

That portion of an operational area necessary for military operations and the administration of such operations. (AJODWG 2000)

area of responsibility

The geographical area assigned to each NATO Strategic Command and to each regional command of Strategic Command Europe. (AAP-6) *See also area of interest.*

assign

1. To place units or personnel in an organisation where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organisation controls administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater proportion of the functions, unit or personnel.
2. To detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. (AAP-6) *See also attach.*

attach

1. To place units or personnel in an organisation where such placement is relatively temporary. Subject to limitations imposed in the attachment order, the commander of the formation, unit, or organisation receiving the attachment will exercise the same degree of command and control thereover as he does over the units and persons organic to his command. However, the responsibility for transfer and promotion of personnel will normally be retained by the parent formation, unit, or organisation.
- b. To detail individuals to specific functions where such functions are secondary or relatively temporary, i.e., attach for quarters and rations, attach for flying duty. (AAP-6) *See also assign.*

augmentation

augmentation is the method by which a combined joint task force headquarters and its support is expanded to form a complete, mission-tailored and operational headquarters. This will be accomplished in the form of a modular approach and/or by individuals. (MC 389/1)

augmentation module

An augmentation module is an additional staff element provided by NATO or other multi-national headquarters or By nations, or formed (identified and trained/exercised together) from individual staff members from these sources. Individual augmentees are single staff officers from these sources. (MC 389/1)

battle damage assessment

In the course of an operation, the timely and accurate estimate of the damage resulting from the application of own military force. (AJODWG 98)

battlefield psychological activities

Planned psychological activities conducted as an integral part of combat operations and designed to bring psychological pressure to bear on enemy forces and civilians under enemy control in the battle area, to assist in the achievement of the tactical objectives. (AAP-6)

battlespace

The environment, factors and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space environments, the included enemy and friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum and the information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest. (AJP-3)

campaign

A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces. (AAP-6)

centre of gravity

Characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (AAP-6)

civil-military co-operation

The resources and arrangements which support the relationship between commanders and the national authorities, civil and military, and civil populations in an area where military forces are or plan to be employed. Such arrangements include co-operation with non-governmental or international agencies, organisations and authorities. (AAP-6)

combatant Command

A command which provides co-ordination and/or command and control functions in specific operational warfare areas of strategic relevance. (LTS)

combined / multinational

Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations, in which elements of more than one nation participate. (AAP-6)

combined joint task force

multinational (combined) and multi-service (joint) task force, task organised and formed for the full range of the Alliance's military missions, which require multinational and multi-service command and control by a combined joint task force headquarters. (AJODWG 2000) *See also combined; joint; multinational.*

combined joint task force headquarters

A combined joint task force headquarters is a non-permanent headquarters, which needs to be activated to accomplish a mission. A combined joint task force headquarters comprises a nucleus staff assigned from a combined joint task force parent headquarters augmented as appropriate for the mission by augmentation staff and support modules. (MC 389/1)

combined joint task force headquarters nucleus

The combined joint task force headquarters nucleus is a permanent minimum framework staff that functions as a core for a combined joint task force headquarters and which is formed from pre-designated personnel located at the combined joint task force parent headquarters. (MC 389/1)

combined joint task force parent headquarters

A combined joint task force parent headquarters is a pre-designated international, multi-service NATO headquarters, which has been tasked to prepare the standing-up of a combined joint task force headquarters and includes a nominated combined joint task force headquarters nucleus. (MC 389/1)

combined operation

Operation in which elements of more than one nation participate. (AJP-3)

command

1. The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, co-ordination, and control of military forces.
2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action.
3. A unit, or units, an organisation, or an area under the command of one individual.
4. To dominate by a field of weapon fire or by observation from a superior position.
5. To exercise a command.

(AAP-6) *See also full command; operational command; tactical command.*

command and control warfare

The integrated use of all military capabilities including operations security, deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare and physical destruction, supported by all-source intelligence and communication and information systems, to deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy an adversary's command and control capabilities while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against similar actions. (AAP-6)

command and control information system

An integrated system comprised of doctrine, procedures, organisational structure, personnel, equipment, facilities and communications which provides authorities at all levels with timely and adequate data to plan, direct and control their activities. (AAP-6) *See also communications and information system.*

Commander's critical information requirements

A comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decision-making process that affect successful mission accomplishment. (AJP-3)

command of the sea

The freedom to use the sea and to deny its use to an adversary in the sub-surface, surface and above water environments. (AAP-6)

commonality

The state achieved when the same doctrine, procedures or equipment are used. (AAP-6)

communications and information system

Assembly of equipment, methods and procedures, and if necessary personnel, organised so as to accomplish specific information conveyance and processing functions. (AAP-6) *Also referred to as CIS; see also command and control information system.*

compatibility

The suitability of products, processes or services for use together under specific conditions to fulfil relevant requirements without causing unacceptable interactions. (AAP-6)

Component Command

The command HQ containing specific service capabilities (air, naval or land) for the planning and conduct of air, naval or land operations. Component Commands have region-wide responsibilities. In principle, this means that there would be no Component Commands with responsibilities limited to sub-regional areas. (LTS)

Note: Component command is used as a generic term covering all kind of specific component commands.

concept of operations

A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to accomplish his mission. (AAP-6)

Conduct of operations

The art of employing forces and or co-ordinating their actions in order to achieve specific objectives in a given geographical area. The conduct of an operation always takes place after a planning phase. (AJODWG2000)

conflict prevention

Activities aimed at conflict prevention are normally conducted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. They range from diplomatic initiatives to preventive deployments of forces intended to [prevent disputes from escalating to armed conflicts or from spreading. Conflict prevention can also include fact finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections and monitoring. Preventive deployments within the framework of conflict prevention is the deployment of operational forces possessing sufficient deterrence capabilities to prevent an outbreak of hostilities. (MC 327/1) *See also humanitarian operations, peace building, peace enforcement, peace keeping, peace making and peace support operations*

control

That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated. (AAP-6) *See also administrative control; operational control; tactical control.*

co-ordinating authority

The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for co-ordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more services or two or more forces of the same service. He has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement he shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority. (AAP-6)

counter air operation

An air operation directed against the enemy's air offensive and defensive capability in order to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority. (AAP-6)

counter-intelligence

Those activities which are concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to security posed by hostile intelligence services or organisations or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism. . (AAP-6)

counter-surveillance

All measures, active or passive, taken to counteract hostile surveillance. (AAP-6)

course of action

In the estimate process, an option that would accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of, a mission or a task. (AJODWG 98)

decisive point

A point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or the information environment. (AAP-6)

doctrine

Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. (AAP-6)

electromagnetic spectrum

The entire and orderly distribution of electromagnetic waves according to their frequency or wavelength. The electromagnetic spectrum includes radio waves, microwaves, heat radiation, visible light, ultraviolet radiation, x-rays, electromagnetic cosmic rays and gamma rays. (MC 64/8).

electronic countermeasures

That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum through the use of electromagnetic energy. There are three sub-divisions of electronic countermeasures: electronic jamming, electronic deception and electronic neutralisation. (AAP-6)

electronic deception

In electronic countermeasures, the deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alteration, absorption or reflection of electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to confuse, distract or seduce an enemy or his electronic systems. (AAP-6)

electronic protective measures

That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to ensure effective friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite the enemy's use of electromagnetic energy. There are two subdivisions of electronic protective measures: active electronic protective measures and passive electronic protective measures. (AAP-6)

active electronic protective measures

Detectable measures, such as altering transmitter parameters as necessary, to ensure effective friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. (AAP-6)

passive electronic protective measures

Undetectable measures, such as those in operating procedures and technical features of equipment, to ensure effective friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. (AAP-6)

electronic warfare

Military action to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum encompassing: the search for, interception and identification of electromagnetic emissions, the employment of electromagnetic energy, including directed energy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum and actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces. (AAP-6)

electronic warfare support measures

That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to search for, intercept and identify electromagnetic emissions and to locate their sources for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. It provides a source of information required for immediate decisions involving electronic countermeasures, electronic protective measures and other tactical actions. (AAP-6)

emission control

Selective control of emitted electromagnetic or acoustic energy. The aim may be twofold:

- a. to minimise the enemy's detection of emissions and exploitation of the information so gained.
 - b. to reduce electromagnetic interference thereby improving friendly sensor performance.
- (AAP-6)

end state

The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved. (AAP-6)

fires

The effects of lethal and non-lethal weapons. (AJODWG 98)

fire support co-ordination line

Within an assigned area of operations, a line established by a land or amphibious force commander to denote co-ordination requirements for fires by other force elements which may affect the commander's current and planned operations. The fire support co-ordination line applies to fires of air, ground or sea weapons using any type of ammunition against surface or ground targets. The establishment of the fire support co-ordination line must be co-ordinated with the appropriate commanders and supporting elements. Attacks against surface or ground targets short of the fire support co-ordination line must be conducted under the positive control or procedural clearance of the associated land or amphibious force commander. Unless in exceptional circumstances, commanders of forces attacking targets beyond the fire support co-ordination line must co-ordinate with all affected commanders in order to avoid fratricide and to harmonise joint objectives.

Note: in the context of this definition the term "surface targets" applies to those in littoral or inland waters within the designated area of operations. (AAP-6)

force protection

All measures taken to conserve the fighting potential of the deployed force by countering threats to its elements from adversary, natural and human hazards, and fratricide. Force protection measures can be active and passive and are based on a continual threat assessment process. (AJP-3)

full command

The military authority and responsibility of a commander to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. Note: the term "command", as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. No NATO or coalition commander has full command over the forces assigned to him since, in assigning forces to NATO, nations will delegate only operational command or operational control. (AAP-6) *See also command; functional command; operational command; tactical command.*

functional command

A command organisation based on military functions rather than geographic areas. (AAP-6) *See also command.*

health service support

All services provided directly or indirectly to contribute to the health and well-being of patients or a population. (AAP-6)

host nation support

Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host nation to NATO and/or other forces and NATO organisations which are located on, operating on/from, or in transit through the host nation's territory. (AAP-6)

humanitarian operations

Operations conducted to alleviate human suffering. Humanitarian operations may precede or accompany humanitarian activities provided by specialised civilian organisations. (MC 327/1) *See also conflict prevention, peace building, peace enforcement, peace keeping, peace making and peace support operations*

interchangeability

The ability of one product, process or service to be used in place of another to fulfil the same requirements. (AAP-6)

interoperability

The ability of Alliance forces and, when appropriate, forces of Partner and other nations to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks. (AAP-6)

joint

Adjective used to describe activities, operations, organisations in which elements of at least two services participate. *Also called "multiservice".* (AAP-6) *See also combined.*

joint fires

Fires produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in co-ordinated action toward a common objective. (AJP-3)

Joint force

Temporary grouping of units of two or more services under a single commander, organised for the purpose of engaging in a military operation. Note: Joint force is used as a general term covering Allied joint force, regional joint force, sub-regional joint force, multinational joint force, combined joint task force, WEU-led joint force, etc. (AJP-3)

joint force commander

A general term applied to a commander authorised to exercise command authority or operational control over a joint force. (AJODWG 98). Note: Joint force commander is used as a generic term covering all possible commanders of a joint force be it a strategic commander, regional commander, joint sub-regional commander or combined joint task group commander. (AJP-3)

joint operation

An operations in which elements of more than one service participate. (AAP-6)

joint operations area

A temporary area defined by a NATO strategic or regional commander, in which a designated joint commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level of war. Note: it is defined in co-ordination with nations and approved by the North Atlantic Council or the Military Committee as appropriate, in accordance with NATO's Operational Planning Architecture. A joint operations area and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of the mission and geographical area, are contingency or mission-specific and may overlap areas of responsibility. (AAP-6)

key nucleus staff

Within the nucleus staff, key staff personnel for each functional staff element (J1 through J9) are identified as "key nucleus staff" having the role to ensure cohesion of the nucleus and enhance the nucleus' ability to form rapidly a combined joint task force headquarters and undertake assigned missions. (MC 389/1)

land component commander

A commander, designated by the JFC or higher authority, who would be responsible for making recommendations to the JFC on the employment of land forces and assets, planning and co-ordinating land operations and accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned to

him. The land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the designating commander. Note: Land component command is used as a generic term covering the specific terms component command air and joint force air component command. (AJP-3)

line of operations

In campaign planning, a line linking decisive points in time and space on the path to the centre of gravity. (AJODWG2000)

maritime component commander

A commander, designated by the JFC or higher authority, who would be responsible for making recommendations to the JFC on the employment of maritime forces and assets, planning and co-ordinating maritime operations and accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned to him. The maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the designating commander. Note: Maritime component command is used as a generic term covering the specific terms component command air and joint force air component command. (AJP-3)

mission

1. A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose.
2. One or more aircraft ordered to accomplish one particular task. (AAP-6)

module

A module consists of pre-identified and pre-trained personnel in the form of cohesive units of variable size, for a support module this is including their equipment. (MC 389/1)

multinational

(See *combined*)

national command

A command that is organised by, and functions under the authority of, a specific nation. It may or may not be placed under a NATO commander. (AAP-6) *See also command.*

national commander

A national commander, territorial or functional, who is normally not in the Allied chain of command. (AAP-6)

national component/contingent

Any national forces of one or more services under the command of a single national commander, assigned to any NATO commander. (AAP-6)

NATO assigned forces

Forces in being which nations agree to place under the operational command or operational control of a NATO commander at the declaration of a specific stage, state or measure in the NATO Precautionary System or as prescribed in special agreements. (AAP-6)

NATO commander

A military commander in the NATO chain of command. *Also called "Allied commander".* (AAP-6)

NATO earmarked forces

Forces which nations agree to place under the operational command or operational control of a NATO commander at some future time. (AAP-6)

NATO joint sub-regional commander

A joint commander at the third level of the NATO military command structure. (AAP-6)

NATO regional commander

A commander at the second level of the NATO military command structure, responsible for the planning and execution of all Alliance military activities/matters, including:

- a. In Strategic Command Europe, delegated responsibilities in his designated region and beyond as directed.
- b. In Strategic Command Atlantic, delegated responsibilities within the Strategic Command Atlantic area of responsibility and beyond as directed. (AAP-6)

NATO strategic commander

A commander at the first and highest level of command in the NATO military structure, responsible for the overall functions of command, planning, direction and conduct of all Alliance military matters and/or activities within his area of responsibility and beyond as directed. He is also responsible for developing and maintaining infrastructure, in accordance with his terms of reference. There are two strategic commanders, namely the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. (AAP-6)

non-combatant evacuation operation

An operation conducted to relocate designated non-combatants threatened in a foreign country to a place of safety.
(AJODWG2000)

objective

An aim to be achieved. (AJODWG 98)

operation

A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (AAP-6)

operation order

A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the co-ordinated execution of an operation. (AAP-6)

operation plan

A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation 'plan' is usually used instead of 'order' in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order. (AAP-6)

operational art

The skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organisation, integration and conduct of theatre strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. (AJODWP 96)

operational command

The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. May also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander. (AAP-6)

operational control

The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include

authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control. (AAP-6)

operational level of war

The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. (AAP-6)

operations security

The process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using passive or active means, to deny the enemy knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces. (AAP-6)

peace building

Actions which support political, economic social and military measures and structures aiming to strengthen and solidify political settlements in order to redress the causes of a conflict. This includes mechanisms to identify and support structures which tend to consolidate peace, advance a sense of confidence and well-being and support economic reconstruction. (MC 327/1) *See also conflict prevention, humanitarian operations, peace enforcement, peace keeping, peace making and peace support operations*

peace enforcement

Operations undertaken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. They are coercive in nature and are conducted when the consent of all Parties to a conflict has not been achieved or might be uncertain. They are designed to maintain or re-establish peace or enforce the terms specified in the mandate. (MC 327/1) *See also conflict prevention, humanitarian operations, peace building, peace keeping, peace making and peace support operations*

peacekeeping

Operations generally undertaken under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and conducted with the consent of all Parties to a conflict to monitor and facilitate implementation of a peace agreement. (MC 327/1) *See also conflict prevention, humanitarian operations, peace building, peace enforcement, peace making and peace support operations.*

peace making

Diplomatic activities conducted after the commencement of a conflict aimed at establishing a cease-fire or a rapid peaceful settlement. They can include the provision of good offices, mediation, conciliation and such actions as diplomatic pressure, isolation or sanctions. (MC 327/1) *See also conflict prevention, humanitarian operations, peace building, peace enforcement, peace keeping and peace support operations.*

peace support operations

Multi-functional operations conducted impartially in support of a UN/OSCE mandate involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies and are designed to achieve a long term political settlement or other conditions specified in the mandate. They include peacekeeping and peace enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian operations. (MC 327/1) *See also conflict prevention, humanitarian operations, peace building, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peace making.*

peace support psychological activities

Planned psychological activities conducted as an integral part of peace support operations, designed to create a supportive atmosphere and a willingness to co-operate among the parties in conflict and civilian population in the area of operations, to protect the peace support force and to assist in the achievement of mission objectives. (AAP-6)

physical security

That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorised access to equipment, installations, material and documents, and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. (AAP-6) *See also protective security.*

priority intelligence requirements

Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decision making. (AAP-6)

protective security

The organised system of defensive measures instituted and maintained at all levels of command with the aim of achieving and maintaining security. (AAP-6) *See also physical security.*

psychological operation

Planned psychological activities designed to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. (AAP-6)

psychological consolidation activities

Planned psychological activities in crisis and war directed at the civilian population located in areas under friendly control in order to achieve a desired behaviour which supports the military objectives and the operational freedom of the supported commanders. (AAP-6)

readiness

The time within which a unit can be made ready to perform unit-type tasks. This time is amplified, or measured, by indicators of its current personnel, materiel and training state. The time does not include transit time. (AJODWP 97).

rear area

For any particular command, the area extending forward from its rear boundary to the rear of the area of responsibility of the next lower level of command. This area is provided primarily for the performance of combat service support functions. (AAP-6)

sea control

The condition that exists when one has freedom of action within an area of the sea for one's own purposes for a period of time in the sub-surface, surface and above water environments. (AAP-6)

sea denial

Preventing an adversary from controlling a maritime area without being able to control that area oneself. *See also command of the sea; sea control* (AAP-6)

Situational awareness

The cognisance of the available information about an operational situation in order to achieve superiority in the decision making capability and its synthesis into possible courses of action. (AJP-3)

special operations component commander

A commander, designated by the JFC or higher authority, who would be responsible for making recommendations to the JFC on the employment of special operations forces and assets, planning and co-ordinating special operations and accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned to him. The special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the designating commander. Note: Special operations component command is used as a generic term covering the specific term joint force special operations component command.

standardisation

The development and implementation of concepts, doctrines, procedures and designs to achieve and maintain the required levels of compatibility, interchangeability or commonality in the operational, procedural, materiel, technical and administrative fields to attain interoperability.. See also *commonality; compatibility; interchangeability; interoperability*. (AAP-6)

strategic level of war

The level of war at which a nation or group of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources to achieve them. (AAP-6)

strategic psychological activities

Planned psychological activities in peace, crisis and war which pursue objectives to gain the support and co-operation of friendly and neutral countries and to reduce the will and the capacity of hostile or potentially hostile countries to wage war. See also *psychological operations*. (AAP-6)

support

The action of a force, or portion thereof, which aids, protects, complements, or sustains any other force. (AAP-6)

supported commander

A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher NATO military authority and who receives forces or other support from one or more supporting commanders. (AAP-6) See also *supporting commander*.

supporting commander

A commander who provides a supported commander with forces or other support and/or who develops a supporting plan. (AAP-6) See also *supported commander*

supporting plan

An operation plan prepared by a supporting or subordinate commander to satisfy the requirements of the supported commander. (AJODWG2000)

sustainability

The ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives. (AAP-6)

tactical command

The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. (AAP-6)

tactical control

The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (AAP-6)

tactical level of war

The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical formations and units. (AAP-6)

targeting

The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. (AAP-6)

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Original	Abbreviations-1 to -5 (Reverse blank)
Original	Glossary-1 to -13 (Reverse blank)
Original	LEP-1 (Reverse blank)

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

AJP-3
LEP

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

LEP-2

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGINAL